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Glossary of Terms 
 
 
Basic service: For those consumers who do not receive their electric supply from a competitive 
supplier, their electric company purchases their electricity on their behalf, providing them supply 
services that are known as “basic service.” 
 
Electric company (this is also referred to as an “electric distribution company” or “EDC”): In 
Massachusetts the electric companies are Western Massachusetts Electric Company d/b/a 
Eversource Energy (“WMECo”); NSTAR Electric Company d/b/a Eversource Energy 
(“NSTAR”); Massachusetts Electric Company d/b/a National Grid (“MECo”); Nantucket 
Electric Company d/b/a National Grid (“Nantucket”); and Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light 
Company d/b/a Unitil (“Fitchburg”). See Appendix 1A for a map of the Massachusetts electric 
companies’ non-overlapping service territories.   
  
Competitive supply market: In this report, we use this term to describe the individual 
residential electric supply market, the market in which residential customers may choose to 
purchase electric service from a company other than their electric company. 
 
kWh: A kilowatt hour describes energy used over a period of time, specifically, 1,000 watts per 
hour. 
 
Low-income: In this report, the term “low-income” refers to customers that receive subsidized 
electricity rates.  In order to qualify for such rate, a customer’s annual income may not exceed 60 
percent of the median income in Massachusetts.  For a family of four, this would translate to a 
household income of $66,115 or less in fiscal year 2018.1  The report’s analysis of low-income 
customers does not encompass those customers who may be eligible for subsidized rates but who 
have not enrolled in the program for subsidized rates. 
 
Municipal aggregation and municipal aggregation suppliers: Municipal aggregations are 
programs where towns or cities enter into contracts with competitive suppliers for those suppliers 
to provide electricity supply services to participating residents and businesses in the respective 
community.  This report refers to competitive suppliers that serve municipal aggregations as 
“municipal aggregation suppliers.”  Customers residing in towns and cities with municipal 
aggregations programs can also choose to be served directly by a competitive supplier other than 
the one that serves the municipal aggregation. 
Municipal light plants: A municipal light plant is a municipality-owned distribution company 
responsible for the transmission and supply of electricity to the residents and businesses in the 
municipality.   
 
Participation rate: As used in this report, the participation rate is the ratio of the number of 
customers participating in the competitive supply market to the total number of electric 
customers.  The total number of electric customers includes those purchasing electricity from any 
of these three sources: competitive suppliers, electric companies, and municipal aggregations.  
Customers served by municipal light plants are not included in the analyses contained in this 
report. 
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Premium: This term is used in the report to denote the difference between the average 
residential competitive supply rate and the average basic service rate.  It could also be referred to 
as a “mark-up.” 
 
Renewable Energy Certificate: The Massachusetts Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard 
(“RPS”) requires retail electricity suppliers (both regulated distribution utilities and competitive 
suppliers) to obtain a percentage of the electricity they serve to their customers from qualifying 
renewable energy facilities.  Suppliers meet their annual RPS obligations by acquiring a 
sufficient quantity of RPS-qualified renewable energy certificates (“RECs”) that are created, 
traded, and tracked at the New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”).  
Restructuring: In 1997, the Massachusetts Legislature restructured the electricity industry, 
creating a competitive market for the supply of electricity (“Restructuring”).  The purpose of 
Restructuring was to reduce electricity costs through the new competitive market.  In 
restructuring the electricity industry, the Legislature recognized that “electricity service is 
essential to the health and well-being of all residents of the commonwealth.”  St. 1997, c. 164, § 
1(a). 
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Executive Summary 
 
The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (“AGO”) commissioned this report to (1) 
determine whether residential consumers in Massachusetts pay more or less for their electric 
supply when they buy it from the competitive marketplace rather than their electric company 
(such as National Grid, Eversource, and Unitil); and (2) identify remedies if warranted. 2    
 
My analysis shows that Massachusetts consumers in the competitive supply market paid $176.8 
million more than they would have paid if they had received electric supply from their electric 
company during the two-year period from July 2015 to June 2017.   
 
Table ES.1 Net Consumer Loss from Participation in the Individual Residential  
Electric Supply Market Compared to the Electric Company’s Basic Service 
 
 July 2015 – 
June 2016 
July 2016 – 
June 2017 
Two-Year Total 
Net Loss 
Total Net Consumer 
Loss (millions) 
 
 
$65.4 m 
 
$111.4 m 
 
$176.8 m 
 
Total net consumer loss increased significantly between the first year of the study (July 2015–
June 2016) and the second year (July 2016–June 2017) because the gap between the average 
basic service rate and the average competitive supply rate increased by 72 percent.  During the 
study period, basic service rates decreased by almost 16 percent, while the loss experienced by 
low-income customers on competitive supply increased by 35 percent.  
 
Low-income customers make up a disproportionately large share of the competitive supply 
market.  Figure ES.1, below, shows that low-income households participate in the competitive 
supply market at twice the rate as non-low-income households. 
 
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? 
 
Prepared for the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office 
ix 
Figure ES.1 Low-Income and Non-Low-Income Customer Participation Rates 
 
 
 
My analysis also shows that these low-income customers pay especially high prices in the 
competitive supply market.  Figure ES.2, below, shows that, assuming an average monthly usage 
of 600 kWh across both income groups, the annual consumer loss for low-income participants is 
$252, which is 17 percent higher than the annual consumer loss of $216 for non-low-income 
participants.  
 
Figure ES.2 Low-Income and Non-Low-Income Customer Average Annual Loss3 
 
 
 
Moreover, my analysis of the impact of the competitive supply market on each municipality in 
the Commonwealth served by an electric company shows that every municipality experienced, 
on average, a net consumer loss in the competitive supply market in June of 2017.   
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I also analyzed the impact of the competitive supply market based on the demographics of the 
Commonwealth’s various communities.   My analysis shows that residents in communities with 
the following demographics paid higher rates to competitive suppliers:  
• Communities with low median incomes;  
• Communities with high percentages of households receiving subsidized low-income 
rates;  
• Communities with high percentages of minority households; and  
• Communities with high percentages of households with limited English proficiency.   
Further, regression analysis of zip code-level data for the month of June 2017 provides findings 
that are consistent with disparate targeting of low-income customers for enrollment to 
competitive supply accounts.  Put simply, a consumer who resides in a low-income community is 
more likely to participate in the competitive market, even if that particular consumer is not a 
low-income customer herself.   
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
My analysis demonstrates that individual residential customers have suffered large financial 
losses in the competitive supply market.  The size of the harm to consumers, the significant loss 
in both years of the study, and the increasing loss from one year to the next, strongly suggest that 
consumer harm is likely to continue.   
 
Although a regulatory environment with stronger consumer protection measures would be 
preferable to the status quo, experience in Massachusetts and in other states demonstrates that 
stronger consumer protection measures are insufficient to transform the competitive supply 
market from one that causes significant net harm to one that provides net benefits.     
 
Accordingly, I strongly recommend that legislators in Massachusetts consider eliminating the 
electric supply market for individual residential consumers. 
 
The scope of this report is limited to the individual residential electric supply marketplace.  I do 
not analyze or make any recommendations regarding the commercial and industrial market, 
where, as a general rule, customers are more sophisticated and have benefited from competition 
in the electric supply market; nor do I analyze or make recommendations regarding the 
Commonwealth’s various municipal aggregations. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1997, the Massachusetts Legislature restructured the electricity industry, creating a 
competitive market for the supply of electricity (“Restructuring”).  The purpose of Restructuring 
was to reduce electricity costs through the new competitive market.  In restructuring the 
electricity industry, the Legislature recognized that “electricity service is essential to the health 
and well-being of all residents of the commonwealth.”  St. 1997, c. 164, § 1(a).  Massachusetts 
was one of several states that restructured the generation portion of their electric markets, 
replacing the previously vertically integrated electric utilities with electric utilities that provide 
distribution and transmission services and that purchase electricity from generation in the 
competitive marketplace.  
 
Following Restructuring, all Massachusetts electric companies continue to deliver electricity to 
all Massachusetts electric consumers.  For these services, Massachusetts electric companies 
charge distribution rates to electric consumers.  The electric companies’ distribution rates are 
highly regulated and are set by the Department of Public Utilities (the “Department”).  Although 
consumers cannot choose the electric company that provides them with distribution services, 
Restructuring created a new electric supply market to allow consumers to choose their electric 
supplier.  Accordingly, all Massachusetts electricity consumers pay two rates when they pay 
their electricity bill: one rate for distribution and one rate for electric supply.   
 
The entities that market and sell electric supply directly to Massachusetts electric consumers are 
called “competitive suppliers.”  Competitive suppliers generally do not generate electricity 
themselves.  Rather, they buy electric supply on the wholesale market and sell it to retail 
consumers.  The Department does not regulate the supply rates charged by competitive suppliers.  
However, competitive suppliers must be licensed by the Department and are subject to certain 
additional regulations designed to protect consumers.   
 
Electricity consumers taking service from a competitive supplier receive their electric supply 
from a supplier, but continue to have that electricity delivered to them by their electric company.  
The electricity delivered to the consumer is exactly the same whether purchased from a supplier 
or the electric company.4  Additionally, most, if not all, competitive electric suppliers opt to bill 
their consumers through the electric company, so to an unknowing consumer it can appear as if 
the supply is being provided by the electric company.  
 
For those consumers who do not receive their electric supply from a competitive supplier, their 
electric company purchases their electricity on their behalf, providing them supply services that 
are now known as “basic service.”  Residential consumers are automatically placed on the 
“fixed” basic service rate, which changes once every six months.5  Basic service is procured 
through a competitive process in which each electric company solicits and receives bids to 
provide electric supply to its consumers for certain pre-appointed periods of the year.  For 
example, NSTAR Electric Company, which does business as Eversource Energy, purchases its 
residential basic service electric supply for the two periods including January 1–June 30 and July 
1–December 31.   
 
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? 
 
Prepared for the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office 
2 
The Legislature took action to open the electric supply market to competition in 1997, yet 
competition in the residential electric supply market remained relatively inactive for the first 
decade.  Starting around 2011, the AGO began to receive numerous complaints from consumers 
about competitive suppliers going door-to-door and conducting telemarketing campaigns.  
Following an investigation pursuant to Chapter 93A, the Commonwealth’s consumer protection 
law, the AGO entered into an Assurance of Discontinuance with a competitive supplier that was 
the subject of consumer complaints, Just Energy (2014).  The settlement included restitution for 
consumers that were affected by Just Energy’s allegedly misleading representations.  The AGO 
continues to receive a large number of complaints concerning competitive electric suppliers, and 
as a result the AGO has undertaken additional investigations of other suppliers.  From January 1, 
2014 through December 31, 2017, the AGO received more than 700 complaints from residential 
consumers regarding various competitive suppliers.  Due to the high number of complaints from 
consumers, the AGO is concerned that the market as a whole might not be operating as intended 
by the Legislature.   
 
Accordingly, the AGO commissioned this report to determine whether the competitive supply 
market does, in fact, lead to reduced electricity costs for Massachusetts consumers.  The AGO 
also commissioned this report to identify legislative and regulatory remedies to protect 
consumers from market abuses, to enable consumers to make better-informed purchasing 
decisions, and to increase suppliers’ accountability for their practices to the Legislature, 
regulators, and the general public.  
 
This report is organized as follows: 
 
• In Section 1, I describe my methodology for computing the consumer loss associated 
with competition in the competitive supply market (“competitive supply market”). 
 
• In Section 2, I discuss my findings relative to the entire residential class (with the 
exception of households participating in a municipal aggregation). 
 
• In Section 3, I discuss the experience of low-income households in the competitive 
supply market, including analyses regarding suppliers’ possible targeting of low-income 
populations.  I also discuss analyses regarding suppliers’ presence among the 
Commonwealth’s communities, including analyses regarding suppliers’ possible 
targeting of vulnerable populations.   
 
• In Section 4, I discuss complaints that the AGO has received and also briefly describe its 
enforcement actions in the competitive supply market. 
 
• Based on my conclusion that competition is harming residential consumers, in Section 5, 
I propose legislative and regulatory remedies to address the harm that otherwise will 
likely continue.  
 
• Section 6 concludes my report. 
 
• Appendices provide additional information and analyses. 
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1. Data examined 
 
The three electric companies that serve Massachusetts provided the AGO with detailed supplier-
specific data separately for the two consecutive twelve-month time periods spanning July 2015 – 
June 2016 and July 2016 – June 2017.  These data include monthly information specific to each 
of the five service territories of Massachusetts’ electric companies: 
 
• Western Massachusetts Electric Company d/b/a Eversource Energy (“WMECo”); 
• NSTAR Electric Company d/b/a Eversource Energy (“NSTAR”); 
• Massachusetts Electric Company d/b/a National Grid (“MECo”); 
• Nantucket Electric Company d/b/a National Grid (“Nantucket”); and 
• Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company d/b/a Unitil (“Fitchburg”).6 
 
In the course of analyzing the data from the electric companies, my principal question was 
whether or not residential consumers are saving money by purchasing their electric supply in 
Massachusetts’ competitive market.7  I provide this analysis in Section 2 of my report.   
 
Based on the electric companies’ dataset, I was able to deduce a number of statistics concerning 
the size and scope of the Massachusetts competitive supply market:8 
 
• Suppliers, in the aggregate, bill Massachusetts customers more than $430 million 
annually. 
 
• Suppliers issued 5,920,193 monthly bills to all Massachusetts residential customers 
during a twelve-month period, suggesting that suppliers serve an average of 
approximately 493,349 households in Massachusetts, of which approximately 102,000 
are low-income households. 
 
• Low-income households make up approximately 21 percent of the residential competitive 
supply market, yet make up only 12 percent of the market for all electric customers.9  
 
• Over one-third (36 percent) of all low-income customers take service from a competitive 
electric supplier.   
 
• More than 50 different suppliers are active in the Massachusetts market.10 
 
• The average usage for all households that participated in the competitive supply market 
during the study period was 607 kWh.11 
 
Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2, and Figure 1.3, below, show the participation rates separately for all 
customers, low-income customers, and non-low-income customers, respectively.  Figure 1.1 
shows that approximately 493,000 customers (20 percent of all residential customers) participate 
in the competitive supply market in Massachusetts.  The average monthly numbers of customers 
shown in these three figures correspond with the average of twelve months of data for the period 
spanning July 2016 through June 2017. 
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Figure 1.1  Average Monthly Numbers of Households Purchasing from Competitive 
Suppliers, Electric Companies, and Municipal Aggregations12 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 show comparable information separately for low-income customers (as 
defined by receiving subsidized electricity rates) and non-low-income customers.  Low-income 
customers and non-low income customers have participation rates of 36 percent and 18 percent, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 1.2 Average Numbers of Low-Income Households Purchasing from Competitive 
Suppliers, Electric Companies, and Municipal Aggregation  
 
 
 
493,349 
20%
1,464,116 
61%
451,320 
19%
Competitive supply Basic supply Muni. Aggregation
101,935 
36%
138,082 
48%
45,250 
16%
Competitive supply Basic supply Muni. Aggregation
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Figure 1.3 Average Numbers of Non-Low-Income Households Purchasing from 
Competitive Suppliers, Electric Companies, and Municipal Aggregation  
 
 
 
 
The electric companies also provided supplier-specific data disaggregated to the zip code level 
for the most recent month of the second twelve-month study period (June 2017), as well as 
electric company-specific counts of bills for both low-income and all other residential consumers 
at the zip code level.13  I used these geographically granular data to examine competitive 
suppliers’ presence among the Commonwealth’s communities and to compare participation in 
the competitive supply market between low-income consumers and all other residential 
consumers.  I discuss my findings based on my zip code analysis in Section 3, below, and 
provide more detailed findings in the corresponding appendices.  I found patterns of apparent 
targeting of economically disadvantaged communities and households by suppliers consistent 
with those shown by my analysis of corresponding zip code data for June 2016.  
 
 
  
391,4…
1,326,035 
63%
406,070 
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2. Are residential consumers benefiting from competition in the 
electric supply market in Massachusetts?  
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, I summarize my findings about the price of competition in the competitive supply 
market.     
 
For the purposes of this Section 2, I analyzed suppliers’ billing data in order to  
 
(1) compute the total annual consumer gain or loss associated with the participation 
by households in the competitive supply market in Massachusetts;14  
 
(2) analyze average consumer loss, when expressed on a per-household basis; and  
 
(3) analyze the range of average rates charged by suppliers.  
 
2.2 What is the annual consumer gain or loss associated with households’ 
participation in the competitive supply market? 
 
Massachusetts residential electricity consumers who took service from a competitive supplier 
paid a total of $176.8 million more than they would have paid if they had received basic service 
from their electric company over the course of the two study periods.  Specifically, customers 
overpaid by $65.4 million during the 2015–2016 study period and by $111.4 million during the 
2016–2017 study period.  The increase in losses from the 2015–2016 study period to the 2016–
2017 study period suggests that customer losses are getting worse and not better.   
 
These losses translate into an average household loss of $134 during the 2015–2016 study period 
and an average household loss of $226 during the 2016–2017 study period.   
 
The size of the competitive supply market was relatively stable between the two study periods.  
The number of average customers participating in the market increased by approximately 1.0 
percent and the total amount of electricity served to residential competitive supply customers 
increased by only 0.3 percent.  
 
By contrast, the difference between the average residential competitive supply rate and the 
average basic service rate—which I also refer to as the “premium”—increased by 72 percent 
between the 12-month period spanning July 2015 to June 2016 and the following 12-month 
period, spanning July 2016 to June 2017.  Accordingly, the increase in the total loss between the 
two study periods is almost entirely due to suppliers charging higher premiums for their 
electricity, rather than suppliers simply providing service to more customers.  The gap between 
the rates that consumers pay suppliers and the rates that they would have paid their electric 
companies for the same usage occurring in the same time periods has increased significantly.  
During the 2016–2017 study period, the average rate that suppliers charged all of their 
consumers in the Commonwealth was $0.1219 per kWh, which was 35 percent higher than the 
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average rate of $0.0905 that these same consumers would have paid for the same usage had they 
taken service from their electric companies.   
 
I summarize these findings in Table 2.1, below.   
 
Table 2.1 Overview of Competitive Supply Market – Two-Year Comparison 
 
Attribute of Market 
July 2015 -                 
June 2016 
July 2016 -                  
June 2017 
Absolute Change 
Percent 
Change 
Average number of customers per 
month 488,336 493,275 4,939 1.0% 
Total supply (kWh) 3,581,962,995  3,593,084,986  11,121,991 0.3% 
Total charges $450,704,148  $437,948,033   $(12,756,115) -2.8% 
Weighted Average Competitive 
Supplier Rate 
$0.12583 
 
$0.12189 
  $(0.0039) -3.1% 
Weighted Average electric company 
Rate 
$0.10757 
 
$0.09047 
  $(0.0171) -15.9% 
Average premium to participate (per 
kWh) (rounded to 1/100th of penny) $0.0183 $0.0314  $0.0132  72.0% 
Average Annual Premium to 
participate per HH  $134   $226   $92  68.5% 
Statewide Total Net Consumer Loss $65,406,644 $111,400,843  $45,994,199  70.3% 
Statewide Total Net Consumer Loss - 
Low-Income $17,400,000 $23,562,438  $6,162,438  35.4% 
 
Figure 2.1, below, shows that the gap between the average monthly rate paid to competitive 
suppliers and the average monthly rate assuming the customers had purchased electric 
companies’ service15 was sustained during each of the twelve months spanning July 2016 
through June 2017.  Moreover, Figure 2.1 shows that low-income participants in the competitive 
supply market consistently pay more for electricity than do other participants in the competitive 
supply market. 
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Figure 2.1 Gap Between Average Rate Paid to Competitive Suppliers and Rate Had 
Participants Purchased from Electric Companies 
 
  
 
  
Methodology  
 
In order to compute the impact on consumers of their participation in the competitive supply 
market, I compared the rates consumers paid to suppliers with the rates they would have paid had 
they taken service from their electric companies,16 accounting for the fact that electric companies 
charge different rates for basic service during any given 12-month period.17  Because the electric 
companies provided monthly data regarding competitive supply rates, I was able to compare 
each competitive supply rate with the actual electric company basic service rate that was then in 
effect.  Because I also had granular, monthly consumption data, I was able to calculate what all 
customers of a given competitive supplier would have paid if they had paid their electric 
companies’ basic service rates instead of the supplier’s rates.18  Finally, after calculating the total 
loss or gain over the two-year period for each supplier, I aggregated all gains and losses to 
calculate the total net consumer loss.   
 
During the twelve-month time period, it is of course possible that a single consumer might have 
had, for example, three months with savings and nine months with losses.  For the first year, 
because supplier-specific data was aggregated across all customers, I cannot precisely determine 
how many consumers paid too much during a given year and how many consumers saved by 
participating in the competitive supply market.  The data for the second year were more granular, 
however, which permits a calculation of the number of bills rendered to customers who saved 
money, and, in this report, I discuss the results of this more disaggregated analysis of the 
consumer impact of the competitive supply market.  In Appendix 2B, I describe my methodology 
for computing net consumer loss for the two study years in more detail.  
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Appendix 2C shows, separately by municipality, the average number of households participating 
in the competitive supply market, the average per-household net consumer loss, and the 
aggregate consumer loss for June 2017.  This information is shown for all households and also 
separately for low-income households.  In Section 3, below, Table 3.1 shows the ten 
municipalities and neighborhoods with the highest aggregate net consumer loss in June 2017 (the 
most recent month of the study period). 
2.3 What is the consumer harm to individual households that purchase electricity from 
competitive suppliers?  
 
Individual suppliers’ average rates per kWh vary widely (and so, too, subsequently, do the 
average supplier-specific consumer losses and gains), as do the numbers of consumers that they 
serve.   
 
During the test period, some suppliers charged extremely high rates; some suppliers served a 
much larger share of the market than did others; some suppliers charged low rates; and some 
suppliers served few consumers.  Also, suppliers do not charge uniform rates.  Indeed, they 
charge a wide range of rates to their various customers. 
 
Although individual consumer harm (measured as consumer loss) and gains vary significantly, 
the vast majority of consumers lost money during the two study periods.  On average, throughout 
the year, 88 percent of households participating in the competitive supply market lost money, 
and 90 percent of low-income households participating in the competitive supply market lost 
money. 
 
Figure 2.2, below shows the frequency of various increments of the differential between the 
electric company rates and the competitive suppliers’ rates (i.e., the premium), with the 
frequency measured by kWh purchased in the market.  
 
Figure 2.2 Frequency of varying levels of premium paid: all households 
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Figure 2.3, below, shows the frequency of various increments of consumer loss (and in some 
instances savings) that customers experience, expressed on a monthly, per-household basis. 
 
Figure 2.3 Frequency of varying levels of consumer loss: all households 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Minority of suppliers who provided limited consumer gains 
 
Twelve percent of bills are associated with competitive suppliers who charged rates that would 
provide savings relative to the electric company rates.  For this small group of customers, 
savings are, on average, $74.56 per year, or less than a third of the average annual overpayment 
of $269.19 
 
These numbers suggest that the “upside” of participation in the competitive supply market is 
very limited.  Specifically, the numbers suggest that a customer who participates in the 
competitive supply market has relatively low odds of saving a small amount of money and 
relatively high odds of paying significantly more money.   
 
Moreover, many of the customers who experienced savings during the two study periods may 
not save long-term.  Some consumers pay less than electric company rates for some of the time 
but these lower rates may be “teaser” rates, meaning that the rates may start low and then 
increase in subsequent months.20  Accordingly, it is possible that a significant portion of the 
customers who take service from suppliers who charged less than basic service during the two 
study periods will ultimately pay more than basic service in the future.   
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2.5 Consumer loss examined at the supplier level 
 
I computed net consumer loss and average premiums separately by supplier.  Because some may 
consider this information competitively sensitive, I provide a summary of my analysis without 
reference to specific suppliers’ names.  I reviewed data for a total of 56 suppliers.   
   
Table 2.2, below, shows the ten suppliers21 (with their identities withheld) who charged the 
highest average premium over basic service during the 2016–2017 study period.22  In short, 
Table 2.2 shows which suppliers charged the most for electric supply on average during the 
2016–2017 study period.  Table 2.2 shows that the three suppliers with the highest rankings 
charged premiums of more than $0.0650 per kWh and charged average rates of more than 
$0.1500 per kWh.  Because electric company rates vary throughout the Commonwealth, I rank 
suppliers based on the premiums they charge relative to the electric companies’ rates rather than 
ranking them based on the suppliers’ rates. 
 
Table 2.2.  Ten Suppliers with the Highest Average Premium – All Households. 
 
Supplier ID 
Average 
Rate 
# of Bills 
Average 
Premium 
Share of 
Accounts 
Net 
Consumer 
Loss 
Share 
of Loss 
Supplier #1 $0.1697 58,892 $0.0797 1.00% $2,799,826 2.51% 
Supplier #18 $0.1571 130,806 $0.0657 2.21% $4,443,744 3.99% 
Supplier #47 $0.1561 108,393 $0.0657 1.83% $3,751,646 3.37% 
Supplier #39 $0.1452 38,021 $0.0552 0.64% $1,079,459 0.97% 
Supplier #37 $0.1450 611,891 $0.0546 10.35% $20,571,677 18.47% 
Supplier #12 $0.1417 362,897 $0.0511 6.14% $8,763,432 7.87% 
Supplier #41 $0.1382 462,750 $0.0484 7.83% $12,970,332 11.64% 
Supplier #25 $0.1449 61,886 $0.0477 1.05% $1,104,503 0.99% 
Supplier #15 $0.1376 213,518 $0.0458 3.61% $4,648,970 4.17% 
Supplier #6 $0.1282 284,867 $0.0381 4.82% $6,237,222 5.60% 
       
Total associated with top 10 2,333,921  39% $66,370,811 60% 
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Table 2.3, below, shows the ten suppliers for which electric companies rendered the most bills.  
These ten suppliers account for 67 percent of the bills rendered in the competitive supply market 
and 74 percent of the net consumer loss. 
 
Table 2.3.  Ten Suppliers with the Highest Number of Bills – All Households. 
 
Supplier ID 
Average 
Rate 
# of Bills 
Average 
Premium 
Share of 
Accounts 
Net 
Consumer 
Loss 
Share of 
Loss 
Supplier #32  $0.1196   623,020   $0.0290  10.54%  $12,035,815  10.81% 
Supplier #37  $0.1450   611,891   $0.0546  10.35%  $20,571,677  18.47% 
Supplier #42  $0.1082   573,887   $0.0170  9.71%  $6,429,872  5.77% 
Supplier #41  $0.1382   462,750   $0.0484  7.83%  $12,970,332  11.64% 
Supplier #12  $0.1417   362,897   $0.0511  6.14%  $8,763,432  7.87% 
Supplier #23  $0.1109   338,309   $0.0203  5.72%  $3,778,146  3.39% 
Supplier #34  $0.1079   295,967   $0.0168  5.01%  $3,379,955  3.03% 
Supplier #6  $0.1282   284,867   $0.0381  4.82%  $6,237,222  5.60% 
Supplier #29  $0.1240   213,923   $0.0341  3.62%  $3,596,144  3.23% 
Supplier #15  $0.1376   213,518   $0.0458  3.61%  $4,648,970  4.17% 
         
Total associated with top 10  3,981,029    67%  $82,411,565  74% 
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Table 2.4, below, shows the ten suppliers responsible for the largest absolute consumer loss in 
Massachusetts.   In aggregate, they account for 75 percent of the net consumer loss, with some 
suppliers accounting disproportionately for consumer loss.  For example, Table 2.4, below, 
shows that approximately 10 percent of all bills are rendered on behalf of Supplier #37, and yet 
Supplier #37’s consumers account for 18 percent of net consumer loss in the Commonwealth.   
 
Table 2.4.  Ten Suppliers Responsible for the Greatest Aggregate Consumer Loss – All 
Households. 
 
Supplier ID 
Average 
Rate 
Number of 
Bills 
Average 
Premium 
Share of 
Accounts 
Net Consumer 
Loss 
Share 
of Loss 
Supplier #37 $0.1450 611,891 $0.0546 10.35% $20,571,677 18.47% 
Supplier #41 $0.1382 462,750 $0.0484 7.83% $12,970,332 11.64% 
Supplier #32 $0.1196 623,020 $0.0290 10.54% $12,035,815 10.81% 
Supplier #12 $0.1417 362,897 $0.0511 6.14% $8,763,432 7.87% 
Supplier #42 $0.1082 573,887 $0.0170 9.71% $6,429,872 5.77% 
Supplier #6 $0.1282 284,867 $0.0381 4.82% $6,237,222 5.60% 
Supplier #15 $0.1376 213,518 $0.0458 3.61% $4,648,970 4.17% 
Supplier #18 $0.1571 130,806 $0.0657 2.21% $4,443,744 3.99% 
Supplier #23 $0.1109 338,309 $0.0203 5.72% $3,778,146 3.39% 
Supplier #47 $0.1561 108,393 $0.0657 1.83% $3,751,646 3.37% 
       
Total associated with Top 10 3,710,338  63% $83,630,855 75% 
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2.6 Do other benefits from competitive supply contracts account for the consumer 
loss?   
 
Other benefits may accrue from competition in the competitive supply market that my 
calculations exclude.  For example, some suppliers offer gift cards, rebates, or rewards 
programs.23  I am unaware of any evidence that would demonstrate that these “additional 
products and services” would offset annual average losses of $226, nor losses that can exceed 
$500, depending on a consumer’s supplier.24    
 
I have also considered whether suppliers’ reliance on renewable energy may explain the large 
gap between electric companies’ basic service rates and those of many suppliers.  Some suppliers 
offer contracts that obligate them to purchase and retire renewable energy certificates in excess 
of renewable energy purchases dictated by Massachusetts’ Renewable Energy Portfolio 
Standard.  Existing law does not require suppliers to report this “extra” renewable energy (also 
known as the suppliers’ “voluntary demand”) and, to the best of my knowledge, no reliable 
statistics or information on these purchases exists for suppliers in Massachusetts. 
 
Some customers may pay rates that are higher than the electric companies’ rates because they are 
willing to pay a premium for greener, cleaner energy.  However, it seems highly unlikely that the 
purchase of “green power” accounts for the large premiums that Massachusetts customers pay 
for competitive supply.   
 
First, it appears unlikely that all or even most customers taking service from a competitive 
supplier receive a “green product.”  For example, a search on Massachusetts’ Shopping for 
Competitive Supply website, energyswitchma.gov, showed that, as of December 2017, only 
approximately 27 percent of offers include an additional green element.25  
 
Moreover, a comparison between comparable “renewable” and “non-renewable” offers in 
Massachusetts makes clear that a renewable energy “premium” cannot account for the large 
premiums charged by most suppliers in Massachusetts.  Massachusetts’ Shopping for 
Competitive Supply website, energyswitchma.gov, shows that, as of March 2017, three 
companies offered both a renewable and a non-renewable product at a fixed rate for twelve 
months.  The following table presents the comparison: 
 
Table 2.5. A comparison between non-renewable and renewable 12-month fixed-rate 
contracts at www.energyswitchma.gov 26    
 
Supplier Non-Renewable 
(cents/kWh) 
Renewable 
(cents/kWh) 
Renewable 
Premium 
(cents/kWh) 
Constellation 
Energy 
$0.1099 $0.1089 ($0.0010) 
Discount Power $0.1200 $0.1250 $0.0050 
Ambit Energy $0.0950 $0.1150 $0.0200 
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The low premium that suppliers appear to place on their own “renewable” 27 offerings strongly 
suggests that the renewable content of competitive suppliers’ service has little to nothing to do 
with the high rates that they charge to customers. Tables 2.2 through 2.4 above show differentials 
relative to basic service rates that are much higher than a hypothetical half-cent ($0.0050 per 
kWh) renewable energy premium and many also exceed even a hypothetical two-cent ($0.0200 
per kWh) renewable energy premium.  Indeed, the average premium for the 2016–2017 study 
period, as seen in Table 2.1, was $0.0314 per kWh.   
 
Accordingly, I believe it is reasonable to assume that the $176.8-million net overpayment during 
the two-study periods is mostly pure consumer loss.   
2.7 Residential customers are not benefiting from electric supply competition. 
 
Based on my examination of competitive supplier data, I conclude that, when viewed in the 
aggregate, residential consumers suffer large net losses as a result of electric supply competition.  
Specifically, customers during the 2016–2017 study period paid an additional $111.4 million per 
year as a result of competitive choice, a substantial increase relative to the net consumer loss of 
$65.4 million during the prior twelve-month study period.  Although competitive supply, as a 
share of the total market of electric customers in Massachusetts, has grown relatively slowly, the 
premium for participation increased by about two-thirds.  In other words, the gap between the 
rates paid to competitive suppliers and electric companies’ basic service rates has increased.  
These consumer losses during the study periods are net of the relatively small gains that a 
minority of consumers experienced.  In addition, it is unlikely that these consumers’ 
overpayment is a fair exchange for some additional benefit, such as the “green power” marketed 
by suppliers.   
 
Unlike the commercial and industrial market, where sophisticated buyers with demands for large 
volumes are likely able to negotiate more favorable rates, individual residential consumers are 
not getting a bargain. 
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3. What is the consumer loss associated with low-income households’ 
participation in the competitive supply market? 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Section 2 discussed my findings regarding the residential competitive supply market as a whole 
(with the exception of households participating in a municipal aggregation and those customers 
located in towns served by municipal light plants28).  In this section, I discuss various attributes 
of a subset of this market, specifically households that receive a low-income rate from their 
electric companies.   
 
The rates that low-income households pay for electricity, an essential service,29 significantly 
affect these households.  Low-income households’ monthly electricity expenditure represents 
monies that they cannot allocate to other goods and services (housing, food, transportation, etc.).  
Due to these customers’ severe budget constraints, high electricity costs could have direct and 
serious consequences on their well-being and quality of life.   
 
Additionally, increased costs for low-income consumers also have implications for non-low-
income residential ratepayers.  The electric bills for low-income ratepayers are subsidized by all 
of the electric companies’ ratepayers.  Because the electric companies calculate the size of each 
low-income consumer’s subsidy by taking a percentage of the consumer’s total bill (which 
includes any rates and charges from competitive suppliers), higher electricity bills for low-
income consumers also result in higher subsidies paid by all other residential electricity 
consumers—including those who do not participate in the competitive supply market.  Moreover, 
due to a purchase of receivables program established in 2014, the electric companies’ ratepayers 
must also subsidize a significant portion of any billed amounts that consumers of competitive 
suppliers are unable to pay.30 
 
I analyzed suppliers’ billing data to (1) quantify the consumer loss (or gain) associated with the 
participation by low-income households in the competitive supply market in Massachusetts; (2) 
compare average rates charged to low-income consumers with those charged all other residential 
consumers; and (3) assess whether there is any evidence of competitive suppliers targeting low-
income households. 
 
As I demonstrate in Section 3.2, below, living in low-income communities increases the 
probability of participation in the over-priced competitive supply market, and also increases the 
size of the premium for such participation.   
3.2 What is the consumer loss associated with low-income households’ participation 
in the competitive supply market? 
 
The annual consumer loss associated with competitive suppliers’ electricity sales to low-income 
consumers was $23.6 million during the 2016–2017 study period.  
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The total annual loss increased by approximately 40 percent relative to the $17 million net 
consumer loss in the competitive supply market for low-income households in the previous 
twelve-month period (spanning July 2015 to June 2016).    
 
The competitive supply market in Massachusetts for low-income households experienced only 
small growth between the two study periods.31  However, the gap between the rates that 
consumers pay suppliers and the rates that they would have paid their electric companies for the 
same usage occurring in the same time periods has increased significantly.  The cost of 
participation—the premium—for low-income consumers has increased substantially between the 
twelve-month period spanning July 2015 to June 2016 and the following twelve-month period, 
spanning July 2016 to June 2017.  The average annual consumer loss for low-income households 
was $231 in the 2016–2017 study period and the average annual consumer loss for all low-
income households was $145 in 2015–2016 study period. 
3.3 What is the consumer harm to low-income households that purchase electricity 
from competitive suppliers?  
 
Massachusetts low-income households, on average, paid significantly more to competitive 
suppliers than if they had taken service from their respective electric companies.  Specifically, 
low-income customers paid an average premium of $0.035 per kWh over what they would have 
paid for basic service electric supply during the 2016–2017 study period.  Moreover, the average 
premium that low-income customers paid for competitive service was higher than the average 
premium that non-low-income customers paid during the same period (non-low-income 
customers paid a premium of “only” $0.030 per kWh).   
 
Accordingly, low-income households pay an extra 17 percent to participate, and therefore, 
unlike other households, low-income households pay a larger premium to purchase electricity in 
the competitive supply market.  These higher rates translate, on an annual basis (and accounting 
for differing average kWh usage), to an average premium of $231 for low-income consumers to 
participate in the competitive supply market as compared to an average annual premium of $224 
for non-low-income consumers.32  Notably, this premium reflects those who saved money as 
well as those who were charged rates higher than those that the electric companies would have 
charged.    
 
I examined losses at a supplier-specific level and determined that the highest average supplier-
specific annual loss for low-income consumers was $541 (compared with $538 in the preceding 
12-month study period).  In other words, low-income customers served by one of the suppliers 
paid, on average, $541 more per year than if they had purchased the electric company’s basic 
service.  Only two out of 40 suppliers charged rates yielding annual savings (low-income 
customers served by the other 38 suppliers all experienced net consumer losses), and the average 
annual savings for those two suppliers were only $16 and $26, respectively.  
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Savings Estimates 
 
As described in Section 2, above, most suppliers did not provide savings on average to 
residential competitive electric households during the study periods, and those that did provided 
relatively small average savings.  The same dynamic also holds true for low-income households 
specifically.   
 
Ten percent of bills are associated with charges that yield savings relative to the electric 
company rates that would have applied had the low-income households not taken service from a 
competitive electric supplier.  These savings are, on average, $69 per year, or approximately one-
fourth of the average annual overpayment of $265 that correspond with above-electric company 
rates.33  The consequence is that, on balance, low-income consumers paid $23.6 million more as 
a result of competition than they would pay if the competitive supply market were not an option. 
3.4 Low-income customers are overrepresented in the competitive supply market.  
 
My analysis demonstrates that low-income households are overrepresented in the competitive 
supply market relative to their representation in the general population of households receiving 
electricity.   
 
Low-income households, on average, represent only 12 percent of electric customers.  However, 
according to data received from the electric companies, low-income households represented 21 
percent of all competitive supply customers during the 2016–2017 study period.    
 
The electric companies’ data also shows that 36 percent—more than a third of all Massachusetts 
low-income households—participated in the competitive supply market (the remaining 64 
percent received basic service or participated in a municipal aggregation) during the 2016–2017 
study period.  By contrast, only 18 percent of Massachusetts non-low-income households 
participated in the competitive supply market—half of the participation rate of low-income 
households.  
 
Although, on average, both low-income and non-low-income customers suffer harm as a result 
of the competitive supply market, my analysis suggests that the competitive supply market has a 
disproportionate impact on low-income customers.  As discussed in Section 3.2 above, during 
the 2016–2017 study period, low-income households paid a premium of 17 percent relative to 
other households.  
 
Participation rates vary among municipalities and across income groups.  I include three maps 
below that show statewide participation rates.  I also include maps that show participation rates 
across income groups for the Boston area, the Springfield area, and the Worcester area. All 
twelve maps are based on information for June 2017.  Each set of three maps shows participation 
rates for: 
• All households; 
• Low-income households; and 
• Non-low-income households. 
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The twelve maps below reflect the higher participation rates by low-income households and also 
show those households’ varying levels of participation throughout the state.  The competitive 
supply market is equally active in towns with municipal aggregations.34  The gray areas 
generally correspond with municipalities that are served by municipal light plants.35 
 
Figure 3.1 shows participation rates for all residential customers throughout the state.  This 
figure shows that the levels of participation in the competitive supply market vary significantly 
among the Commonwealth’s various communities. 
Figure 3.1  Participation in the individual residential market for electric supply, June 2017: 
Percent of all electric consumers enrolled in competitive supply. 
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Figure 3.2 below shows statewide participation rates just for low-income households, and Figure 
3.3 below shows statewide participation rates just for non-low-income households.  Comparing 
these two maps shows the stark difference in participation rates, depending on household 
incomes, with much higher concentrations of participation by low-income household than by 
non-low-income households. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Participation in the individual residential market for electric supply, June 2017: 
Percent of all low-income electric consumers enrolled in competitive supply 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3  Participation in the individual residential market for electric  supply, June 
2017: Percent of all non-low-income electric consumers enrolled in competitive supply 
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Participation in the Boston area 
 
Figure 3.4 shows participation rates across all incomes for the Boston area and shows varying 
levels of participation. 
 
Figure 3.4  Boston-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply, June 2017:  Percent of all electric consumers enrolled in competitive supply 
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Figure 3.5 shows Boston area participation rates just for low-income households, and Figure 3.6 
below shows Boston-area participation rates for non-low-income households.  Comparing these 
two maps shows the stark difference in participation rates between high- and low-income 
communities.   
 
Figure 3.5  Boston-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply, June 2017:  Percent of all low-income electric consumers enrolled in competitive 
supply 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6  Boston-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply June 2017:  Percent of all non-low-income electric consumers enrolled in 
competitive supply 
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Participation in the Springfield area 
 
Figure 3.7 shows participation rates across all incomes for the Springfield area and shows 
varying levels of participation. 
 
Figure 3.7  Springfield-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply, June 2017:  Percent of all electric consumers enrolled in competitive supply 
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Figure 3.8 shows Springfield area participation rates just for low-income households, and Figure 
3.9 below shows Springfield-area participation rates for non-low-income households.  
Comparing these two maps shows that the stark difference in participation rates between high- 
and low-income communities holds true in Springfield as well. 
 
Figure 3.8  Springfield-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply, June 2017:  Percent of all low-income electric consumers enrolled in competitive 
supply 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9  Springfield-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply June 2017:  Percent of all non-low-income electric consumers enrolled in 
competitive supply 
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Participation in the Worcester area 
 
Figure 3.10 shows participation rates across all incomes for the Worcester area and shows 
varying levels of participation. 
 
Figure 3.10  Worcester-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply, June 2017:  Percent of all electric consumers enrolled in competitive supply 
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Figure 3.11 shows Worcester area participation rates just for low-income households, and Figure 
3.12 below shows Worcester-area participation rates for non-low-income households.  As in the 
Boston and Springfield areas, participation rates in the Worcester area by low-income 
households are substantially higher than by non-low-income households.  
 
Figure 3.11  Worcester-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply, June 2017:  Percent of all low-income electric consumers enrolled in competitive 
supply 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12  Worcester-area participation in the individual residential market for electric 
supply June 2017:  Percent of all non-low-income electric consumers enrolled in 
competitive supply 
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In summary, the four sets of maps viewed side-by-side clearly show a pattern of higher 
participation by low-income households than by other households.  This differential is especially 
concerning given the larger premium paid by low-income households who participate in the 
competitive supply market, as detailed in Section 3.3 above.  
 
Section 3.5, below, analyzes other demographic aspects of the competitive supply market. 
 
3.5 Potential targeting of vulnerable communities.  
 
I also examined whether the electric companies’ billing data provides demographic evidence that 
competitive suppliers have targeted certain demographic populations in Massachusetts. I 
examined data at the geographically granular level36 corresponding with zip codes,37 paying 
special attention to demographics such as the prevalence of households with limited English 
proficiency,38 the percent designated as minority,39 and the percent of low-income customers.   
 
As part of my analyses of various demographic characteristics, I also assessed participation rates 
by (1) all households; (2) low-income households;40 and (3) non-low-income households.  Also, 
because the participation rate in municipalities that are served by municipal aggregation 
suppliers is approximately the same as that in municipalities without municipal aggregations,41 I 
included those towns as well (excluding from my analysis those consumers served by municipal 
aggregation suppliers). 
 
I found that participation rates are significantly higher (and thus consumer harm 
disproportionately occurring) in areas with certain demographics (or overlapping combinations 
of these demographics).  Specifically, a community’s percentage of minority households; 
African American households; Hispanic households; households with limited English 
proficiency; and low-income households correlates with higher rates of participation in the 
individual residential market for electric supply.  Conversely, communities with higher median 
incomes tended to have significantly lower participation rates than more economically 
disadvantaged communities.   
 
Not only are participation rates significantly higher in communities with five of the six 
demographic attributes I analyzed, but also the premiums that residents in these communities pay 
as a result of choosing competitive suppliers is greater than in other areas of Massachusetts.  
Therefore, these communities are harmed not only as a result of disproportionately higher levels 
of participation in the individual residential market for electric supply, but also as a result of 
paying larger premiums for their participation.   
 
Table 3.1 below shows the ten municipalities and neighborhoods with the highest aggregate net 
consumer monthly loss.  
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Table 3.1 Ten Municipalities with the Highest Aggregate Net Consumer Loss (all incomes, 
monthly loss (June 2017))42 
  
Municipality/ 
Neighborhood 
Total 
Consumer 
Loss in Month 
Average Per 
Household Loss 
(Monthly) 
% of Households 
Participating in 
Competitive 
Supply Market 
# Competitive 
Supply 
Accounts 
Worcester $274,749 $14.42 28% 19,055 
Springfield $273,201 $17.74 28% 15,403 
Dorchester $208,823 $12.69 33% 16,461 
Brockton $180,573 $16.24 33% 11,122 
Lynn $167,567 $15.48 32% 10,823 
Lowell $163,967 $15.72 26% 10,430 
Lawrence $153,228 $17.26 35% 8,878 
Fall River $151,610 $13.92 28% 10,888 
Quincy $134,899 $14.52 21% 9,288 
New Bedford $108,881 $11.15 24% 9,765 
 
In fact, as shown in Appendix 2C, all municipalities experienced net consumer loss in June 2017.    
 
  
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? 
 
Prepared for the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office 
29 
Table 3.2, below, summarizes the participation rates for the demographics discussed above for 
households of all incomes.  Table 3.2 shows higher percentage participation rates in the 
individual residential supply market in communities with certain demographic attributes.  
Generally, these communities participate significantly more in the competitive supply market 
and pay higher premiums than do other communities.  For example, communities with the 
highest percentage of Hispanic households have a participation rate in the competitive supply 
market of 33 percent across all incomes, and the average premium paid by consumers in these 
communities is $0.0352, which is 18 percent higher than the premium of $0.0299 paid in the 
Commonwealth’s other communities.  Isolating other demographics using the filters described 
above produces similar results, as seen in Appendices 3B-3I.  
 
Table 3.2 Participation Rates Based on Various Demographics: All Households 43  
 
Participation Rates - All Households 
Demographics 
Demographic-
Specific 
Communities 
All Other 
Communities 
Majority-Minority 30% 19% 
African American – Top 20 32% 20% 
Hispanic – Top 20 33% 20% 
Limited English Proficiency – Top 20 30% 20% 
Bottom 20 Median Income 31% 20% 
Percent receiving low-income subsidy – Top 20 32% 20% 
Top 20 Median Income 15% 21% 
 
Statewide, across all demographic groups, the participation rates for low-income households and 
non-low-income households are 36 percent and 18 percent respectively.   
  
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? 
 
Prepared for the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office 
30 
Table 3.3, below, shows that the participation rates for low-income households located in 
communities with certain demographic attributes range between 44 percent and 47 percent, 
significantly higher than the low-income participation rate in other communities in 
Massachusetts.  For example, Table 3.3 shows that in the 20 communities with the highest levels 
of limited English proficiency, the participation by low-income households in the individual 
residential supply market is 45% whereas the participation by low-income households in all 
other Massachusetts communities is 34%. 
 
Table 3.3 Participation Rates Based on Various Demographics: Low-Income Households  
 
Participation Rates – Low-Income 
Demographics 
Demographic-
Specific 
Communities 
All Other 
Communities 
Majority-Minority 45% 31% 
African American – Top 20 46% 33% 
Hispanic – Top 20 47% 33% 
Limited English Proficiency – Top 20 45% 34% 
Bottom 20 Median Income 44% 34% 
Percent receiving low-income subsidy – Top 20 44% 34% 
Top 20 Median Income 18% 35% 
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Table 3.4, below, shows that the pattern of substantially higher participation rates in minority 
communities persists for both low-income and non-low-income electric customers. For example, 
the participation rate by non-low-income households in the twenty communities with the highest 
percentages of African Americans is 27 percent whereas the participation rate by non-low-
income households in the rest of the state is 18 percent. 
 
Table 3.4 Participation Rates Based on Various Demographics: Non-Low-Income 
Households 
 
Participation Rates – Non-Low-Income 
Demographics 
Demographic-
Specific 
Communities 
All Other 
Communities 
Majority-Minority 25% 17% 
African American – Top 20 27% 18% 
Hispanic – Top 20 27% 18% 
Limited English Proficiency – Top 20 25% 18% 
Bottom 20 Median Income 25% 18% 
Percent receiving low-income subsidy – Top 20 25% 18% 
Top 20 Median Income 15% 19% 
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Table 3.5, below, summarizes the premiums for the demographic groups discussed above.  Table 
3.5 shows that some communities and households pay higher premiums than do others.  As 
reflected in Table 3.5, it is generally more expensive to participate in the competitive supply 
market for households that are located in communities that have a majority of minority 
households, have relatively higher numbers of households with limited English proficiency, and 
with relatively higher percentages of low-income people.   
 
 
Table 3.5 Premium paid for participation in competitive supply market based on various 
demographics  
 
 Premium 
Demographics 
Demographic-
Specific 
Communities 
All Other 
Communities 
Demographic 
Premium 
Majority-Minority $0.03328 $0.02953 13% 
African American – Top 20 $0.03220 $0.03010 7% 
Hispanic – Top 20 $0.03521 $0.02986 18% 
Limited English Proficiency – 
Top 20 
$0.03442 $0.02990 15% 
Bottom 20 Median Income $0.03427 $0.03000 14% 
Percent receiving low-income 
subsidy – Top 20 
$0.03487 $0.02999 16% 
Top 20 Median Income $0.02933 $0.03034 -3% 
 
 
  
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? 
 
Prepared for the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office 
33 
3.6 Statistical analysis shows correlation between income and participation.  
 
Participation rates in the competitive supply market vary substantially across Massachusetts.  
Following this report’s findings of substantial consumer loss from competitive supply, I analyzed 
whether any observable characteristics of individual zip codes predict higher participation rates 
with statistical significance.   
 
Approach 
 
Competitive supply participation rates are defined as the number of accounts billed by 
competitive suppliers divided by the total number of accounts, and correspondingly for just the 
subset of low-income accounts.  These rates are zip code- and municipality-specific and were 
derived from June 2017 data. 
 
I considered socio-demographic characteristics of zip codes as possible predictors of 
participation rates.  For each zip code, the median household income approximates the income of 
a typical customer.  An additional indicator for neighborhood affluence (or poverty) is the share 
of all electric accounts that are identified as low-income; in general, more affluent 
neighborhoods have higher median incomes and lower shares of low-income accounts.   
 
Zip code-level variation in race and English proficiency were also considered in the analysis.  
Regressions controlled for the total number of accounts in each zip code and whether a 
municipal aggregator was available to consumers.  They included electric company-level fixed 
effects to account for regional differences in average consumer behavior and standard errors 
were clustered at the municipality.  
 
Findings 
 
Analysis of the zip code-level data for the month of June 2017 provides findings that are 
consistent with disparate targeting of low-income customers for enrollment in competitive 
supply accounts.  There is a negative relationship between a zip code’s typical income level—as 
measured by either median household income, or the proportion of all accounts that are low-
income—and its participation in the competitive supply market.  In other words, neighborhoods 
with lower incomes tend to have higher rates of participation in the competitive supply 
market among both low-income customers and all other customers.   
 
This association between greater low-income populations and market participation rates is 
supported by multiple regression analysis, including as additional covariates (a covariate is a 
variable that is possibly predictive of the outcome under study) the total number of accounts in a 
zip code, differences in levels of participation among the different electric company service 
areas, and the presence of a municipal aggregator.  Variation in the shares of low-income 
accounts alone predicts approximately one third of the variation in how many low-income 
households participate in the competitive supply market at the zip code level (r-squared = 0.3).   
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This finding—that the share of low-income customers in a zip code predicts the rate at which 
consumers participate in the competitive market—is not causal; the data do not allow us to 
determine what drives customers to enter the market for competitive supply.  However, it merits 
further investigation, since the observed pattern is consistent with suppliers targeting 
economically disadvantaged areas for marketing and advertising, which may drive higher sign-
ups.  (Conversely, if suppliers targeted all areas of Massachusetts equally, one would not 
necessarily expect a low-income customer in Dover, a high-income community, to be more or 
less likely to purchase electricity from a competitive supplier than a low-income customer in 
Springfield.) 
 
Figure 3.13, below, is a scatter plot that shows that as the percentage of low-income households 
in a zip code increases, so, too, does the level of participation in the competitive supply market. 
 
Figure 3.13  Boston, Springfield, and Worcester Zip Codes by Share of Low-Income 
Customers and Rate of Participation in the Competitive Supply Market (June 2017) 
 
 
 
 
Finally, my regression analysis shows that neither the magnitude of the higher rates charged in 
the competitive supply market nor the number of suppliers operating in a given zip code was 
strongly predicted by zip code incomes or anything else in the set of demographic variables 
considered.  However, although neither the income or any other demographic variable associated 
with a zip code predicts the size of the premium to participate in the competitive supply market 
in that particular zip code, my analysis of rates paid shows that, on average, low-income 
households pay more to participate in the market than do non-low-income households. 
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3.7 Consumer loss examined at the supplier level 
 
I also computed net loss and average premiums for low-income customers separately by 
supplier.44  I analyzed various attributes of the competitive suppliers serving low-income 
households: their average premiums (weighted by usage), the number and percent of bills 
associated with each supplier, and the amount and percent of consumer loss (or gain) associated 
with each supplier.45   
 
Table 3.6 below shows the ten suppliers (with their identities concealed), for which at least 100 
total bills were rendered to low-income consumers, who charged the highest premiums during 
the 2016–2017 study period.46  
 
Table 3.6 Ten suppliers with the highest average premium – low-income households 
 
Masked 
Supplier ID 
Average 
Rate 
# of Bills 
Average 
Premium 
Share of 
Accounts 
Net Consumer 
Loss 
Share of 
Loss 
Supplier #1  $0.1671   2,635   $0.0778  0.22%  $118,919  0.50% 
Supplier #18  $0.1648   34,096   $0.0738  2.79%  $1,229,851  5.22% 
Supplier #47  $0.1547   36,739   $0.0648  3.01%  $1,327,411  5.63% 
Supplier #39  $0.1471   10,720   $0.0580  0.88%  $355,810  1.51% 
Supplier #12  $0.1416   136,009   $0.0516  11.13%  $3,449,749  14.64% 
Supplier #41  $0.1391   105,476   $0.0502  8.63%  $2,862,367  12.15% 
Supplier #37  $0.1394   56,781   $0.0502  4.65%  $1,644,197  6.98% 
Supplier #15  $0.1391   88,406   $0.0476  7.24%  $2,034,689  8.64% 
Supplier #25  $0.1404   9,600   $0.0436  0.79%  $157,136  0.67% 
Supplier #29  $0.1282   74,480   $0.0394  6.10%  $1,448,851  6.15% 
         
Total associated with top 10  554,942    45%  $14,628,982  62% 
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Table 3.7 below shows the ten suppliers for which electric companies rendered the most bills to 
low-income households.  These ten suppliers account for 67 percent of the bills rendered in the 
competitive supply market and 74 percent of the net consumer loss.  The ten suppliers and their 
respective rankings differs from those shown in Table 2.6 above, which corresponds with all 
households. 
 
Table 3.7 Ten suppliers with the highest number of bills – low-income households 
 
Supplier ID 
Average 
Rate 
# of Bills 
Average 
Premium 
Share of 
Accounts 
Net Consumer 
Loss 
Share 
of Loss 
Supplier #12  $0.1416   136,009   $0.0516  11.13%  $3,449,749  14.64% 
Supplier #42  $0.1108   106,105   $0.0191  8.69%  $1,187,957  5.04% 
Supplier #41  $0.1391   105,476   $0.0502  8.63%  $2,862,367  12.15% 
Supplier #15  $0.1391   88,406   $0.0476  7.24%  $2,034,689  8.64% 
Supplier #32  $0.1225   82,977   $0.0328  6.79%  $1,696,511  7.20% 
Supplier #6  $0.1264   76,048   $0.0364  6.23%  $1,554,980  6.60% 
Supplier #29  $0.1282   74,480   $0.0394  6.10%  $1,448,851  6.15% 
Supplier #37  $0.1394   56,781   $0.0502  4.65%  $1,644,197  6.98% 
Supplier #34  $0.1081   48,707   $0.0178  3.99%  $527,076  2.24% 
Supplier #43  $0.1273   45,184   $0.0351  3.70%  $939,809  3.99% 
         
Total associated with top 10  820,173    67%  $17,346,187  74% 
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Table 3.8 below shows the ten suppliers responsible for the largest absolute net low-income 
consumer loss in Massachusetts.  In the aggregate, they account for 78 percent of the net 
consumer low-income loss although they account for only 65 percent of the bills rendered to 
households receiving subsidized rates on behalf of competitive suppliers.  The column “Ratio of 
% Loss to % of Accounts” shows that many of the suppliers’ shares of net consumer loss greatly 
exceed their corresponding shares of bills.  For example, Table 3.8 shows that approximately 11 
percent of all bills are rendered on behalf of Supplier #12, and yet Supplier #12’s consumers 
account for 15 percent of net consumer loss.   
 
Table 3.8   Ten suppliers responsible for the greatest aggregate consumer loss: low-income 
households  
 
Supplier ID 
Average 
Rate 
Number 
of Bills 
Average 
Premium 
Share of 
Accounts 
Net 
Consumer 
Loss 
Share 
of Loss 
Ratio of 
% Loss to 
% of 
Accounts 
Supplier #12  $0.1416   136,009   $0.0516  11.13%  $3,449,749  14.64% 132% 
Supplier #41  $0.1391   105,476   $0.0502  8.63%  $2,862,367  12.15% 141% 
Supplier #15  $0.1391   88,406   $0.0476  7.24%  $2,034,689  8.64% 119% 
Supplier #32  $0.1225   82,977   $0.0328  6.79%  $1,696,511  7.20% 106% 
Supplier #37  $0.1394   56,781   $0.0502  4.65%  $1,644,197  6.98% 150% 
Supplier #6  $0.1264   76,048   $0.0364  6.23%  $1,554,980  6.60% 106% 
Supplier #29  $0.1282   74,480   $0.0394  6.10%  $1,448,851  6.15% 101% 
Supplier #47  $0.1547   36,739   $0.0648  3.01%  $1,327,411  5.63% 187% 
Supplier #18  $0.1648   34,096   $0.0738  2.79%  $1,229,851  5.22% 187% 
Supplier #42  $0.1108   106,105   $0.0191  8.69%  $1,187,957  5.04% 58% 
          
Total associated with top 10  797,117    65% 
 
$18,436,565  78% 120% 
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3.8 Conclusions about the low-income market  
 
Based on my examination of competitive supplier data, I found that, on average, 101,922 low-
income households paid $23.6 million more over the July 2016 – June 2017 study period than 
they would have paid if they had paid their electric companies’ fixed basic service rates.  The 
average low-income household on competitive supply lost $231 over the course of the year.  
Some households lost more than $541.   
 
The evidence of harm to low-income households is overwhelming—the participation rate is 
double that of all other households, and low-income households pay a larger premium to 
participate because the rates they are charged are higher than the rates charged to non-low-
income households.  These results are particularly alarming due to the disproportionate real-
world impact of consumer loss in connection with the payment of an essential service—
electricity—for these households with limited incomes where expenditures on utilities represent 
a larger share of the household budget. 
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4. Reports of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices  
 
Complaints regarding the practices of competitive suppliers have increased significantly in recent 
years.  In the seven years from 2006 to 2013, the AGO received approximately 215 complaints about 
competitive suppliers.  Since 2014, however, the AGO has received more than 700 complaints 
regarding competitive suppliers.  The complaints often allege a variety of unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices, many times alleging more than one type of misconduct per complaint.  
  
The complaints typically include one or more of the following common allegations: 
  
• the competitive supplier promised savings, but the consumer ultimately pays substantially 
more for electric supply than he or she did before; 
• the competitive supplier falsely represented an affiliation with the consumer’s electric 
company;  
• the competitive supplier falsely represented that it was “with” a state program (or the electric 
company) and contacted the consumer in order to “reduce” the consumer’s electricity bill; 
• the competitive supplier, once provided with the consumer’s account number, switched the 
consumer’s account to the supplier without the consumer’s affirmative consent; 
• the competitive supplier took advantage of the consumer’s age, disability, or language barrier 
in order to sign the consumer up for the supplier’s product; 
• competitive suppliers employing high-pressure, aggressive sales tactics, including harassing 
consumers by coming to their door or calling their phone over and over again in a short time 
span; 
• the competitive supplier solicited the consumer on the phone, even where the consumer is on 
the “Do Not Call” list; 
• competitive suppliers going door-to-door ignore “No Solicitation” signs; 
• the competitive supplier’s lack of customer service makes it difficult or impossible for a 
consumer to cancel their contract;  
• the competitive supplier requires a high termination fee to cancel the contract; 
• the competitive supplier promised a certain rate, but the consumer was charged a higher rate 
instead; and 
• the competitive supplier made misleading claims about the sources and amounts of renewable 
energy it provides to its customers.  
 
These allegations are not just common in Massachusetts, but across the fourteen states and 
jurisdictions in which the electric supply market was deregulated for residential consumers (the 
“deregulated states”).  A perfunctory internet search indicates that in the last five years, thirteen of the 
fourteen deregulated states have launched investigations regarding unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices by electric suppliers who also are licensed to do business in Massachusetts.  This includes at 
least 35 investigations or lawsuits by state public utility commissions and state attorneys general 
and/or consumer advocates.  Moreover, suppliers who are licensed to do business in Massachusetts 
have been the subject of at least 59 class action lawsuits, as well as numerous individual lawsuits—all 
alleging unfair and deceptive acts and practices consistent with the types of complaints regularly 
received by the AGO.47  Unfortunately, the investigations and lawsuits appear to have little deterrent 
effect—rather, they seem to be borne by the suppliers as a mere cost of doing business. 
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5. Remedies 
5.1  End the individual residential market for electric supply48 
 
My analysis shows that almost 500,000 Massachusetts consumers overpaid $176.8 million over a 
two-year period for electricity, an essential service.  The impact of this overpayment is 
disproportionately felt by low-income customers, economically disadvantaged communities, and 
other vulnerable populations.  Moreover, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3, above, the benefits 
that these customers received from the additional amounts paid to competitive suppliers are 
small to non-existent.   
 
Accordingly, I find that the individual residential market for electric supply causes significant net 
harm to Massachusetts consumers, and I strongly recommend that the Legislature end the 
individual residential market for electric supply.49   
 
I also believe that implementing stronger consumer protection measures, although preferable to 
the status quo, would be insufficient to prevent further substantial net harm to Massachusetts 
consumers.  Based on the experiences of other restructured states, as well as the basic economics 
of the individual residential market, I believe that it is not possible to transform the individual 
residential market from one that causes significant net harm to Massachusetts consumers to one 
that provides net benefits.  
 
Other restructured states have implemented a variety of strict legislative and regulatory 
measures, but consumer harm continues to occur.  In its February 2016 Order (discussed in 
Section 5.2.3, below), the New York Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”) noted that an 
earlier attempt to strengthen rules regarding competitive supplier (referred to in New York as 
“ESCOs” or energy supply companies) business practices had not reduced complaints:  
 
Despite the [NYPSC]’s recent modifications to the [Uniform Business Practices] to 
strengthen and enhance customer protections through changes in the marketing 
standards and customer enrollment procedures that ESCOs and their representatives 
must follow, abuses continue. These abuses lead to customer complaints filed with the 
[NYPSC], which have been steadily increasing. The total number of initial complaints 
received by the [NYPSC] against ESCOs in 2015 was 5,044.50 
 
In December 2016, the NYPSC issued a notice launching an investigation into whether 
competitive suppliers should continue to market to residential and small business consumers.51   
 
In Connecticut, the legislature and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (“PURA”) strengthened 
consumer protection through the adoption of a number of comprehensive measures, including a 
ban on variable rates.52  However, these measures have merely mitigated the loss and not 
transformed the market into one that provides net benefits.  Before these measures were adopted, 
I computed a net monthly “overpayment” of $13.7 million by Connecticut’s households, or as 
much as $164 million annually in 2014.53  After substantial regulatory and legislative effort to 
establish additional consumer safeguards, the consumer loss in Connecticut declined to “only” 
$58 million during 201554 and $46 million during 2017.55    
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Moreover, as recently as January 2017, the Connecticut Consumer Counsel called for an 
investigation into abusive and deceptive marketing practices by competitive electric suppliers 
who target vulnerable consumers,56 although PURA has thus far declined to open an 
investigation.  
 
In Maryland, the Public Service Commission has found that some suppliers fail to comply with 
the provisions of Maryland’s Door-to-Door Sales Act.  In its 2014 decision fining one supplier 
for various violations, the Commission stated, among other things: “we conclude that [the 
supplier] committed at least hundreds of violations of the Door-to-Door Sales Act by not 
providing consumers with contracts that contain the required language in that Act” and “there is 
no dispute that [the supplier’s] door-to-door solicitations were in violation of this Act over many 
months.  Considering how significantly [the supplier] relied upon this type of solicitation to 
attract new consumers, its ongoing failure to comply with this law is remarkable.  . . . The record 
clearly establishes that these violations of Maryland law were an ongoing practice in [the 
supplier’s] door-to-door solicitations.”57 
 
Complaints and issues with marketing practices across jurisdictions, as seen in further detail in 
Appendix 4, are so consistent because the economics of the competitive supply market suggest 
that the market will always fail individual residential consumers: 
 
• Suppliers compete with the electric companies’ basic service, which is a wholesale price 
that tracks current wholesale market prices relatively closely and is bought in bulk without 
any profit mark-up. 
 
• The electricity delivered to the consumer is exactly the same whether purchased from a 
supplier or the electric company. 
 
• Suppliers have significant expenses for overhead (marketing, multiple employees).   
 
• Due to these structural disadvantages, suppliers cannot, on average, “beat” basic service 
long-term.   
 
• Suppliers, however, have a high level of sophistication relative to residential consumers 
regarding the relatively complex energy supply markets.   
 
These factors create a harmful combination that results in consumers overpaying for sometimes 
absolutely no benefit.58  And, as discussed in detail in Section 2.5 above, when suppliers claim to 
offer benefits, those benefits are rarely, if ever, commensurate with the premium charged by 
those suppliers. 
 
Rather than wait for more consumers to be harmed, the Massachusetts Legislature should 
seriously consider whether the competitive supply market lends itself to competition.  The large 
and growing annual consumer losses (which disproportionately harm low-income and minority 
communities) suggest that suppliers have found Massachusetts markets to be attractive precisely 
because they are able to charge high rates.   
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Moreover, the end of the competitive supply market would not end or even harm consumer 
choice.  Those consumers interested in paying variable rates that follow approximate monthly 
market prices can elect the variable basic service rate.  Consumers who have an interest in fixing 
their rate for a year’s time can participate in their electric companies’ budget billing programs.  
Finally, consumers who would like to purchase “green” or renewable energy can elect to 
purchase renewable energy through a “green button” program whereby they send their 
consumption to a third-party that will then bill them for REC (renewable energy certificate) 
purchases, or they may participate in any town-run green program.   
 
Accordingly, because consumer harm—and especially consumer harm to vulnerable 
populations—is likely to continue even with the most stringent legislative and regulatory 
measures and oversight, I recommend that the Legislature end the practice of marketing and 
selling electric supply to residential consumers on an individual basis (i.e., those residential 
consumers who do not participate in a municipal aggregation or other group-buying 
collaborative). 
5.2 If the market continues to operate, take action to address imbalances. 
 
Although my primary recommendation is that the Legislature end the practice of marketing and 
selling electric supply to residential consumers on an individual basis, I have also considered 
ways to enhance consumer safeguards that may mitigate the consumer harm that would result if 
the competitive supply market were to continue.   
 
My research and analysis shows that Massachusetts lacks several consumer protection measures 
that have been implemented in other states.  I recommend that regulators and legislators 
implement consumer protection safeguards to deter, mitigate, and prevent further consumer 
harm.  I discuss these safeguards below.  Moreover, as I demonstrate below, it is essential to 
allocate and fund sufficient resources to enforce consumer protection safeguards.  
5.2.1 Well-functioning markets require transparency and informed decision-making. 
 
It seems improbable that if consumers fully understood the options available to them, they would 
choose to pay, on balance, tens of millions of dollars more each year for electricity than they 
would if they stayed with electric companies.  Going forward, it is critically important that 
suppliers be fully accountable to the Legislature, the Department, and consumers for the prices 
they charge and the practices they use to market and sell electricity.  As regulators in another 
state aptly observed: “In a deregulated market, a consumer’s ability to make rational, well-
informed choices among competing suppliers – and indeed the stability and growth of the 
supplier marketplace itself – is directly undermined by deceptive misrepresentations . . . .”59  
 
Prior to this report, it was largely unknown what, if any, benefits the competitive electric supply 
marketplace delivered to Massachusetts consumers.  As currently constructed, the Massachusetts 
market operates largely in a “black box.”  This lack of transparency makes it infinitely more 
difficult to hold bad actors in the marketplace accountable for their abuses.  Accordingly, going 
forward, critical information about the market should be publicly provided.  The information 
should be clear, accurate, comprehensive, and easily accessible.   
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I recommend, at minimum, making publicly available (ideally in one location) the following 
information about the competitive supply market: 
 
• Each supplier’s historical rates by product for the prior 24 months; 
• The current and historical residential fixed basic service rates for each electric company 
for the last 24 months.60  This disclosure should also include key information about 
residential fixed basic service, which most consumers do not know, but which is critical 
to assessing the viability of many long-term, fixed rate product offers—the pattern of 
basic service rates in the summer and winter months.61   
• Aggregated complaint data for each supplier based on complaints received by the 
Department, the AGO, and the electric companies. 
 
Additionally, each electric company should be required to submit a monthly report for 
publication on the Department’s website (either in a Department docket or elsewhere), which 
details the following: 
 
• All suppliers in each electric company’s service territory who billed consumers for the 
prior month;  
• All the rates charged by each supplier for the prior month; and  
• The number of residential consumers charged per supplier, per rate.62 
 
I recommend implementing monthly reports because this will enable those charged with 
oversight of the market to regularly assess and report on the current state of the market.  Reports 
such as the Electric Supplier Market Fact Sheets generated in Connecticut by the Office of 
Consumer Counsel provide the type of transparency needed for the competitive supply 
marketplace.63  The most recent Connecticut report shows that, in the aggregate, Connecticut 
consumers paid $46 million more during 2017 to suppliers than if they were served by their 
electric companies.  The Connecticut fact sheet (included as Appendix 5A) also disaggregates 
this amount to show, by supplier, the annual payment that the suppliers’ consumers paid either 
above or below what they would have paid if they stayed with the electric companies’ basic 
service.  Massachusetts policy makers and consumers merit the same level of accountability and 
information as are provided policy makers and consumers in Connecticut. 
 
The Legislature and the Department should also take steps to ensure that the Commonwealth’s 
most vulnerable consumers are not taken advantage of by suppliers.  Among other things, 
electric companies should report semi-annually to the Department and the AGO the numbers of 
low-income consumers and all other residential consumers by supplier, and by electric company, 
separately by zip code.  This information should help the Department and the AGO monitor 
whether any particular suppliers are targeting vulnerable populations. Appendix 2C shows 
household participation in the competitive supply market by zip code-municipality and Appendix 
3B through 3I shows household participation separately for all households, low-income 
households, and non-low-income households for certain municipalities.  
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The disproportionately higher participation by low-income households in the competitive supply 
market merits scrutiny.  Moreover, it may be appropriate for municipal leaders, local agencies, 
and community organizations to monitor suppliers’ practices in those communities with 
particularly high levels of consumer participation.  I recommend that the Department maintain a 
page on its Shopping for Competitive Supply website, energyswitchma.gov, that shows which 
suppliers are active in which communities based on billing data provided by electric companies.   
5.2.2 Adequate oversight and enforcement are essential 
 
Currently, competitive electric suppliers must comply with various consumer protection laws and 
regulations in Massachusetts, including G.L. c. 164, § 1F and G.L. c. 102C; Department 
regulations at 220 CMR 11.00; and AGO regulations at 940 CMR 19.00.64  However, the mere 
existence of regulations and laws is insufficient to protect consumers.  Although I support the 
implementation of stronger legislative and regulatory measures, I also caution legislators and 
regulators that significant consumer harm likely will continue.  As discussed in Section 6.1, 
above, the existence of Maryland’s Door-to-Door Sales Act did not prevent deceptive sales 
practices or consumer harm, nor did the measures implemented by the NY PSC or the CT 
PURA.  
 
As some competitive suppliers continue to operate in violation of existing laws and regulations, 
strong and timely enforcement via supplier-specific investigations is needed to ensure 
compliance.  The experience of consumer advocates and regulators in Massachusetts and in other 
states demonstrates that it is time-consuming and resource-intensive to investigate suppliers that 
may engage in deceptive and aggressive sales practices, representing yet more costs of 
competition for taxpayer-funded public agencies with limited budgets. 
 
In order to allow for more efficient and timely investigations and enforcement measures, the 
Legislature should consider legislation that authorizes the Department to assess all suppliers for 
the purposes of establishing an enforcement fund for regulators to dedicate a team to enforce 
applicable laws and regulations.65   
 
Finally, last year the Department issued an order in a proceeding, D.P.U. 16-156, which I believe 
should allow for more rigorous oversight of competitive suppliers.  The Department adopted 
interim guidelines for formal investigations and proceedings regarding competitive suppliers 
(“Interim Guidelines”).  The intent of these Interim Guidelines is to provide a process and 
procedure that will be uniformly implemented when a competitive supplier has allegedly violated 
the Department’s regulations, and will apply to all competitive supply proceedings that require 
compliance with G.L. c. 30A.  Under G.L. c. 164, § 1F and, more specifically, 220 CMR § 
11.07(4)(c), the Department has the authority to assess penalties in connection with violations of 
its regulations, as well as the authority to revoke or place conditions on a supplier’s license for 
non-compliance.     
 
In summary, if competition in the competitive supply market is permitted to continue, I 
recommend the establishment of a dedicated enforcement team funded by competitive suppliers.   
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5.2.3 The Legislature should strongly consider more targeted remedies.  
 
My analysis shows that consumers overpaid by $176.8 million from July 2015—June 2017 for 
an essential service.  Other states have found that residential customers who receive competitive 
supply in their states pay more than default service but do not necessarily derive any (or derive 
negligible) value from some of these products.  Accordingly, the Legislature may want to 
consider enacting some of the targeted remedies proposed or enacted elsewhere, such as in New 
York66 and Connecticut, which require that competitive suppliers who do not guarantee savings 
provide something of actual value to the consumer.   
 
The New York PSC, in addition to considering whether suppliers should be completely 
prohibited from serving their current products to mass-market consumers, issued an order 
prohibiting service to low-income customers by competitive suppliers in December 2016.67   
 
In Connecticut, the legislature and PURA prohibited suppliers from charging variable rates due 
to findings that variable rates caused significant harm to consumers.68  As detailed in Section 4 
above, many Massachusetts consumer complaints concern suppliers that offer low introductory 
rates to consumers and then subsequently increase them significantly, often without warning.  
Low initial rates attract consumers who may not understand or have been informed adequately 
that the rates are variable and may increase.  The Legislature should thus consider prohibiting 
variable rates. 
 
Another source of consumer complaints concerns slamming—the practice of switching a 
consumer to a supplier without the consumer’s explicit authorization to do so.  Slamming can 
occur when a sales representative acquires the consumer’s account number from the consumer or 
the consumer’s bill.  All electric companies should be required to develop plans to implement a 
“do not switch” option for consumers to block their accounts from unauthorized switching from 
basic service, including a robust program to educate consumers about the availability of the no-
switch option.   
5.3 Summary 
 
Absent legislative and regulatory intervention, the existing competitive supply market will 
continue to lead to substantial and unwarranted consumer harm. Implementing strong consumer 
measures and enforcing these measures are time-consuming and resource-intensive.  These costs 
should not be overlooked when weighing the costs and benefits of residential electric supply 
competition.  Until such time as the Commonwealth’s policy makers take steps to protect 
consumers, annual consumer losses in the tens of millions likely will continue and low-income 
consumers will continue to spend millions more for an essential service than they would have if 
they had stayed with their electric companies. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The goal of a competitive supply market should be to encourage efficient suppliers to stay in the 
market and inefficient ones to exit the market.  However, the typical scenario experienced by 
other states is one in which there is substantial consumer harm prompting extensive regulatory 
and legislative intervention, only to see consumer harm continue.  The most effective action, 
therefore, would be to end the competitive supply market. 
 
If, on the other hand, competitive suppliers were to continue to operate in the competitive supply 
market, timely action is necessary to mitigate consumer harm in Massachusetts.  Such action 
would include taking steps to monitor whether any particular suppliers are targeting vulnerable 
populations through increased transparency and oversight.  Public accountability is essential.  
Information regarding suppliers’ rates and complaints by supplier and by category should be 
easily accessible.  Finally, regulations without sufficient enforcement are meaningless.  
Accordingly, the Legislature should ensure that regulators are provided with the authority and 
resources necessary to pursue those suppliers who violate Massachusetts law.   
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Endnotes 
1 https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/01/05/FY2018LIHEAPIncomeEligibility.pdf. 
 
2 Sarah M. Bosley, who has been active in utility regulation since 1999, contributed to this report.  See Exhibit ES1 
for Ms. Baldwin’s experience and qualifications. 
3 Actual consumer losses depend on customers’ usage, their choice of supplier, and the rate that the supplier charges 
(individual suppliers charge a wide range of rates to their various customers). 
4 In some instances, the competitive supplier may offer “green” or “renewable” electricity, which entails both the 
purchase of electricity from the grid as well as Renewable Energy Certificates that may “offset” some or all of the 
consumer’s electricity use.   
5 Residential consumers also have the choice to sign up for a variable basic service rate. 
6 Although three electric companies serve Massachusetts, the billing data correspond with five non-overlapping 
territories because some mergers within the industry retained the separate billing of the acquired utilities. 
7 The electric companies’ monthly billing data show separately for each supplier (and for the most recent twelve-
month period, the electric companies provided information separately for each of the different rates that the supplier 
charged its consumer base during the month): the number of bills rendered, the total amount charged, and the total 
kWh associated with each distinct rate. I was able to isolate those bills with charges greater than if the usage had 
been billed at EDC rates from those bills with charges less than if the usage had been billed at electric company 
rates. 
8 All data in the bulleted list below is based on the 2016–2017 study period unless otherwise noted.   
9 Low-income households can apply for reduced electricity distribution rates.  Eligibility for the discount rates is 
based upon verification of a low-income customer’s receipt of any means-tested public benefit, or verification of 
eligibility for the low-income home energy assistance program, or its successor program, for which eligibility does 
not exceed 60 percent of the state median income for the size of the household.  G.L. c. 164, § 1F(4); 
http://www.mass.gov/hed/docs/dhcd/cd/liheap/liheapbenefit.pdf.  Thus, “any household that receives help from an 
income-tested government assistance program — whether Food Stamps, public housing, Medicaid, free school 
lunch, etc. — and whose income is at or below 60% of median income qualifies for the discount rates.”  Charlie 
Harak, Utility Advocacy for Low-Income Households in Massachusetts (National Consumer Law Center 3rd ed. 
2013), available at https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/stay%20connected/utility-handbook-2d-
ed.pdf.    
 
The low-income rate provides a discount of approximately 25 percent to 35 percent off the entire electric bill, which 
includes both distribution and supply charges. See https://www.eversource.com/Content/docs/default-source/rates-
tariffs/ema-greater-boston-rates.pdf?sfvrsn=10; https://www9.nationalgridus.com/masselectric/home/rates/4_res.asp.  
The electricity consumption for income-qualified households is billed at distribution rates that are lower than 
distribution rates for other residential customers.  However, as described above, they receive a subsidy calculated as 
a percentage of the customer’s total bill.  The customer’s total bill includes the customer’s supply charge, regardless 
of whether the customer receives basic service or competitive supply. 
10 Because, in some instances, the electric companies’ billing records show slightly different spellings of suppliers’ 
names, I had to make assumptions about whether similar, but not identical, names likely corresponded with the same 
supplier.  As a general rule, if the first five letters were the same, I treated the suppliers as the same.   
11 Average monthly usage among low-income households participating in the competitive supply market is 552 kWh 
in comparison with average monthly usage of 621 kWh among non-low-income households—this difference affects 
the calculation of annual average per-household losses for the two groups. 
12 Municipalities with municipal aggregations do not have trivial participation in the individual residential electric 
supply market.  For this group in June 2017, the participation rate in the individual residential electric supply market 
is 20 percent of total accounts (where the total is the sum of basic service accounts, competitive supply accounts, 
and accounts served by municipal aggregation suppliers, i.e., all households in the community), which is similar to 
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the participation rate for the rest of the state (21 percent during this month).  This group has about 140,000 accounts 
served by competitive suppliers, accounting for approximately 28 percent of the approximate 497,000 accounts 
associated with the June 2017 zip code data.   
13 The AGO requested granular data for June 2017 because this was the most recent data point at the time of the 
request. 
14 In this section and in subsequent sections of the report, I compare the market during the July 2016 through June 
2017 period with the market from the prior twelve-month period (July 2015 through June 2016). The data set from 
the prior year does not include the granular information regarding the differing rates charged by individual suppliers, 
but instead permits the calculation of the average rate charged by supplier in any given month.  My analysis of the 
market based on data from two consecutive years shows that the most recent year continues a pattern that persists 
and is a harbinger of future continuing harm to households throughout the state absent prompt and effective 
intervention. 
15 The EDC rate shown is a statewide average computed based on the competitive suppliers’ customers’ actual usage 
and the rates that their respective electric companies would have charged in each of the months for that usage.  
16 EDC rates vary among the service territories and during the year.  I computed a statewide average EDC rate of 
$0.0905 (that is, the average rate that customers of competitive suppliers would have paid their electric companies) 
based on the locations of the suppliers’ customers (which determines the electric companies that offer basic service), 
the months corresponding to their usage (because electric companies’ rates vary throughout the year), and the 
amount of their usage during the relevant time periods.   
17 During the first study period, Eversource charged two different rates, National Grid charged three different rates, 
and Fitchburg charged three different rates.  During the second study period, Eversource charged two different rates, 
National Grid charged four different rates, and Fitchburg charged three different rates.  See Appendix 2A for the 
EDC’s basic rates during the study period, and see Appendix 1A for a map of their service territories. 
18 I do not include supplier-specific results in my report to err on the side of caution in maintaining confidentiality.  
As Section 5, below, discusses, the Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel distributes an annual fact sheet with 
supplier-specific consumer gains and losses.  I recommend that similarly comprehensive and supplier-specific 
information be made public in Massachusetts to allow for informed decision-making by consumers and policy 
makers and to increase accountability by suppliers to policy makers and the general public. 
19 By contrast, the average annual consumer loss of $226 takes into consideration the groups of consumers who 
overpay and those who underpay.  The average annual overpayment of $269 corresponds with only those bills 
associated with competitive suppliers whose rates are more than the corresponding EDC basic service rate.   
20 It is also possible for suppliers to design fixed-rate electricity contracts to work in similar way to variable rate 
contracts with a teaser.  For example, the customer may save money during the initial period of the fixed-rate 
contract, but ultimately end up paying more than he or she would have otherwise later in the contract due to a drop 
in wholesale costs and basic service rates.   
21 I limited the supplier group to only those suppliers who rendered at least 100 bills during the 2016–2017 study 
period.  I used 100 total bills in a year as a cut-off for identifying suppliers with a non-trivial participation.  
Appendix 2D provides complete information for all suppliers that served consumers for all twelve months of the 
study period, and for which at least 100 bills were rendered during this time period. 
22 See Section 3 for a parallel analysis of suppliers and low-income households. 
23 See, e.g., suppliers’ offers of cash back cards and diner rewards cards.  
http://www.energyswitchma.gov/#/compare/1/1 site visited March 30, 2017.  
24 See, e.g., Angela Wise, et al. v. Energy Plus Holdings LLC, Case No. 1:11-cv-07345, in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York; https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/4945-judge-oks-
14m-energy-plus-class-action-settlement/ ($14 million settlement resolved allegations that a competitive supplier 
deceived customers into signing contracts by luring them with promises of rewards.) (last visited January 26, 2018). 
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25 Specifically, a search for electric supply offerings at zip code 02108 on December 6, 2017, showed that only 15 of 
56 offerings had a renewable element.   
 
26 http://energyswtichma.gov/#/, visited on March 7, 2017.     
27 The premium may be low at least in part to “greenwashing.”  Greenwashing is a phenomenon whereby suppliers 
claim to be “green” but are purchasing low-cost renewable energy certificates from sources that are not eligible 
under the Renewable Portfolio Standard.  Although these purchases allow a supplier to market its product as “green” 
they often have limited environmental benefits because they originate from older or out-of-region sources that do 
not promote “additionality,” i.e., additional renewable energy on the grid.   See, e.g., 
http://blog.massenergy.org/blog/competitive-electricity-suppliers; See also http://blog.massenergy.org/blog/class-i-
recs.   
28 The data provided by the electric companies included a small number of customers who reside in a municipality 
with a municipal light plant but are nonetheless served by an EDC and take service from a competitive supplier.  
Due to their small sample and their potential to skew the data, I have excluded them from my municipal-level 
analyses.   
29 A necessity does not have as much price elasticity of demand as do other normal goods (although it is a normal 
good) because, although consumers can curtail their usage to some extent, they cannot curtail their usage entirely. 
30 See Investigation by the Department of Public Utilities regarding Purchase of Receivables pursuant to G.L. c. 164, 
§ 1D and G.L. c. 164, § 76, D.P.U. 10-53 (2014). 
31 I estimated the size of the market by comparing the number of bills rendered and kWh purchased in each of the 
two study periods.   
32 Average monthly usage among low-income households participating in the competitive supply market is 552 kWh 
in comparison with average monthly usage of 621 kWh among non-low-income households, which affects the 
calculation of annual average per-household losses for the two groups. 
33 By contrast, the average annual consumer loss of $231 for low-income households takes into consideration the 
groups of consumers who overpay and those who underpay.  The overpayment of $265 corresponds with only those 
bills associated with competitive suppliers whose rates are more than the corresponding EDC basic service rate.   
34 The scope of this report does not include an analysis of the consumer loss (or gain) associated with households’ 
purchase of municipal aggregation (that is, a comparison of the rates that households pay municipal aggregation 
suppliers with the rates they would pay electric companies).    
35 The gray areas generally correspond with municipalities that are served by municipal light plants, however, there 
are some zip code portions of some municipalities that are mainly served by municipal power plants where there are 
non-municipal accounts (i.e., where customers are served by electric companies or competitive suppliers).  Those 
instances where areas are gray in the maps that depict low-income participation and are not gray in the maps that 
depict participation by all customers correspond to the few instances where there are not any low-income customers 
in the zip code. 
36 The electric companies provided data with rate and usage information corresponding with approximately 
500,0000 bills rendered on behalf of competitive suppliers during June 2017 disaggregated to the geographically 
granular level corresponding with zip codes.   
37 Zip code shapefiles are from MassGIS (http://www.mass.gov/anf/research-and-tech/it-serv-and-
support/application-serv/office-of-geographic-information-massgis/datalayers/zipcodes.html), to which Census data 
at the ZCTA level was joined using a publicly available crosswalk (https://www.udsmapper.org/zcta-
crosswalk.cfm). 
38 As used in 2011–2015 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, a limited 
English household is “one in which no member 14 years old and over (1) speaks only English or (2) speaks a non-
English language and speaks English very well.  In other words, all members 14 years old and over have at least 
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some difficulty with English.  By definition, English-only households cannot belong to this group.” (From 
https://www.census.gov/topics/population/language-use/about/faqs.html.) 
39 Using the same data, “percent minority” was constructed as the percentage of the population who are not both 
White and non-Hispanic, so this group captures non-White races and/or Hispanic ethnicities.  
40 For the purpose of comparing participation rates, low-income corresponds with those households receiving 
discounted electricity rates.  For the purpose of identifying the 20 town-zip code areas with the lowest incomes, I 
examined municipalities’ median incomes. 
41 See Section 1, above.  
42 See Appendix 2C for a complete list of municipalities and associated net consumer losses. 
43 For the purpose of identifying the 20 poorest communities, median incomes are used.  For the purpose of 
computing participation rates by low-income households, I examined households that receive subsidized electric 
rates.   
44 See Section 2.5, above, for the corresponding analysis for all residential customers.   
45 Appendix 2D provides complete information for all suppliers that served consumers for all twelve months of the 
2016–2017 study period, and for which at least 100 bills were rendered.   
46 I chose a cut-off of 100 total bills during the 12-month study period in order to exclude suppliers who serve very 
few low-income customers. 
47 See Appendix 4A for more detailed information regarding the investigations and lawsuits. 
48 This recommendation does not apply to the commercial and industrial market for competitive electric supply, nor 
does it apply to municipal aggregations or private aggregators who purchase residential competitive supply as part 
of a procurement of small and/or large commercial industrial supply.    
49 I do not, at this time, recommend any other changes to other sectors of the electric supply market. 
50 New York Public Service Commission Case 15-M-0127 (In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy Service 
Companies), Case 12-M-0476 (Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Assess Certain Aspects of the 
Residential and Small Non-Residential Retail Energy Markets in New York State, Case 98-M-1343 (In the Matter of 
Retail Access Business Rules), Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets and Establishing Further Process, issued and 
effective February 23, 2016 (“NYPSC Order”), at 12–13, footnote omitted.  As discussed in more detail in Section 
5.2.3, below, the decision was vacated but the NY PSC has issued another order indicating that it intends to further 
pursue the issue.  See Retail Energy Supply Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of State, 152 A.D.3d 1133, 1137–38, 59 
N.Y.S.3d 590, 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (“We do find, however, that the PSC's broad statutory jurisdiction and 
authority over the sale of gas and electricity authorized it to impose the limitations set forth in the Reset Order.”); 
see also Robert Walton, “New York Supreme Court Upholds State Prohibition on ESCO Sales to Low-Income 
Customers,” Utility Dive (July 5, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-york-supreme-court-upholds-state-
prohibition-on-esco-sales-to-low-incom/446380/.    
51 NYPSC, Case 12-M-0476, Notice of Evidentiary and Collaborative Tracks and Deadline for Initial Testimony and 
Exhibits, Issued December 2, 2106, at 3. (“After considerable experience with the offering of retail service to mass 
market customers by ESCOs, the Commission has determined that the retail markets serving mass-market customers 
are not providing sufficient competition or innovation to properly serve consumers.  Despite efforts to realign the 
retail market, customer abuses and overcharging persist, and there has been little innovation . . . ..”) 
52 Connecticut Public Act No. 14-75, AN ACT CONCERNING ELECTRIC CUSTOMER CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, signed into law, June 3, 2014.  
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Public+Act&bill_num=75& 
PURA Establishment of Rules for Electric Suppliers and EDCs Concerning Operations and Marketing in the 
Electric Retail Market, Connecticut Public Regulatory Authority Docket No. 13-07-18, Decision, November 5, 2014 
(Connecticut Decision). 
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53 PURA Establishment of Rules for Electric Suppliers and EDCs Concerning Operations and Marketing in the 
Electric Retail Market, Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority Docket No. 13-07-18, testimony of Susan 
M. Baldwin and Helen E. Golding on behalf of the Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel, March 10, 2014, at p. 
82. 
54 Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel, News Release, April 20, 2016, “Connecticut Residential Customers of 
Electric Suppliers Paid $58 Million More Than Standard Service in 2015.”  
55 See OCC fact sheet, included as Appendix 5A: Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel, “OCC Fact Sheet: 
Electric Supplier Market, January 2017 through December 2017,” updated on February 6, 2018. 
http://www.ct.gov/occ/lib/occ/fact_sheet_electric_supplier_market_december_2017.pdf 
56 “State Urged To Probe Abusive Electricity Suppliers,” Gregory B. Hladky, Hartford Courant, January 31, 2017, 
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-call-to-probe-abusive-electric-suppliers-20170130-story.html 
(reproduced in Appendix 5B). 
57 Maryland Public Service Commission Case No. 9324, Order 86211, issued March 7, 2014 (“Maryland Order”), at 
21-22, 25.  As summarized by the Maryland PSC: “Maryland’s ‘Door-to-Door Sales Act’ states that it is an ‘unfair 
or deceptive trade practice’ for a seller to fail to provide a consumer with:  1) A fully completed receipt or copy 
of the contract at the time of its execution, which ‘is in the same language as that principally used in the oral sales 
presentation;’ 2) A statement on the receipt or contract of the customer’s right to cancel the transaction within three 
days of the transaction which must be in bold and near the signature line; and 3) A separate ‘Notice of Cancellation’ 
form containing the statutorily required language.”  Maryland Order at 21, footnotes, omitted. 
58 Indeed, the NYPSC similarly attributes the unabated complaints it receives to a fundamental deficit in the existing 
competitive supplier (ESCO) model, finding “mass market customers purchasing commodity only from ESCOs are 
unlikely to obtain value commensurate with the premium paid in excess of the cost that would be paid as a full 
service customer of the utility.”  NYPSC Order at 12.   
59 Maryland Order, at 3. 
60 In 2017, the Department of Public Utilities created a webpage “Basic service information and rates,” found at: 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/basic-service-information-and-rates.   
61 During the past few years in Massachusetts, basic service rates have generally tended to go up during the cold 
winter months and go down during the warm summer months.  This type of information, which is readily available 
to those in the industry, should also be readily available to consumers shopping for supply. 
62 Electric companies in Connecticut currently provide this information to the Connecticut PURA under Docket 06-
10-22.  The information can be accessed by all members of the public.  Appendix 5C includes an excerpt of a report 
filed by Eversource for January 2017. 
63 See Appendix 5A. 
64 The AGO is currently revising its regulations to strengthen disclosure requirements.   
65 In Connecticut, as part of a settlement agreement with Energy Plus Holdings, LLC, the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Authority was provided with $4.5 million for consumer assistance and education and enforcement activity regarding 
third party electric suppliers. http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=545458   
66 In February 2016, the NYPSC issued an order intended to implement immediate reforms in the practices of the 
state’s energy service companies (ESCOs).  Those reforms were intended to 1) “address the unfair business 
practices” and 2) “ensure residential and small nonresidential commercial customers (mass market customers) are 
receiving value from the retail energy markets.” NYPSC Order at 1. In July 2016, the NYPSC order was partially 
vacated for failure to provide due process to the affected ESCOs and remanded to the agency for further 
proceedings.  National Energy Marketers Assn. v. New York State Pub. Serv. Commn., 2016 NY Slip Op. 26233 
Decided on July 22, 2016, Supreme Court, Albany County (Zwack, J.). On appeal, the judgment regarding due 
process was upheld, but, notably, the appeals court did affirm that the PSC had the authority to issue the rules set 
forth in the February 2016 order.  See Retail Energy Supply Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of State, 152 A.D.3d 1133, 
1137–38, 59 N.Y.S.3d 590, 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).  Although the specific remedies are in abeyance, the 
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NYPSC’s December 2016 Notice in the continuing investigation makes clear that the Commission retains the 
original concerns about the failure of competition in the retail energy market for mass market consumers and about 
the negative impact of industry practices on those consumers.  Notice of Evidentiary and Collaborative Tracks and 
Deadline for Initial Testimony and Exhibits, Issued December 2, 2106, at 3.  
67 NYPSC Case 15-M-0127 (In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy Service Companies), Case 12-M-0476 
(Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Assess Certain Aspects of the Residential and Small Non-Residential 
Retail Energy Markets in New York State, Case 98-M-1343 (In the Matter of Retail Access Business Rules), Order 
Adopting a Prohibition on Service to Low-Income Customers by Energy Service Companies, issued and effective 
December 16, 2016. 
68 Connecticut regulators stated: “Thousands of residential and business customers experienced significant rate 
increases under variable plans during late 2013 and early 2014.  Some customers only learned about rate increases 
after service had been rendered and the cost incurred.  The lack of notification regarding a change to the customer’s 
electric generation price when a fixed plan converted to a variable plan or when rates increased under a variable plan 
was unreasonable and contributed to the problems and issues identified in this proceeding.”  PURA Establishment of 
Rules for Electric Suppliers and EDCs Concerning Operations and Marketing in the Electric Retail Market, 
Connecticut Public Regulatory Authority Docket No. 13-07-18, Decision, November 5, 2014 (Connecticut 
Decision), at 1. 
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Experience	and	Qualifications	of	Susan	M.	Baldwin	
Experience and Qualifications of Susan M. Baldwin 
Susan M. Baldwin specializes in utility economics, regulation, and public policy, with a long-
standing focus on telecommunications markets and with a more recent focus on consumer issues 
in electric and gas markets.  Ms. Baldwin has been actively involved in public policy for forty 
years.  Since 2001, she has been consulting to public sector agencies, consumer advocates, and 
others as an independent consultant.  Ms. Baldwin received her Master of Economics from 
Boston University, her Master of Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School, and her 
Bachelor of Arts degree in Mathematics and English from Wellesley College.  Ms. Baldwin has 
extensive experience both in government and in the private sector.    
Ms. Baldwin has testified before 23 state public utility commissions on matters relating to 
telecommunications, electric and gas matters, and has also authored numerous comments and 
declarations submitted in various Federal Communications Commission proceedings on behalf 
of, among others, the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates.  Ms. Baldwin 
analyzed the Connecticut residential retail electric market in 2013–2014 on behalf of the 
Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel (“OCC”).  She co-sponsored testimony with Helen E. 
Golding on behalf of the OCC in Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control Docket No. 
13-07-18 that summarized these analyses and that proposed regulatory remedies for the
residential retail electric market in Connecticut.  Ms. Baldwin also analyzed approximately 800
individual complaints submitted to the Connecticut DPUC by consumers about the practices of
retail electric suppliers.
Ms. Baldwin has served in a direct advisory capacity to public utility commissions in five states, 
testified before state legislative committees in four states, and has sponsored expert reports in 
several state taxation proceedings.  Ms. Baldwin has contributed to numerous comments 
submitted to the FCC on diverse aspects of broadband in various proceedings on topics such as 
data collection, mapping, deployment, universal service, affordability, consumer protection, and 
network management.  Also, in state regulatory proceedings that have examined carriers’ 
proposals for spin-offs and for mergers, she has recommended conditions concerning broadband 
deployment and adoption. Ms. Baldwin has participated in more than twenty state and federal 
regulatory investigations of the impact of proposed transfers of control on consumers.  Ms.
Baldwin has been an invited speaker at more than 40 conferences. 
Ms. Baldwin served as a direct advisor to the then Massachusetts Department of 
Telecommunications and Energy (DTE) between August 2001 and July 2003, in Massachusetts 
DTE Docket 01-20, an investigation of Verizon’s total element long run incremental cost studies 
for recurring and nonrecurring unbundled network elements.  She assisted with all aspects of this 
comprehensive case in Massachusetts.  Ms. Baldwin analyzed recurring and nonrecurring cost 
studies, ran cost models, reviewed parties’ testimony, cross-examined witnesses, trained staff, 
met with the members of the Commission, assisted with drafting substantial portions of the 
major orders issued by the DTE, and also assisted with the compliance phase of the proceeding. 
Ms. Baldwin worked with Economics and Technology, Inc. for twelve years (1984 to 1988 and 
1992-2000), most recently as a Senior Vice President.  Among her numerous projects was the
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition?Appendix ES1
Prepared for the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General 1/3
responsibility of advising the Vermont Public Service Board in matters relating to a 
comprehensive investigation of NYNEX’s revenue requirement and proposed alternative 
regulation plan, and participating in all phases of that in-depth investigation.  During her first 
years at ETI, Ms. Baldwin was the Director of Publications and Tariff Research, and, in that 
capacity, she trained and supervised staff in the analysis of telecommunications rate structures, 
services, and regulation. 
Ms. Baldwin served four years (1988-1992) as the Director of the Telecommunications Division 
for the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (now the Department of 
Telecommunications & Cable), where she directed a staff of nine, and acted in a direct advisory 
capacity to the DPU Commissioners.  (The Massachusetts DTC maintains a non-separated staff, 
which directly interacts with the Commission, rather than taking an advocacy role of its own in 
proceedings).  Ms. Baldwin advised and drafted decisions for the Commission in numerous DPU 
proceedings including investigations of a comprehensive restructuring of New England 
Telephone Company’s rates, an audit of NET’s transactions with its NYNEX affiliates, 
collocation, ISDN, Caller ID, 900-type services, AT&T’s request for a change in regulatory 
treatment, pay telephone and alternative operator services, increased accessibility to the network 
by disabled persons, conduit rates charged by NET to cable companies, and quality of service.  
Under her supervision, staff analyzed all telecommunications matters relating to the regulation of 
the then $1.7-billion telecommunications industry in Massachusetts, including the review of all 
telecommunications tariff filings; petitions; cost, revenue, and quality of service data; and 
certification applications.  As a member of the Telecommunications Staff Committees of the 
New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners (NECPUC) and the National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), she contributed to the development 
of telecommunications policy on state, regional, and national levels. 
Ms. Baldwin has worked with local, state, and federal officials on energy, environmental, 
budget, welfare, and telecommunications issues.  As a policy analyst for the New England 
Regional Commission (NERCOM), Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (DPW), and 
Massachusetts Office of Energy Resources (MOER), she acquired extensive experience working 
with governors’ offices, state legislatures, congressional offices, and industry and advocacy 
groups.  As an energy analyst for NERCOM, Ms. Baldwin coordinated New England’s first 
regional seminar on low-level radioactive waste, analyzed federal and state energy policies, and 
wrote several reports on regional energy issues.  As a budget analyst for the DPW, she forecast 
expenditures, developed low-income policy, negotiated contracts, prepared and defended budget 
requests, and monitored expenditures of over $100 million.  While working with the MOER, Ms. 
Baldwin conducted a statewide survey of the solar industry and analyzed federal solar 
legislation. 
Ms. Baldwin received Boston University’s Dean’s Fellowship and received her Master of 
Economics from Boston University.  She received her Master of Public Policy from the Harvard 
Kennedy School and while attending the Harvard Kennedy School, Ms. Baldwin served as a 
teaching assistant for a graduate course in microeconomics and as a research assistant for the 
school’s Energy and Environmental Policy Center.  Ms. Baldwin received her Bachelor of Arts 
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degree in Mathematics and English from Wellesley College, and at Wellesley College was a 
Rhodes Scholar nominee.  She has also studied in Ghent, Belgium. 
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Appendix	1A	
	
Map	of	EDC	service	areas	and	municipal	light	plant	towns	
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Appendix	2A	
	
EDC	rates	during	study	period:	July	2015	–	June	2016			
and	July	2016	–	June	2017	
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Months Number	of	Months
July	2015	-	
June	2016
July	2016-	
June	2017
July	-	Sept 3 $0.09257 0.08042$							
Oct 1 $0.09257 0.08084$							
Nov	-	April 6 $0.13038 0.09787$							
May	-	June 2 $0.08042 0.09432$							
July	-	Dec 6 $0.10050 0.08208$							
Jan	-	June 6 $0.10844 0.10318$							
July	-	Dec 6 $0.09767 0.07708$							
Jan	-	June 6 $0.10426 0.09126$							
July	-	Nov 5 $0.07878 0.07878$							
Dec	-	May 6 $0.12239 0.09704$							
June 1 $0.11191 0.09934$							
National	Grid
Nstar
WMECo
Fitchburg
EDC	rates	during	study	period:			
July	2015	–	June	2016	and	July	2016	–	June	2017
Rate
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Appendix	2B	
	
Methodology	for	computing	consumer	loss	
Methodology for Computing Consumer Loss 
Overview 
This report analyzes detailed residential billing data rendered on behalf of competitive 
suppliers by EDCs for two different consecutive twelve-month time periods – the first 
time period spans July 2015 through June 2016 and the second time period spans July 
2016 through June 2017.  For each of these two data sets, the EDCs provided supplier-
specific and monthly-specific data.  The data for the second time period are more 
granular than for the first time period, and enable, among other things, a separate analysis 
of customers who saved versus those who lost by participating in the market.  Both years’ 
sets of data allow for approximations of the net consumer impact for each supplier and 
also statewide. A brief description follows that explains my methodology for computing 
the consumer loss associated with the individual residential electric supply market in 
Massachusetts.  The end of this appendix includes two tables based on excerpts from the 
actual data provided by the EDCs to illustrate further my methodology. 
Study Year 1: July 2015 – June 2016 
The billing data provided by EDCs to the AGO for the first of the two years that this 
report encompasses (that is July 2015 through June 2016) includes monthly data by 
supplier (separately for each EDC region) and separately for each of the twelve months, a 
total count of the customers served, a total count of the usage, and a total count of the 
dollar amount paid. From this information, one can compute the average rate per kWh by 
supplier and by month, as well as the average residential usage. Comparing these rates 
with the hypothetical rate that these customers would have paid had they been served 
instead by their EDC, assuming the same usage, yields an approximation of consumer 
loss, which I sum to compute the aggregate statewide loss.  However, these data did not 
contain information about the spread of specific rates billed by individual suppliers 
(which, as evidenced in subsequent data, can be quite substantial), and how usage varied 
across those different rates.  The table at the end of this appendix shows my methodology 
for computing the consumer impact, based on actual data for an unnamed supplier in a 
specific region during the 12-month period corresponding with “Study Year 1,” that is 
July 2015 through June 2016.    
Study Year 2: July 2016 – June 2017 
My methodology for computing the consumer impact for “Study Year 2” (July 2016 
through June 2017) is similar in approach.  With higher-resolution data showing the 
number of accounts billed and the kWh purchased from each supplier at each distinct 
rate, I was able to compare the actual rates charged by competitive suppliers with the 
hypothetical rate that would have applied in a given month if the customers had remained 
on basic service from the regional EDCs.  The spread of rates offered throughout the 
study year reveals that some customers saved money relative to the EDC rates, and others 
lost money relative to the EDCs’ rates.  An excerpt from source data for one competitive 
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supplier for March 2017 is attached and shows the wide variety of rates that suppliers 
charge their customer base.  In order to compute consumer loss for the second study year, 
I compared the counterfactual bill each group of customers would have paid their EDC 
during the corresponding time period, again assuming no change in usage, with the actual 
bill rendered for each competitive supplier at each distinct rate.  Net consumer loss is the 
sum of all these gains or losses. 
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MONTH 	  YEAR 	  COUNT 	  KWH 	  BILLED	  AMT
Average	  rate	  during	  
month	  (per	  kWh)
a AUG 2015 29,610	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   25,378,965	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $3,939,181.64 $0.155214
b DEC 2015 28,585	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   16,737,528	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,511,319.43 $0.150041
c JUL 2015 30,269	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   22,432,947	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $3,498,868.56 $0.155970
d NOV 2015 28,868	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   15,387,081	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,329,527.67 $0.151395
e OCT 2015 29,449	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   16,994,615	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,579,689.20 $0.151795
f SEP 2015 29,887	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   24,230,597	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $3,707,343.10 $0.153003
g APR 2016 27,332	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   14,050,030	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,160,098.38 $0.153743
h FEB 2016 27,903	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   17,326,927	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,584,814.07 $0.149179
i JAN 2016 28,260	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   18,622,963	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,785,582.17 $0.149578
j JUN 2016 27,010	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   14,598,573	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,259,329.73 $0.154764
k MAR 2016 27,607	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   15,443,273	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,336,325.05 $0.151284
l MAY 2016 27,165	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13,016,451	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $2,008,726.63 $0.154322
m 2015 176,668	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   121,161,733	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $18,565,929.60
n 2016 165,277	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   93,058,217	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $14,134,876.03
o Total 341,945	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   214,219,950	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $32,700,805.63
p Avg	  #	  of	  customers 28,495	  
q Avg	  usage	  per	  bill 626
Hypothetical	  EDC	  billing
r 2015 NSTAR $0.100500 $12,176,754
s 2016 NSTAR $0.108440 $10,091,233
t Total $22,267,987
$10,432,818
v Supplier	  A	  average	  rate $0.152651
w NSTAR	  averate	  rate $0.103949
x Amount	  above	  EDC 47%
y $366.12
Rows	  a	  through	  l	  are	  ordered	  alphabetically	  and	  include	  source	  data	  from	  NSTAR.
Rows	  m	  and	  n	  compute	  half-­‐year	  totals.
Row	  o	  computes	  12-­‐month	  total.
Row	  p	  computes	  the	  average	  number	  of	  customers	  served	  by	  Supplier	  A	  during	  any	  month.
Row	  q	  computes	  the	  average	  usage	  per	  bill	  rendered	  to	  Supplier	  A's	  customers.
Rows	  r	  through	  t	  compute	  the	  hypothetical	  billing	  had	  the	  customers	  been	  served	  by	  NSTAR.
Row	  u	  computes	  the	  total	  consumer	  loss	  by	  comparing	  total	  actual	  billing	  with	  hypothetical	  NSTAR	  billing.
Row	  v	  computes	  Supplier	  A's	  average	  rate	  during	  the	  12-­‐month	  period.
Row	  w	  computes	  NSTAR's	  hypothetical	  rate	  based	  on	  when	  the	  usage	  occurred.
Row	  x	  shows	  the	  "premium"	  that	  Supplier	  A's	  customers	  paid	  relative	  to	  NSTAR's	  rate.
Row	  y	  expresses	  the	  annual	  consumer	  loss	  on	  a	  per-­‐consumer	  basis.
The	  "average	  rate	  per	  month"	  is	  computed.
Illustrative	  Calculations	  Based	  on	  the	  Actual	  Billing	  of	  Supplier	  "A"
Consumer	  Loss	  -­‐	  annual	  per	  customer
Total	  Consumer	  loss
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Rate	class	
($/kwh)
Total	kWh	
billed	to	
residential	
accounts
Total	amount	
($)	billed	to	
residential	
accounts	
#	of	Residential	
Accounts	Billed
$0.15480 1,011											 $156.50 1
$0.15487 1,195											 $185.07 2
$0.15493 2,951											 $457.20 3
$0.15509 953														 $147.80 1
$0.15524 928														 $144.06 1
$0.15535 908														 $141.06 1
$0.15537 905														 $140.61 1
$0.15538 1,293											 $200.91 3
$0.15542 897														 $139.41 1
$0.15547 888														 $138.06 1
$0.15564 862														 $134.16 1
$0.15565 860														 $133.86 1
$0.15574 849														 $132.22 1
$0.15579 841														 $131.02 1
$0.15583 1,671											 $260.39 2
$0.15590 825														 $128.62 1
$0.15610 798														 $124.57 1
$0.15617 789														 $123.22 1
$0.15628 775														 $121.12 1
$0.15647 187														 $29.26 1
$0.15662 737														 $115.43 1
$0.15663 736														 $115.28 1
$0.15671 727														 $113.93 1
$0.15675 723														 $113.33 1
$0.15689 708														 $111.08 1
$0.15690 707														 $110.93 1
$0.15693 704														 $110.48 1
$0.15699 698														 $109.58 1
$0.15704 1,386											 $217.66 2
$0.15711 686														 $107.78 1
$0.15714 683														 $107.33 1
$0.15737 1,324											 $208.36 2
$0.15755 1,296											 $204.18 2
$0.15773 633														 $99.84 1
$0.15779 628														 $99.09 1
$0.15793 617														 $97.44 1
Supplier	X:	March	2017,	MeCO	Region
(subset	of	Supplier	X's	Bills	in	March	2017)
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Rate	class	
($/kwh)
Total	kWh	
billed	to	
residential	
accounts
Total	amount	
($)	billed	to	
residential	
accounts	
#	of	Residential	
Accounts	Billed
$0.15808 605														 $95.64 1
$0.15818 598														 $94.59 1
$0.15829 175														 $27.70 1
$0.15849 576														 $91.29 1
$0.15891 1,100											 $174.80 2
$0.15896 1,094											 $173.90 2
$0.15909 539														 $85.75 1
$0.15911 538														 $85.60 1
$0.15914 1,072											 $170.60 2
$0.15963 509														 $81.25 1
$0.15966 507														 $80.95 1
$0.15972 504														 $80.50 1
$0.15974 503														 $80.35 1
$0.15978 501														 $80.05 1
$0.15984 996														 $159.20 2
$0.15986 1,988											 $317.80 4
$0.16000 980														 $156.80 2
$0.16004 1,952											 $312.40 4
$0.16014 483														 $77.35 1
$0.16019 962														 $154.10 2
$0.16023 958														 $153.50 2
$0.16027 477														 $76.45 1
$0.16047 468														 $75.10 1
$0.16049 1,401											 $224.85 3
$0.16054 930														 $149.30 2
$0.16058 463														 $74.35 1
$0.16061 462														 $74.20 1
$0.16063 461														 $74.05 1
$0.16065 920														 $147.80 2
$0.16075 456														 $73.30 1
$0.16077 455														 $73.15 1
$0.16094 1,347											 $216.78 3
$0.16096 896														 $144.22 2
$0.16113 882														 $142.12 2
$0.16118 439														 $70.76 1
$0.16122 526														 $84.80 1
$0.16126 436														 $70.31 1
$0.16183 1,245											 $201.48 3
$0.16203 816														 $132.22 2
$0.16221 402														 $65.21 1
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Rate	class	
($/kWh)
Total	kWh	
billed	to	
residential	
accounts
Total	amount	
($)	billed	to	
residential	
accounts	
#	of	Residential	
Accounts	Billed
$0.16224 401														 $65.06 1
$0.16249 1,179											 $191.58 3
$0.16253 392														 $63.71 1
$0.16262 778														 $126.52 2
$0.16265 1,552											 $252.44 4
$0.16269 387														 $62.96 1
$0.16279 1,152											 $187.53 3
$0.16292 1,900											 $309.55 5
$0.16302 754														 $122.92 2
$0.16309 750														 $122.32 2
$0.16320 744														 $121.42 2
$0.16372 358														 $58.61 1
$0.16375 714														 $116.92 2
$0.16379 356														 $58.31 1
$0.16387 354														 $58.01 1
$0.16422 346														 $56.82 1
$0.16443 341														 $56.07 1
$0.16464 1,008											 $165.96 3
$0.16486 331														 $54.57 1
$0.16491 330														 $54.42 1
$0.16542 638														 $105.54 2
$0.16552 317														 $52.47 1
$0.16577 312														 $51.72 1
$0.16597 616														 $102.24 2
$0.16629 906														 $150.66 3
$0.16645 598														 $99.54 2
$0.16732 284														 $47.52 1
$0.16739 283														 $47.37 1
$0.16763 279														 $46.77 1
$0.16802 546														 $91.74 2
$0.16815 271														 $45.57 1
$0.16992 124														 $21.07 1
$0.17020 732														 $124.59 3
$0.17063 717														 $122.34 3
$0.17080 237														 $40.48 1
$0.17098 235														 $40.18 1
$0.17107 468														 $80.06 2
$0.17162 228														 $39.13 1
$0.17221 444														 $76.46 2
$0.17251 219														 $37.78 1
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? Appendix 2B
Prepared for the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General 6/7
Rate	class	
($/kwh)
Total	kWh	
billed	to	
residential	
accounts
Total	amount	
($)	billed	to	
residential	
accounts	
#	of	Residential	
Accounts	Billed
$0.17315 426														 $73.76 2
$0.17348 840														 $145.72 4
$0.17477 199														 $34.78 1
$0.17503 1,182											 $206.88 6
$0.17528 585														 $102.54 3
$0.17679 552														 $97.59 3
$0.17724 362														 $64.16 2
$0.17917 676														 $121.12 4
$0.18081 160														 $28.93 1
$0.18293 300														 $54.88 2
$0.18384 292														 $53.68 2
$0.18440 91																	 $16.78 1
$0.18632 136														 $25.34 1
$0.19532 218														 $42.58 2
$0.19750 104														 $20.54 1
$0.20041 196														 $39.28 2
$0.20489 90																	 $18.44 1
$0.21717 53																	 $11.51 1
$0.22600 130														 $29.38 1
$0.25532 47																	 $12.00 1
$0.26786 42																	 $11.25 1
$/	kWh,	
Supplier	X	in	
March	2017
Total	kWh	
billed	to	
residential	
accounts
Total	amount	
($)	billed	to	
residential	
accounts	
#	of	Residential	
Accounts	Billed
$0.12426 2,016,726			 250,600.61$			 3,178	
Note:	The	numbers	above	are	an	excerpt	from	1056	rows	of	
billing	data	for	Supplier	X.		The	totals	below	correspond	with	the	
billing	information	in	all	1056	rows.		
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Consumer	loss	by	municipality	–		
aggregate	and	average	per-household	
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Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
Abington all 19,065$										 15.51$												 0.0265$													 19% 1,229															
Abington low 2,015$												 14.19$												 0.0281$													 26% 142																			
Acton all 14,132$										 11.22$												 0.0250$													 14% 1,259															
Acton low 1,190$												 15.26$												 0.0363$													 19% 78																					
Acushnet all 8,643$												 10.41$												 0.0230$													 20% 830																			
Acushnet low 1,808$												 12.56$												 0.0289$													 27% 144																			
Adams all 12,667$										 11.35$												 0.0248$													 26% 1,116															
Adams low 3,872$												 12.41$												 0.0280$													 37% 312																			
Agawam all 21,227$										 14.54$												 0.0269$													 20% 1,460															
Agawam low 3,782$												 15.37$												 0.0287$													 28% 246																			
Alford all 2,000$												 21.98$												 0.0348$													 25% 91																					
Alford low 65$																		 21.54$												 0.0464$													 38% 3																							
Allston all 22,383$										 12.11$												 0.0308$													 19% 1,848															
Allston low 2,262$												 12.78$												 0.0331$													 32% 177																			
Amesbury all 17,342$										 15.39$												 0.0293$													 16% 1,127															
Amesbury low 3,081$												 15.88$												 0.0362$													 29% 194																			
Amherst all 23,502$										 15.34$												 0.0297$													 15% 1,532															
Amherst low 3,833$												 18.79$												 0.0355$													 26% 204																			
Andover all 31,233$										 15.19$												 0.0251$													 16% 2,056															
Andover low 1,207$												 12.84$												 0.0218$													 22% 94																					
Aquinnah all 580$																 8.41$														 0.0205$													 14% 69																					
Aquinnah low 98$																		 32.66$												 0.0743$													 17% 3																							
Arlington all 31,478$										 12.39$												 0.0260$													 13% 2,541															
Arlington low 3,306$												 14.44$												 0.0351$													 25% 229																			
Ashby all 44$																		 7.35$														 0.0139$													 1% 6																							
Ashfield all 2,476$												 17.31$												 0.0316$													 15% 143																			
Ashfield low 527$																 20.28$												 0.0404$													 31% 26																					
Ashland all 12,736$										 11.55$												 0.0255$													 16% 1,103															
Ashland low 1,344$												 15.63$												 0.0357$													 21% 86																					
Assonet all 1,784$												 6.54$														 0.0147$													 18% 273																			
Assonet low 454$																 11.65$												 0.0266$													 30% 39																					
Athol all 20,398$										 14.81$												 0.0278$													 27% 1,377															
Athol low 6,985$												 15.98$												 0.0311$													 36% 437																			
Attleboro all 62,318$										 16.92$												 0.0298$													 21% 3,683															
Attleboro low 12,944$										 17.35$												 0.0354$													 32% 746																			
Consumer	Loss	by	Municipality	in	June	2017:	All	Households	and																																																																							
Low-Income	Households	(Sorted	Alphabetically)
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Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
Auburn all 22,087$										 13.94$												 0.0235$													 23% 1,584															
Auburn low 2,559$												 13.76$												 0.0240$													 27% 186																			
Auburndale all 3,360$												 11.91$												 0.0280$													 12% 282																			
Auburndale low 165$																 14.98$												 0.0390$													 13% 11																					
Avon all 4,927$												 14.80$												 0.0250$													 19% 333																			
Avon low 896$																 17.23$												 0.0305$													 29% 52																					
Ayer all 10,521$										 14.82$												 0.0258$													 20% 710																			
Ayer low 1,588$												 13.46$												 0.0294$													 37% 118																			
Barnstable all 1,885$												 7.31$														 0.0166$													 23% 258																			
Barnstable low 98$																		 12.27$												 0.0285$													 31% 8																							
Barre all 8,174$												 14.04$												 0.0249$													 27% 582																			
Barre low 1,342$												 12.43$												 0.0239$													 37% 108																			
Bass	River all 2,061$												 7.69$														 0.0176$													 15% 268																			
Bass	River low 212$																 11.18$												 0.0240$													 22% 19																					
Becket all 3,628$												 15.57$												 0.0288$													 13% 233																			
Becket low 475$																 11.86$												 0.0208$													 26% 40																					
Bedford all 6,438$												 9.43$														 0.0206$													 13% 683																			
Bedford low 684$																 18.99$												 0.0453$													 15% 36																					
Belchertown all 20,441$										 14.67$												 0.0252$													 22% 1,393															
Belchertown low 3,555$												 14.00$												 0.0278$													 36% 254																			
Bellingham all 20,556$										 13.88$												 0.0258$													 23% 1,481															
Bellingham low 2,653$												 18.69$												 0.0336$													 29% 142																			
Berlin all 3,623$												 13.03$												 0.0198$													 23% 278																			
Berlin low 209$																 10.43$												 0.0205$													 30% 20																					
Bernardston all 2,184$												 14.66$												 0.0261$													 15% 149																			
Bernardston low 336$																 17.66$												 0.0340$													 15% 19																					
Beverly all 43,351$										 16.06$												 0.0308$													 17% 2,699															
Beverly low 5,498$												 15.40$												 0.0373$													 27% 357																			
Billerica all 43,562$										 17.37$												 0.0308$													 17% 2,508															
Billerica low 5,373$												 21.84$												 0.0404$													 30% 246																			
Blackstone all 12,454$										 11.54$												 0.0224$													 30% 1,079															
Blackstone low 1,949$												 13.17$												 0.0282$													 41% 148																			
Blandford all 1,361$												 15.65$												 0.0282$													 13% 87																					
Blandford low 151$																 12.59$												 0.0232$													 22% 12																					
Bolton all 4,945$												 14.13$												 0.0198$													 19% 350																			
Bolton low 268$																 22.37$												 0.0346$													 35% 12																					
Boston all 76,476$										 9.82$														 0.0209$													 11% 7,784															
Boston low 15,832$										 11.46$												 0.0285$													 31% 1,382															
Bourne all 5,141$												 9.16$														 0.0206$													 21% 561																			
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Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
Bourne low 848$																 13.46$												 0.0306$													 26% 63																					
Boxford all 11,280$										 22.97$												 0.0317$													 17% 491																			
Boxford low 113$																 18.81$												 0.0381$													 13% 6																							
Brant	Rock all 324$																 9.82$														 0.0207$													 14% 33																					
Brant	Rock low 95$																		 13.57$												 0.0266$													 37% 7																							
Brewster all 11,340$										 6.81$														 0.0168$													 20% 1,666															
Brewster low 919$																 11.49$												 0.0256$													 21% 80																					
Bridgewater all 25,930$										 17.32$												 0.0268$													 17% 1,497															
Bridgewater low 3,085$												 18.58$												 0.0332$													 26% 166																			
Brighton all 32,625$										 9.93$														 0.0233$													 17% 3,284															
Brighton low 3,550$												 13.50$												 0.0330$													 26% 263																			
Brimfield all 5,929$												 14.19$												 0.0221$													 26% 418																			
Brimfield low 723$																 13.15$												 0.0219$													 30% 55																					
Brockton all 180,573$								 16.24$												 0.0325$													 33% 11,122													
Brockton low 59,507$										 16.82$												 0.0354$													 45% 3,538															
Brookfield all 6,535$												 12.91$												 0.0222$													 32% 506																			
Brookfield low 1,388$												 13.48$												 0.0242$													 41% 103																			
Brookline all 29,523$										 12.52$												 0.0278$													 11% 2,359															
Brookline low 1,446$												 15.22$												 0.0371$													 15% 95																					
Buckland all 2,595$												 18.41$												 0.0341$													 16% 141																			
Buckland low 446$																 17.82$												 0.0331$													 20% 25																					
Burlington all 17,004$										 11.84$												 0.0256$													 15% 1,436															
Burlington low 2,127$												 15.41$												 0.0351$													 25% 138																			
Buzzards	Bay all 3,238$												 8.18$														 0.0192$													 22% 396																			
Buzzards	Bay low 600$																 13.96$												 0.0331$													 24% 43																					
Cambridge all 50,183$										 14.78$												 0.0350$													 11% 3,395															
Cambridge low 10,084$										 17.82$												 0.0439$													 32% 566																			
Canton all 15,459$										 11.17$												 0.0246$													 15% 1,384															
Canton low 1,945$												 14.85$												 0.0344$													 21% 131																			
Carlisle all 2,356$												 8.10$														 0.0171$													 15% 291																			
Carlisle low 120$																 24.00$												 0.0520$													 19% 5																							
Carver all 6,777$												 9.20$														 0.0192$													 18% 737																			
Carver low 1,656$												 12.08$												 0.0270$													 26% 137																			
Cataumet all 786$																 6.14$														 0.0188$													 18% 128																			
Cataumet low (7)$																			 (6.95)$													 (0.0150)$												 4% 1																							
Centerville all 8,920$												 7.02$														 0.0161$													 21% 1,270															
Centerville low 1,046$												 13.58$												 0.0288$													 21% 77																					
Charlemont all 2,682$												 18.50$												 0.0342$													 21% 145																			
Charlemont low 772$																 20.88$												 0.0407$													 33% 37																					
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	2C
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 4/21
Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
Charlestown all 9,590$												 9.07$														 0.0171$													 14% 1,057															
Charlestown low 286$																 12.45$												 0.0288$													 17% 23																					
Charlton all 19,103$										 13.89$												 0.0218$													 27% 1,375															
Charlton low 1,563$												 13.25$												 0.0235$													 31% 118																			
Chatham all 5,758$												 8.68$														 0.0230$													 17% 663																			
Chatham low 261$																 13.74$												 0.0316$													 18% 19																					
Chelmsford all 31,851$										 15.38$												 0.0280$													 15% 2,071															
Chelmsford low 3,286$												 17.20$												 0.0341$													 24% 191																			
Chelsea all 61,037$										 13.22$												 0.0301$													 36% 4,616															
Chelsea low 19,559$										 14.51$												 0.0348$													 47% 1,348															
Cheshire all 4,821$												 13.47$												 0.0263$													 23% 358																			
Cheshire low 1,055$												 13.18$												 0.0299$													 36% 80																					
Chesterfield all 1,246$												 18.32$												 0.0335$													 11% 68																					
Chesterfield low 283$																 21.77$												 0.0422$													 20% 13																					
Chestnut	Hill all 11,608$										 12.22$												 0.0237$													 14% 950																			
Chestnut	Hill low 687$																 18.07$												 0.0432$													 20% 38																					
Chilmark all 1,111$												 6.04$														 0.0183$													 12% 184																			
Chilmark low 30$																		 14.83$												 0.0324$													 14% 2																							
Clarksburg all 1,620$												 12.36$												 0.0258$													 18% 131																			
Clarksburg low 385$																 11.65$												 0.0240$													 24% 33																					
Clinton all 24,332$										 13.87$												 0.0276$													 27% 1,754															
Clinton low 4,434$												 13.48$												 0.0290$													 42% 329																			
Cohasset all 9,864$												 21.58$												 0.0317$													 14% 457																			
Cohasset low 140$																 9.33$														 0.0168$													 19% 15																					
Colrain all 2,772$												 16.70$												 0.0310$													 19% 166																			
Colrain low 547$																 17.11$												 0.0312$													 26% 32																					
Conway all 2,316$												 18.53$												 0.0345$													 15% 125																			
Conway low 319$																 19.95$												 0.0387$													 28% 16																					
Cotuit all 2,800$												 6.50$														 0.0160$													 18% 431																			
Cotuit low 483$																 16.64$												 0.0372$													 31% 29																					
Cummaquid all 1,093$												 8.28$														 0.0192$													 26% 132																			
Cummaquid low (7)$																			 (6.95)$													 (0.0150)$												 6% 1																							
Cummington all 949$																 13.56$												 0.0258$													 13% 70																					
Cummington low 41$																		 8.15$														 0.0142$													 14% 5																							
Dalton all 7,546$												 14.88$												 0.0275$													 17% 507																			
Dalton low 1,176$												 14.34$												 0.0269$													 21% 82																					
Dartmouth all 33$																		 33.17$												 0.0541$													 33% 1																							
Dedham all 16,958$										 11.26$												 0.0242$													 15% 1,506															
Dedham low 2,672$												 14.44$												 0.0337$													 25% 185																			
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Deerfield all 912$																 11.26$												 0.0193$													 15% 81																					
Deerfield low 85$																		 14.21$												 0.0264$													 18% 6																							
Dennis all 3,766$												 6.33$														 0.0159$													 19% 595																			
Dennis low 261$																 12.45$												 0.0279$													 22% 21																					
Dennis	Port all 3,882$												 6.70$														 0.0162$													 13% 579																			
Dennis	Port low 540$																 10.20$												 0.0226$													 23% 53																					
Dorchester all 208,823$								 12.69$												 0.0288$													 33% 16,461													
Dorchester low 89,206$										 13.30$												 0.0324$													 49% 6,705															
Douglas all 10,493$										 13.07$												 0.0224$													 22% 803																			
Douglas low 1,305$												 13.60$												 0.0266$													 32% 96																					
Dover all 2,067$												 7.01$														 0.0134$													 14% 295																			
Dover low 59$																		 14.84$												 0.0322$													 25% 4																							
Dracut all 34,437$										 15.75$												 0.0276$													 18% 2,186															
Dracut low 5,022$												 15.55$												 0.0290$													 26% 323																			
Dudley all 16,141$										 12.85$												 0.0223$													 28% 1,256															
Dudley low 3,237$												 15.64$												 0.0296$													 38% 207																			
Dunstable all 3,259$												 13.99$												 0.0216$													 20% 233																			
Dunstable low 399$																 33.26$												 0.0483$													 38% 12																					
Duxbury all 6,919$												 8.34$														 0.0180$													 13% 830																			
Duxbury low 366$																 13.07$												 0.0293$													 13% 28																					
E	Cambridge all 11,826$										 14.42$												 0.0317$													 12% 820																			
E	Cambridge low 2,019$												 17.41$												 0.0431$													 29% 116																			
E	Harwich all 3,645$												 8.26$														 0.0194$													 21% 441																			
E	Harwich low 352$																 14.09$												 0.0320$													 25% 25																					
E.	Bridgewater all 18,198$										 16.12$												 0.0269$													 22% 1,129															
E.	Bridgewater low 2,346$												 17.38$												 0.0323$													 32% 135																			
E.	Brookfield all 3,686$												 12.29$												 0.0213$													 30% 300																			
E.	Brookfield low 756$																 18.43$												 0.0348$													 45% 41																					
East	Boston all 64,650$										 15.22$												 0.0358$													 29% 4,249															
East	Boston low 17,948$										 15.63$												 0.0385$													 43% 1,148															
East	Dennis all 2,006$												 7.04$														 0.0170$													 16% 285																			
East	Dennis low 153$																 16.99$												 0.0350$													 27% 9																							
East	Falmouth all 14,375$										 8.00$														 0.0189$													 21% 1,797															
East	Falmouth low 1,811$												 10.84$												 0.0237$													 28% 167																			
East	Freetown all 2,340$												 7.70$														 0.0161$													 15% 304																			
East	Freetown low 548$																 11.18$												 0.0249$													 27% 49																					
East	Longmeadow all 22,994$										 15.97$												 0.0278$													 24% 1,440															
East	Longmeadow low 2,188$												 15.30$												 0.0331$													 29% 143																			
East	Orleans all 1,677$												 7.77$														 0.0204$													 16% 216																			
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East	Orleans low 57$																		 14.37$												 0.0324$													 17% 4																							
East	Otis all 1,597$												 18.15$												 0.0321$													 9% 88																					
East	Otis low 126$																 41.97$												 0.0820$													 11% 3																							
East	Sandwich all 3,391$												 6.03$														 0.0144$													 20% 562																			
East	Sandwich low 535$																 15.29$												 0.0340$													 24% 35																					
East	Walpole all 2,803$												 11.68$												 0.0259$													 14% 240																			
East	Walpole low 266$																 17.72$												 0.0435$													 17% 15																					
East	Wareham all 4,665$												 9.37$														 0.0217$													 24% 498																			
East	Wareham low 1,745$												 9.64$														 0.0227$													 38% 181																			
Eastham all 4,248$												 7.13$														 0.0184$													 17% 596																			
Eastham low 376$																 14.45$												 0.0332$													 21% 26																					
Easthampton all 21,694$										 17.22$												 0.0309$													 16% 1,260															
Easthampton low 4,247$												 17.26$												 0.0319$													 25% 246																			
Easton all 33,708$										 18.72$												 0.0290$													 20% 1,801															
Easton low 2,812$												 17.25$												 0.0310$													 34% 163																			
Edgartown all 4,719$												 5.53$														 0.0137$													 17% 854																			
Edgartown low 275$																 9.47$														 0.0162$													 20% 29																					
Egremont all 2,931$												 15.26$												 0.0261$													 20% 192																			
Egremont low 91$																		 6.96$														 0.0145$													 30% 13																					
Erving all 2,216$												 16.17$												 0.0320$													 19% 137																			
Erving low 496$																 13.78$												 0.0298$													 27% 36																					
Essex all 4,469$												 16.86$												 0.0298$													 16% 265																			
Essex low 398$																 28.40$												 0.0546$													 25% 14																					
Everett all 72,935$										 15.06$												 0.0309$													 29% 4,843															
Everett low 16,642$										 14.93$												 0.0313$													 40% 1,115															
Fairhaven all 11,017$										 9.34$														 0.0211$													 16% 1,180															
Fairhaven low 2,291$												 10.91$												 0.0252$													 21% 210																			
Fall	River all 151,610$								 13.92$												 0.0323$													 28% 10,888													
Fall	River low 57,762$										 13.67$												 0.0338$													 35% 4,224															
Falmouth all 8,480$												 8.80$														 0.0214$													 18% 964																			
Falmouth low 724$																 12.93$												 0.0292$													 23% 56																					
Feeding	Hills all 11,190$										 12.88$												 0.0233$													 19% 869																			
Feeding	Hills low 2,298$												 14.27$												 0.0267$													 25% 161																			
Fitchburg all 14,191$										 5.40$														 0.0115$													 16% 2,626															
Fitchburg low 6,124$												 5.92$														 0.0140$													 27% 1,035															
Florida-Drury all 1,033$												 15.65$												 0.0301$													 17% 66																					
Florida-Drury low 221$																 13.80$												 0.0324$													 19% 16																					
Forestdale all 1,697$												 5.44$														 0.0124$													 20% 312																			
Forestdale low 303$																 10.43$												 0.0208$													 24% 29																					
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Foxboro all 20,617$										 16.64$												 0.0273$													 17% 1,239															
Foxboro low 1,896$												 15.80$												 0.0310$													 29% 120																			
Framingham all 89,377$										 14.30$												 0.0313$													 24% 6,252															
Framingham low 17,651$										 17.37$												 0.0407$													 36% 1,016															
Franklin all 37,987$										 15.62$												 0.0260$													 21% 2,432															
Franklin low 2,891$												 16.81$												 0.0345$													 31% 172																			
Gardner all 28,645$										 12.55$												 0.0258$													 25% 2,282															
Gardner low 8,147$												 13.42$												 0.0294$													 35% 607																			
Gill all 1,820$												 17.33$												 0.0317$													 16% 105																			
Gill low 253$																 28.16$												 0.0537$													 13% 9																							
Gloucester all 48,607$										 16.69$												 0.0322$													 20% 2,912															
Gloucester low 8,943$												 18.55$												 0.0387$													 29% 482																			
Goshen all 1,070$												 18.45$												 0.0338$													 9% 58																					
Goshen low 237$																 29.56$												 0.0529$													 21% 8																							
Grafton all 23,788$										 15.22$												 0.0244$													 20% 1,563															
Grafton low 1,975$												 15.92$												 0.0298$													 34% 124																			
Granby all 15,516$										 15.98$												 0.0272$													 34% 971																			
Granby low 2,012$												 16.36$												 0.0290$													 44% 123																			
Granville all 4,488$												 13.89$												 0.0239$													 24% 323																			
Granville low 364$																 11.04$												 0.0205$													 33% 33																					
Green	Harbor all 274$																 15.20$												 0.0320$													 8% 18																					
Green	Harbor low 55$																		 27.27$												 0.0654$													 15% 2																							
Greenfield all 20,852$										 16.39$												 0.0307$													 15% 1,272															
Greenfield low 7,209$												 16.69$												 0.0320$													 27% 432																			
Gt.	Barrington all 11,523$										 13.28$												 0.0252$													 24% 868																			
Gt.	Barrington low 1,413$												 12.62$												 0.0288$													 35% 112																			
Hadley all 11,050$										 16.35$												 0.0299$													 14% 676																			
Hadley low 1,534$												 18.04$												 0.0371$													 23% 85																					
Halifax all 9,897$												 16.17$												 0.0248$													 20% 612																			
Halifax low 1,865$												 21.19$												 0.0359$													 30% 88																					
Hamilton all 10,655$										 21.52$												 0.0339$													 18% 495																			
Hamilton low 647$																 28.15$												 0.0456$													 23% 23																					
Hampden all 7,906$												 16.37$												 0.0250$													 24% 483																			
Hampden low 812$																 17.27$												 0.0263$													 33% 47																					
Hancock all 1,078$												 10.08$												 0.0187$													 15% 107																			
Hancock low 40$																		 13.45$												 0.0211$													 9% 3																							
Hanover all 13,441$										 15.43$												 0.0239$													 18% 871																			
Hanover low 790$																 16.81$												 0.0325$													 26% 47																					
Hanson all 11,848$										 16.21$												 0.0251$													 19% 731																			
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	2C
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 8/21
Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
Hanson low 845$																 16.24$												 0.0279$													 20% 52																					
Hardwick all 4,335$												 15.76$												 0.0293$													 22% 275																			
Hardwick low 979$																 15.79$												 0.0296$													 30% 62																					
Harvard all 4,999$												 15.24$												 0.0239$													 16% 328																			
Harvard low 32$																		 10.80$												 0.0182$													 14% 3																							
Harwich all 5,285$												 6.31$														 0.0162$													 22% 838																			
Harwich low 772$																 11.19$												 0.0252$													 27% 69																					
Harwich	Port all 2,533$												 6.74$														 0.0175$													 17% 376																			
Harwich	Port low 82$																		 9.14$														 0.0211$													 16% 9																							
Hatfield all 3,035$												 19.97$												 0.0378$													 13% 152																			
Hatfield low 290$																 22.33$												 0.0408$													 17% 13																					
Haverhill all 85,273$										 16.97$												 0.0320$													 20% 5,024															
Haverhill low 26,971$										 18.93$												 0.0369$													 31% 1,425															
Hawley all 450$																 9.79$														 0.0211$													 23% 46																					
Hawley low 145$																 10.37$												 0.0233$													 44% 14																					
Heath all 1,976$												 20.59$												 0.0367$													 17% 96																					
Heath low 586$																 30.86$												 0.0545$													 35% 19																					
Hinsdale all 2,876$												 16.63$												 0.0308$													 14% 173																			
Hinsdale low 702$																 20.63$												 0.0403$													 20% 34																					
Holbrook all 25,126$										 15.70$												 0.0278$													 33% 1,600															
Holbrook low 5,238$												 20.70$												 0.0371$													 40% 253																			
Holland all 4,517$												 12.62$												 0.0208$													 25% 358																			
Holland low 647$																 13.21$												 0.0239$													 33% 49																					
Holliston all 7,671$												 11.66$												 0.0247$													 12% 658																			
Holliston low 491$																 13.64$												 0.0301$													 15% 36																					
Hopedale all 8,499$												 14.07$												 0.0237$													 27% 604																			
Hopedale low 624$																 14.85$												 0.0280$													 30% 42																					
Hopkinton all 7,647$												 9.43$														 0.0200$													 13% 811																			
Hopkinton low 467$																 12.97$												 0.0260$													 20% 36																					
Hubbardston all 5,742$												 13.11$												 0.0227$													 25% 438																			
Hubbardston low 710$																 16.90$												 0.0303$													 30% 42																					
Humarock all 546$																 8.53$														 0.0208$													 9% 64																					
Humarock low 32$																		 32.21$												 0.0769$													 11% 1																							
Huntington all 2,430$												 18.99$												 0.0358$													 13% 128																			
Huntington low 301$																 15.83$												 0.0293$													 17% 19																					
Hyannis all 17,608$										 9.01$														 0.0192$													 26% 1,955															
Hyannis low 5,383$												 12.94$												 0.0298$													 33% 416																			
Hyannis	Port all 149$																 3.38$														 0.0097$													 12% 44																					
Hyannis	Port low (3)$																			 (3.03)$													 (0.0082)$												 17% 1																							
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Hyde	Park all 47,409$										 12.92$												 0.0300$													 30% 3,670															
Hyde	Park low 14,489$										 14.39$												 0.0358$													 39% 1,007															
Indian	Orchard all 16,801$										 16.49$												 0.0311$													 27% 1,019															
Indian	Orchard low 9,851$												 17.91$												 0.0324$													 41% 550																			
Jamaica	Plain all 34,108$										 12.71$												 0.0299$													 17% 2,683															
Jamaica	Plain low 6,452$												 15.85$												 0.0385$													 36% 407																			
Kingston all 6,389$												 8.07$														 0.0169$													 15% 792																			
Kingston low 972$																 11.18$												 0.0247$													 21% 87																					
Lake	Pleasant all 97$																		 9.69$														 0.0191$													 11% 10																					
Lake	Pleasant low 30$																		 14.84$												 0.0257$													 13% 2																							
Lancaster all 6,240$												 13.22$												 0.0177$													 17% 472																			
Lancaster low 482$																 12.05$												 0.0235$													 25% 40																					
Lanesborough all 2,890$												 13.26$												 0.0241$													 14% 218																			
Lanesborough low 464$																 15.48$												 0.0292$													 17% 30																					
Lawrence all 153,228$								 17.26$												 0.0361$													 35% 8,878															
Lawrence low 76,935$										 18.58$												 0.0387$													 46% 4,141															
Lee all 6,056$												 12.02$												 0.0218$													 17% 504																			
Lee low 718$																 11.58$												 0.0229$													 20% 62																					
Leicester all 18,752$										 15.15$												 0.0241$													 29% 1,238															
Leicester low 2,904$												 16.99$												 0.0293$													 36% 171																			
Lenox all 5,835$												 15.52$												 0.0260$													 14% 376																			
Lenox low 430$																 15.35$												 0.0369$													 24% 28																					
Lenoxdale all 432$																 20.57$												 0.0347$													 9% 21																					
Lenoxdale low 11$																		 5.75$														 0.0098$													 10% 2																							
Leominster all 64,559$										 13.50$												 0.0256$													 28% 4,781															
Leominster low 12,990$										 13.17$												 0.0290$													 41% 986																			
Leverett all 2,925$												 19.37$												 0.0340$													 18% 151																			
Leverett low 311$																 22.23$												 0.0354$													 21% 14																					
Lexington all 17,143$										 10.31$												 0.0209$													 14% 1,662															
Lexington low 914$																 14.99$												 0.0345$													 16% 61																					
Leyden all 924$																 16.21$												 0.0318$													 16% 57																					
Leyden low 165$																 32.93$												 0.0667$													 17% 5																							
Lincoln all 3,948$												 10.53$												 0.0240$													 17% 375																			
Lincoln low 257$																 19.76$												 0.0458$													 22% 13																					
Longmeadow all 21,140$										 18.66$												 0.0326$													 20% 1,133															
Longmeadow low 840$																 14.00$												 0.0267$													 22% 60																					
Lowell all 163,967$								 15.72$												 0.0325$													 26% 10,430													
Lowell low 55,097$										 16.85$												 0.0352$													 41% 3,270															
Ludlow all 23,494$										 16.67$												 0.0300$													 17% 1,409															
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Ludlow low 4,055$												 17.04$												 0.0303$													 22% 238																			
Lunenburg all 686$																 6.72$														 0.0123$													 2% 102																			
Lunenburg low 66$																		 10.96$												 0.0260$													 2% 6																							
Lynn all 167,567$								 15.48$												 0.0313$													 32% 10,823													
Lynn low 50,279$										 15.29$												 0.0333$													 47% 3,289															
Malden all 83,431$										 15.46$												 0.0319$													 21% 5,398															
Malden low 16,922$										 15.77$												 0.0337$													 34% 1,073															
Manchester all 6,281$												 17.74$												 0.0305$													 15% 354																			
Manchester low 44$																		 6.28$														 0.0105$													 13% 7																							
Manomet all 356$																 9.12$														 0.0215$													 13% 39																					
Manomet low 45$																		 22.55$												 0.0489$													 13% 2																							
Marion all 2,489$												 6.10$														 0.0147$													 15% 408																			
Marion low 316$																 10.54$												 0.0235$													 16% 30																					
Marlboro all 54,504$										 15.35$												 0.0293$													 21% 3,551															
Marlboro low 7,915$												 15.55$												 0.0317$													 35% 509																			
Marshfield all 13,835$										 8.48$														 0.0173$													 16% 1,631															
Marshfield low 1,393$												 11.06$												 0.0258$													 20% 126																			
Marshfld	Hls all 170$																 10.02$												 0.0202$													 12% 17																					
Marshfld	Hls low 27$																		 26.65$												 0.0602$													 20% 1																							
Marstons	Mls all 4,476$												 6.22$														 0.0137$													 22% 720																			
Marstons	Mls low 480$																 10.90$												 0.0231$													 20% 44																					
Mashpee all 16,889$										 7.62$														 0.0171$													 21% 2,216															
Mashpee low 2,569$												 12.78$												 0.0280$													 27% 201																			
Mattapan all 44,323$										 13.99$												 0.0324$													 39% 3,168															
Mattapan low 16,669$										 14.76$												 0.0357$													 48% 1,129															
Mattapoisett all 3,823$												 7.62$														 0.0169$													 15% 502																			
Mattapoisett low 275$																 9.16$														 0.0194$													 20% 30																					
Maynard all 8,487$												 13.80$												 0.0304$													 14% 615																			
Maynard low 1,231$												 18.37$												 0.0436$													 22% 67																					
Medfield all 6,295$												 10.32$												 0.0221$													 14% 610																			
Medfield low 262$																 12.50$												 0.0289$													 15% 21																					
Medford all 62,281$										 15.30$												 0.0306$													 17% 4,070															
Medford low 5,360$												 14.49$												 0.0322$													 27% 370																			
Medway all 7,464$												 11.17$												 0.0238$													 15% 668																			
Medway low 869$																 19.75$												 0.0445$													 21% 44																					
Melrose all 21,095$										 15.80$												 0.0298$													 11% 1,335															
Melrose low 1,955$												 13.58$												 0.0308$													 21% 144																			
Mendon all 7,160$												 14.41$												 0.0219$													 22% 497																			
Mendon low 424$																 12.48$												 0.0203$													 32% 34																					
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Methuen all 63,573$										 15.40$												 0.0285$													 22% 4,129															
Methuen low 13,738$										 16.32$												 0.0343$													 34% 842																			
Middlefield all 402$																 12.56$												 0.0256$													 11% 32																					
Middlefield low 26$																		 3.66$														 0.0075$													 39% 7																							
Milford all 44,399$										 15.13$												 0.0280$													 26% 2,935															
Milford low 6,159$												 16.34$												 0.0333$													 39% 377																			
Millbury all 20,602$										 13.35$												 0.0208$													 27% 1,543															
Millbury low 2,414$												 13.12$												 0.0234$													 37% 184																			
Millers	Falls all 617$																 11.02$												 0.0204$													 15% 56																					
Millers	Falls low 91$																		 6.49$														 0.0115$													 17% 14																					
Millis all 5,852$												 11.94$												 0.0246$													 15% 490																			
Millis low 243$																 7.84$														 0.0168$													 18% 31																					
Millville all 4,501$												 13.64$												 0.0249$													 28% 330																			
Millville low 465$																 15.48$												 0.0274$													 28% 30																					
Milton all 16,755$										 11.01$												 0.0235$													 16% 1,522															
Milton low 1,079$												 12.26$												 0.0287$													 22% 88																					
Monroe all 195$																 11.49$												 0.0257$													 23% 17																					
Monroe low 6$																				 3.23$														 0.0141$													 25% 2																							
Monson all 13,468$										 15.96$												 0.0273$													 24% 844																			
Monson low 1,826$												 15.60$												 0.0288$													 31% 117																			
Montague all 2,536$												 18.38$												 0.0348$													 14% 138																			
Montague low 279$																 17.41$												 0.0345$													 18% 16																					
Monterey all 2,317$												 20.15$												 0.0362$													 13% 115																			
Monterey low 147$																 36.70$												 0.0540$													 15% 4																							
Montgomery all 1,080$												 17.15$												 0.0305$													 17% 63																					
Montgomery low (12)$																	 (11.91)$											 (0.0214)$												 5% 1																							
Monument	Bch all 1,733$												 9.79$														 0.0222$													 21% 177																			
Monument	Bch low 271$																 14.25$												 0.0306$													 41% 19																					
Mt.Washington all 575$																 15.96$												 0.0269$													 23% 36																					
Mt.Washington low 11$																		 3.75$														 0.0061$													 43% 3																							
N	Cambridge all 17,650$										 16.40$												 0.0369$													 12% 1,076															
N	Cambridge low 3,468$												 18.35$												 0.0432$													 34% 189																			
N	Dartmouth all 8,870$												 8.92$														 0.0202$													 14% 994																			
N	Dartmouth low 2,062$												 14.32$												 0.0318$													 18% 144																			
N	Falmouth all 3,327$												 7.76$														 0.0199$													 16% 429																			
N	Falmouth low 123$																 8.22$														 0.0155$													 22% 15																					
N.	Adams all 18,425$										 13.08$												 0.0272$													 23% 1,409															
N.	Adams low 6,599$												 13.55$												 0.0272$													 31% 487																			
N.	Andover all 32,723$										 16.63$												 0.0257$													 17% 1,968															
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	2C
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 12/21
Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
N.	Andover low 2,246$												 17.02$												 0.0325$													 21% 132																			
N.	Brookfield all 7,357$												 13.35$												 0.0237$													 27% 551																			
N.	Brookfield low 1,407$												 16.36$												 0.0306$													 33% 86																					
Nahant all 3,969$												 16.40$												 0.0305$													 15% 242																			
Nahant low 238$																 12.55$												 0.0253$													 28% 19																					
Nantucket all 5,859$												 6.93$														 0.0095$													 7% 845																			
Nantucket low 202$																 8.42$														 0.0103$													 11% 24																					
Natick all 26,434$										 11.19$												 0.0228$													 16% 2,362															
Natick low 3,499$												 19.02$												 0.0428$													 21% 184																			
Needham all 12,993$										 9.32$														 0.0204$													 13% 1,394															
Needham low 635$																 14.43$												 0.0346$													 18% 44																					
New	Ashford all 247$																 12.36$												 0.0222$													 17% 20																					
New	Ashford low 3$																				 2.68$														 0.0046$													 13% 1																							
New	Bedford all 108,881$								 11.15$												 0.0261$													 24% 9,765															
New	Bedford low 46,793$										 12.25$												 0.0301$													 32% 3,821															
New	Braintree all 1,291$												 14.03$												 0.0243$													 22% 92																					
New	Braintree low 205$																 20.46$												 0.0341$													 30% 10																					
New	Marlboro all 2,190$												 16.22$												 0.0275$													 12% 135																			
New	Marlboro low 99$																		 10.99$												 0.0238$													 12% 9																							
New	Salem all 1,267$												 14.08$												 0.0271$													 19% 90																					
New	Salem low 83$																		 11.82$												 0.0250$													 16% 7																							
Newbury all 7,236$												 16.45$												 0.0274$													 15% 440																			
Newbury low 440$																 16.28$												 0.0295$													 20% 27																					
Newburyport all 18,401$										 14.32$												 0.0286$													 15% 1,285															
Newburyport low 1,213$												 11.03$												 0.0271$													 26% 110																			
Newton all 8,192$												 11.01$												 0.0245$													 15% 744																			
Newton low 570$																 9.99$														 0.0239$													 26% 57																					
Newton	Center all 9,223$												 10.02$												 0.0192$													 14% 920																			
Newton	Center low 363$																 13.45$												 0.0298$													 16% 27																					
Newton	Hlds all 4,627$												 11.77$												 0.0260$													 14% 393																			
Newton	Hlds low 534$																 16.18$												 0.0382$													 23% 33																					
Newton	L	F all 822$																 13.05$												 0.0319$													 13% 63																					
Newton	L	F low 176$																 25.10$												 0.0624$													 22% 7																							
Newton	U	F all 1,811$												 12.24$												 0.0280$													 12% 148																			
Newton	U	F low 192$																 11.27$												 0.0274$													 25% 17																					
Newtonvlle all 6,406$												 12.54$												 0.0276$													 14% 511																			
Newtonvlle low 398$																 14.76$												 0.0351$													 20% 27																					
Norfolk all 4,562$												 9.11$														 0.0188$													 14% 501																			
Norfolk low 130$																 11.82$												 0.0270$													 10% 11																					
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North	Carver all 434$																 10.59$												 0.0217$													 19% 41																					
North	Carver low 13$																		 2.09$														 0.0046$													 26% 6																							
North	Chatham all 1,362$												 7.28$														 0.0221$													 17% 187																			
North	Chatham low 27$																		 26.65$												 0.0602$													 6% 1																							
North	Eastham all 2,566$												 6.45$														 0.0181$													 15% 398																			
North	Eastham low 391$																 17.78$												 0.0399$													 25% 22																					
North	Easton all 2$																				 1.88$														 0.0032$													 20% 1																							
North	Hatfield all 197$																 19.74$												 0.0353$													 7% 10																					
North	Truro all 1,817$												 7.77$														 0.0204$													 14% 234																			
North	Truro low 103$																 17.17$												 0.0377$													 11% 6																							
Northampton all 34,101$										 15.74$												 0.0328$													 17% 2,166															
Northampton low 6,795$												 16.90$												 0.0403$													 31% 402																			
Northboro all 17,051$										 15.47$												 0.0245$													 19% 1,102															
Northboro low 1,244$												 18.02$												 0.0308$													 28% 69																					
Northfield all 3,476$												 16.24$												 0.0305$													 15% 214																			
Northfield low 630$																 15.00$												 0.0298$													 29% 42																					
Norton all 21,519$										 17.01$												 0.0262$													 18% 1,265															
Norton low 2,533$												 16.03$												 0.0310$													 23% 158																			
Norwell all 11,613$										 17.54$												 0.0257$													 18% 662																			
Norwell low 291$																 18.20$												 0.0392$													 20% 16																					
Oak	Bluffs all 6,084$												 8.46$														 0.0204$													 17% 719																			
Oak	Bluffs low 580$																 16.58$												 0.0346$													 26% 35																					
Oakham all 3,448$												 13.63$												 0.0243$													 29% 253																			
Oakham low 417$																 16.70$												 0.0333$													 38% 25																					
Ocean	Bluff all 83$																		 4.13$														 0.0096$													 12% 20																					
Onset all 4,362$												 9.85$														 0.0222$													 19% 443																			
Onset low 609$																 8.95$														 0.0201$													 30% 68																					
Orange all 13,348$										 13.78$												 0.0272$													 27% 969																			
Orange low 5,755$												 15.31$												 0.0319$													 39% 376																			
Orleans all 4,823$												 7.31$														 0.0164$													 21% 660																			
Orleans low 544$																 13.59$												 0.0319$													 20% 40																					
Osterville all 3,663$												 7.54$														 0.0167$													 17% 486																			
Osterville low 196$																 11.51$												 0.0252$													 20% 17																					
Otis all 1,509$												 12.68$												 0.0217$													 13% 119																			
Otis low 152$																 21.77$												 0.0440$													 13% 7																							
Oxford all 20,000$										 12.66$												 0.0213$													 28% 1,580															
Oxford low 3,432$												 14.73$												 0.0264$													 36% 233																			
Palmer-3Rivers all 19,125$										 13.91$												 0.0254$													 24% 1,375															
Palmer-3Rivers low 5,309$												 14.87$												 0.0277$													 35% 357																			
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Pelham all 1,478$												 15.89$												 0.0288$													 15% 93																					
Pelham low 36$																		 8.93$														 0.0141$													 9% 4																							
Pembroke all 20,598$										 15.94$												 0.0255$													 19% 1,292															
Pembroke low 1,432$												 13.64$												 0.0245$													 25% 105																			
Pepperell all 12,708$										 13.89$												 0.0237$													 20% 915																			
Pepperell low 1,629$												 14.17$												 0.0283$													 32% 115																			
Peru all 1,267$												 17.36$												 0.0299$													 17% 73																					
Peru low 266$																 22.13$												 0.0380$													 23% 12																					
Petersham all 1,735$												 13.25$												 0.0214$													 22% 131																			
Petersham low 74$																		 9.30$														 0.0199$													 18% 8																							
Phillipston all 2,711$												 15.40$												 0.0262$													 21% 176																			
Phillipston low 457$																 16.33$												 0.0261$													 37% 28																					
Pittsfield all 64,271$										 16.83$												 0.0319$													 18% 3,818															
Pittsfield low 19,698$										 18.06$												 0.0341$													 27% 1,091															
Plainfield all 1,038$												 15.04$												 0.0274$													 19% 69																					
Plainfield low 148$																 9.89$														 0.0173$													 33% 15																					
Plainville all 11,123$										 16.14$												 0.0257$													 17% 689																			
Plainville low 1,462$												 15.89$												 0.0304$													 26% 92																					
Plymouth all 36,254$										 8.19$														 0.0170$													 17% 4,428															
Plymouth low 6,068$												 10.84$												 0.0244$													 25% 560																			
Plympton all 813$																 5.05$														 0.0104$													 15% 161																			
Plympton low 17$																		 2.08$														 0.0041$													 16% 8																							
Pocasset all 4,539$												 9.76$														 0.0248$													 20% 465																			
Pocasset low 700$																 19.43$												 0.0466$													 28% 36																					
Provincetown all 5,049$												 7.42$														 0.0188$													 15% 680																			
Provincetown low 798$																 14.51$												 0.0331$													 25% 55																					
Quincy all 134,899$								 14.52$												 0.0291$													 21% 9,288															
Quincy low 22,529$										 14.44$												 0.0300$													 39% 1,560															
Randolph all 54,122$										 15.59$												 0.0295$													 29% 3,472															
Randolph low 11,323$										 16.06$												 0.0309$													 37% 705																			
Rehoboth all 13,701$										 15.97$												 0.0258$													 18% 858																			
Rehoboth low 1,515$												 18.04$												 0.0291$													 27% 84																					
Revere all 79,144$										 15.42$												 0.0303$													 25% 5,132															
Revere low 16,572$										 16.54$												 0.0335$													 37% 1,002															
Richmond all 1,586$												 13.10$												 0.0230$													 13% 121																			
Richmond low 101$																 12.56$												 0.0231$													 20% 8																							
Rochester all 2,133$												 6.52$														 0.0134$													 15% 327																			
Rochester low 294$																 10.51$												 0.0230$													 24% 28																					
Rockland all 22,438$										 13.74$												 0.0252$													 23% 1,633															
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	2C
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 15/21
Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
Rockland low 3,007$												 14.67$												 0.0294$													 32% 205																			
Rockport all 9,337$												 14.37$												 0.0269$													 14% 650																			
Rockport low 625$																 12.02$												 0.0262$													 19% 52																					
Roslindale all 34,043$										 11.71$												 0.0266$													 25% 2,907															
Roslindale low 9,165$												 14.08$												 0.0341$													 38% 651																			
Rowe all 661$																 14.38$												 0.0246$													 21% 46																					
Rowe low 112$																 22.34$												 0.0357$													 24% 5																							
Roxbry	Xng all 14,955$										 12.40$												 0.0297$													 26% 1,206															
Roxbry	Xng low 5,673$												 13.94$												 0.0349$													 50% 407																			
Roxbury all 48,009$										 13.23$												 0.0298$													 36% 3,630															
Roxbury low 22,029$										 13.95$												 0.0344$													 49% 1,579															
Royalston all 1,965$												 16.10$												 0.0279$													 19% 122																			
Royalston low 407$																 19.39$												 0.0321$													 25% 21																					
Rutland all 11,163$										 13.24$												 0.0225$													 26% 843																			
Rutland low 1,287$												 14.96$												 0.0292$													 39% 86																					
S	Boston all 1,903$												 12.86$												 0.0233$													 5% 148																			
S	Boston low 75$																		 15.08$												 0.0391$													 14% 5																							
S	Dartmouth all 6,674$												 8.51$														 0.0203$													 13% 784																			
S	Dartmouth low 1,563$												 13.25$												 0.0306$													 19% 118																			
S	Wellfleet all 1,063$												 6.44$														 0.0186$													 16% 165																			
S	Wellfleet low 219$																 18.26$												 0.0455$													 28% 12																					
S	Yarmouth all 8,840$												 8.40$														 0.0193$													 22% 1,052															
S	Yarmouth low 1,789$												 13.76$												 0.0329$													 28% 130																			
Sagamore all 778$																 7.01$														 0.0162$													 19% 111																			
Sagamore low 151$																 12.61$												 0.0328$													 15% 12																					
Sagamore	Bch all 1,700$												 6.05$														 0.0153$													 19% 281																			
Sagamore	Bch low 292$																 12.68$												 0.0266$													 27% 23																					
Salem all 49,150$										 14.18$												 0.0296$													 19% 3,466															
Salem low 11,322$										 15.02$												 0.0343$													 33% 754																			
Salisbury all 11,482$										 14.19$												 0.0263$													 17% 809																			
Salisbury low 2,152$												 17.08$												 0.0310$													 27% 126																			
Sandisfield all 2,688$												 12.05$												 0.0214$													 17% 223																			
Sandisfield low 337$																 21.09$												 0.0376$													 16% 16																					
Sandwich all 7,290$												 7.04$														 0.0159$													 20% 1,035															
Sandwich low 906$																 12.77$												 0.0268$													 22% 71																					
Saugus all 27,767$										 13.61$												 0.0251$													 19% 2,040															
Saugus low 3,188$												 14.17$												 0.0280$													 25% 225																			
Savoy all 1,072$												 14.48$												 0.0263$													 20% 74																					
Savoy low 166$																 7.53$														 0.0133$													 34% 22																					
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Scituate all 22,221$										 17.03$												 0.0281$													 17% 1,305															
Scituate low 889$																 16.16$												 0.0318$													 22% 55																					
Seekonk all 17,540$										 16.77$												 0.0295$													 19% 1,046															
Seekonk low 2,731$												 20.53$												 0.0375$													 25% 133																			
Sharon all 8,036$												 9.80$														 0.0198$													 13% 820																			
Sharon low 545$																 13.64$												 0.0277$													 17% 40																					
Sheffield all 6,296$												 18.46$												 0.0317$													 19% 341																			
Sheffield low 1,241$												 20.01$												 0.0355$													 29% 62																					
Shelburne all 345$																 12.78$												 0.0242$													 12% 27																					
Shelburne low 30$																		 10.04$												 0.0174$													 21% 3																							
Shelburne	Fls all 1,781$												 14.60$												 0.0279$													 16% 122																			
Shelburne	Fls low 156$																 11.17$												 0.0193$													 16% 14																					
Sherborn all 2,208$												 9.99$														 0.0211$													 14% 221																			
Sherborn low 107$																 21.45$												 0.0459$													 20% 5																							
Shirley all 7,679$												 14.46$												 0.0246$													 20% 531																			
Shirley low 1,446$												 14.76$												 0.0291$													 33% 98																					
Shutesbury all 2,268$												 14.92$												 0.0284$													 17% 152																			
Shutesbury low 183$																 12.21$												 0.0270$													 18% 15																					
Somerset all 26,570$										 15.46$												 0.0315$													 23% 1,719															
Somerset low 4,153$												 15.97$												 0.0328$													 26% 260																			
Somerville all 56,762$										 13.52$												 0.0313$													 18% 4,199															
Somerville low 12,079$										 14.28$												 0.0343$													 42% 846																			
South	Boston all 22,162$										 14.34$												 0.0317$													 10% 1,545															
South	Boston low 3,532$												 15.16$												 0.0383$													 31% 233																			
South	Carver all 547$																 9.12$														 0.0198$													 12% 60																					
South	Carver low (3)$																			 (0.70)$													 (0.0017)$												 13% 4																							
South	Chatham all 1,294$												 6.81$														 0.0199$													 13% 190																			
South	Chatham low 92$																		 9.16$														 0.0181$													 28% 10																					
South	Deerfield all 3,909$												 14.69$												 0.0270$													 15% 266																			
South	Deerfield low 401$																 11.14$												 0.0222$													 25% 36																					
South	Dennis all 5,159$												 7.27$														 0.0178$													 19% 710																			
South	Dennis low 1,266$												 13.19$												 0.0288$													 34% 96																					
South	Harwich all 824$																 8.68$														 0.0216$													 15% 95																					
South	Harwich low 51$																		 12.69$												 0.0356$													 33% 4																							
South	Lee all 114$																 19.05$												 0.0373$													 10% 6																							
South	Lee low 40$																		 39.60$												 0.0685$													 13% 1																							
South	Orleans all 853$																 6.28$														 0.0180$													 18% 136																			
South	Orleans low 5$																				 5.36$														 0.0127$													 6% 1																							
South	Walpole all 451$																 11.00$												 0.0237$													 12% 41																					
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	2C
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 17/21
Municipality Income
Total	
Consumer	
Loss	in	Month
Average	Per	
Household	
Loss	
(Monthly)
Premium																	
(per	kWh)
%	of	
Households	
Participating	in	
Competitive	
Supply	Market
#	Competitive	
Supply	
Accounts
South	Walpole low 18$																		 17.70$												 0.0424$													 5% 1																							
Southampton all 5,719$												 15.29$												 0.0276$													 15% 374																			
Southampton low 470$																 15.17$												 0.0268$													 18% 31																					
Southboro all 10,507$										 12.91$												 0.0177$													 22% 814																			
Southboro low 232$																 14.53$												 0.0254$													 25% 16																					
Southbridge all 39,447$										 15.50$												 0.0272$													 35% 2,545															
Southbridge low 15,246$										 17.71$												 0.0319$													 49% 861																			
Southwick all 12,034$										 16.90$												 0.0302$													 18% 712																			
Southwick low 1,667$												 18.32$												 0.0332$													 25% 91																					
Spencer all 20,414$										 13.49$												 0.0237$													 29% 1,513															
Spencer low 4,350$												 14.79$												 0.0287$													 41% 294																			
Springfield all 273,201$								 17.74$												 0.0341$													 28% 15,403													
Springfield low 153,731$								 18.72$												 0.0350$													 45% 8,213															
Stockbridge all 4,058$												 16.10$												 0.0288$													 16% 252																			
Stockbridge low 202$																 14.43$												 0.0275$													 22% 14																					
Stoneham all 19,338$										 13.93$												 0.0298$													 14% 1,388															
Stoneham low 2,307$												 18.31$												 0.0423$													 19% 126																			
Stoughton all 38,826$										 15.44$												 0.0293$													 22% 2,514															
Stoughton low 5,100$												 15.41$												 0.0316$													 31% 331																			
Sturbridge all 14,867$										 13.02$												 0.0206$													 27% 1,142															
Sturbridge low 1,527$												 11.14$												 0.0222$													 35% 137																			
Sudbury all 8,743$												 9.91$														 0.0219$													 14% 882																			
Sudbury low 765$																 21.24$												 0.0469$													 19% 36																					
Sunderland all 3,608$												 16.03$												 0.0301$													 12% 225																			
Sunderland low 555$																 16.81$												 0.0317$													 24% 33																					
Sutton all 12,818$										 14.39$												 0.0229$													 25% 891																			
Sutton low 680$																 13.08$												 0.0227$													 32% 52																					
Swampscott all 15,045$										 16.66$												 0.0282$													 15% 903																			
Swampscott low 1,271$												 18.97$												 0.0390$													 25% 67																					
Swansea all 23,519$										 16.39$												 0.0322$													 22% 1,435															
Swansea low 4,163$												 15.95$												 0.0346$													 28% 261																			
Teaticket all 3,729$												 8.63$														 0.0200$													 21% 432																			
Teaticket low 673$																 12.24$												 0.0270$													 32% 55																					
Tewksbury all 29,374$										 16.31$												 0.0287$													 16% 1,801															
Tewksbury low 2,575$												 15.99$												 0.0293$													 23% 161																			
Tolland all 1,311$												 13.51$												 0.0238$													 18% 97																					
Tolland low 104$																 20.87$												 0.0351$													 29% 5																							
Topsfield all 6,085$												 16.10$												 0.0261$													 16% 378																			
Topsfield low 215$																 19.52$												 0.0357$													 32% 11																					
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Townsend all 1,788$												 7.74$														 0.0160$													 7% 231																			
Townsend low 273$																 9.75$														 0.0228$													 8% 28																					
Truro all 1,493$												 6.33$														 0.0178$													 17% 236																			
Truro low 138$																 11.50$												 0.0271$													 31% 12																					
Turners	Falls all 4,991$												 11.83$												 0.0221$													 16% 422																			
Turners	Falls low 1,843$												 13.17$												 0.0249$													 24% 140																			
Tyngsboro all 14,158$										 16.79$												 0.0274$													 19% 843																			
Tyngsboro low 2,035$												 16.96$												 0.0321$													 35% 120																			
Tyringham all 461$																 17.72$												 0.0185$													 8% 26																					
Tyringham low 38$																		 37.86$												 0.0727$													 20% 1																							
Upton all 10,518$										 16.06$												 0.0252$													 22% 655																			
Upton low 664$																 13.83$												 0.0276$													 33% 48																					
Uxbridge all 18,693$										 13.43$												 0.0219$													 25% 1,392															
Uxbridge low 1,892$												 13.81$												 0.0259$													 35% 137																			
Vineyard	Hvn all 4,679$												 7.70$														 0.0191$													 19% 608																			
Vineyard	Hvn low 532$																 11.31$												 0.0224$													 29% 47																					
Vlg	Nag	Wd all 405$																 10.67$												 0.0275$													 14% 38																					
Vlg	Nag	Wd low 6$																				 3.06$														 0.0082$													 40% 2																							
W	Barnstable all 2,174$												 6.84$														 0.0159$													 23% 318																			
W	Barnstable low 309$																 16.29$												 0.0383$													 29% 19																					
W	Hyannisprt all 1,120$												 9.10$														 0.0217$													 17% 123																			
W	Hyannisprt low 166$																 15.07$												 0.0345$													 38% 11																					
W	Somerville all 13,729$										 14.47$												 0.0342$													 9% 949																			
W	Somerville low 1,074$												 16.03$												 0.0368$													 22% 67																					
W.	Bridgewater all 8,523$												 16.42$												 0.0277$													 18% 519																			
W.	Bridgewater low 1,377$												 18.36$												 0.0326$													 32% 75																					
W.	Brookfield all 6,583$												 13.83$												 0.0250$													 28% 476																			
W.	Brookfield low 994$																 16.30$												 0.0323$													 34% 61																					
W.	Newbury all 4,083$												 13.04$												 0.0205$													 19% 313																			
W.	Newbury low 7$																				 1.44$														 0.0018$													 10% 5																							
W.Stockbridge all 2,328$												 14.83$												 0.0273$													 18% 157																			
W.Stockbridge low 113$																 11.32$												 0.0243$													 15% 10																					
Waban all 2,940$												 10.03$												 0.0224$													 13% 293																			
Waban low 74$																		 7.41$														 0.0187$													 20% 10																					
Wales all 2,588$												 10.70$												 0.0180$													 26% 242																			
Wales low 948$																 16.93$												 0.0281$													 42% 56																					
Walpole all 11,654$										 11.05$												 0.0242$													 15% 1,055															
Walpole low 1,016$												 17.51$												 0.0411$													 18% 58																					
Waltham all 54,801$										 11.10$												 0.0252$													 19% 4,936															
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Waltham low 8,184$												 14.59$												 0.0347$													 33% 561																			
Waquoit all 1,733$												 6.28$														 0.0143$													 23% 276																			
Waquoit low 454$																 11.96$												 0.0257$													 30% 38																					
Ware all 17,496$										 14.02$												 0.0265$													 27% 1,248															
Ware low 5,972$												 15.84$												 0.0303$													 38% 377																			
Wareham all 13,250$										 9.16$														 0.0203$													 22% 1,446															
Wareham low 3,639$												 11.63$												 0.0270$													 35% 313																			
Warren all 8,453$												 13.72$												 0.0231$													 29% 616																			
Warren low 2,007$												 13.29$												 0.0249$													 38% 151																			
Warwick all 1,712$												 16.79$												 0.0341$													 24% 102																			
Warwick low 412$																 17.15$												 0.0404$													 35% 24																					
Washington all 770$																 16.75$												 0.0305$													 16% 46																					
Washington low 105$																 15.02$												 0.0298$													 27% 7																							
Watertown all 28,853$										 12.34$												 0.0277$													 15% 2,339															
Watertown low 3,929$												 15.17$												 0.0345$													 26% 259																			
Wayland all 7,383$												 9.53$														 0.0204$													 15% 775																			
Wayland low 297$																 12.39$												 0.0284$													 19% 24																					
Webster all 27,939$										 12.36$												 0.0226$													 28% 2,261															
Webster low 7,145$												 12.38$												 0.0244$													 38% 577																			
Wellfleet all 3,719$												 7.28$														 0.0201$													 16% 511																			
Wellfleet low 285$																 12.40$												 0.0269$													 20% 23																					
Wendall all 1,592$												 14.60$												 0.0283$													 25% 109																			
Wendall low 445$																 13.08$												 0.0258$													 36% 34																					
Wenham all 1,433$												 16.10$												 0.0233$													 19% 89																					
Wenham low 8$																				 8.16$														 0.0123$													 17% 1																							
West	Chatham all 950$																 7.72$														 0.0199$													 14% 123																			
West	Chatham low 76$																		 25.43$												 0.0527$													 15% 3																							
West	Dennis all 2,085$												 6.54$														 0.0175$													 14% 319																			
West	Dennis low 81$																		 7.37$														 0.0181$													 15% 11																					
West	Falmouth all 1,592$												 10.83$												 0.0260$													 14% 147																			
West	Falmouth low 24$																		 12.23$												 0.0264$													 18% 2																							
West	Harwich all 1,736$												 7.58$														 0.0194$													 15% 229																			
West	Harwich low 180$																 11.98$												 0.0268$													 24% 15																					
West	Hatfield all 732$																 17.43$												 0.0328$													 13% 42																					
West	Hatfield low 138$																 19.72$												 0.0381$													 16% 7																							
West	Newton all 6,742$												 10.84$												 0.0233$													 14% 622																			
West	Newton low 485$																 16.73$												 0.0392$													 18% 29																					
West	Roxbury all 27,187$										 12.88$												 0.0279$													 19% 2,110															
West	Roxbury low 3,613$												 15.71$												 0.0369$													 30% 230																			
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West	Springfield all 37,637$										 15.77$												 0.0296$													 21% 2,387															
West	Springfield low 10,783$										 15.27$												 0.0286$													 36% 706																			
West	Tisbury all 2,983$												 8.15$														 0.0205$													 17% 366																			
West	Tisbury low 200$																 18.18$												 0.0368$													 15% 11																					
West	Wareham all 3,805$												 10.66$												 0.0234$													 23% 357																			
West	Wareham low 1,024$												 12.65$												 0.0297$													 34% 81																					
West	Yarmouth all 11,603$										 9.76$														 0.0225$													 19% 1,189															
West	Yarmouth low 2,210$												 15.78$												 0.0353$													 26% 140																			
Westboro all 15,953$										 14.81$												 0.0248$													 15% 1,077															
Westboro low 752$																 15.67$												 0.0315$													 21% 48																					
Westford all 23,313$										 18.50$												 0.0284$													 14% 1,260															
Westford low 1,155$												 17.50$												 0.0340$													 20% 66																					
Westhampton all 2,207$												 17.24$												 0.0311$													 16% 128																			
Westhampton low 167$																 23.91$												 0.0456$													 17% 7																							
Westminster all 10,368$										 17.02$												 0.0273$													 20% 609																			
Westminster low 1,115$												 23.24$												 0.0393$													 24% 48																					
Weston all 6,048$												 9.62$														 0.0201$													 16% 629																			
Weston low 237$																 11.87$												 0.0283$													 29% 20																					
Westport all 18,859$										 13.39$												 0.0276$													 19% 1,408															
Westport low 3,418$												 14.92$												 0.0310$													 30% 229																			
Westport	Pt all 345$																 10.14$												 0.0340$													 14% 34																					
Westwood all 6,888$												 9.88$														 0.0210$													 12% 697																			
Westwood low 374$																 16.24$												 0.0385$													 14% 23																					
Weymouth all 71,820$										 15.06$												 0.0280$													 21% 4,768															
Weymouth low 9,665$												 15.97$												 0.0335$													 31% 605																			
Whately all 1,210$												 17.04$												 0.0299$													 11% 71																					
Whately low 153$																 19.14$												 0.0364$													 15% 8																							
Whitinsville all 26,138$										 15.32$												 0.0264$													 26% 1,706															
Whitinsville low 3,487$												 15.92$												 0.0297$													 27% 219																			
Whitman all 21,546$										 17.85$												 0.0297$													 21% 1,207															
Whitman low 2,821$												 17.85$												 0.0319$													 28% 158																			
Wht	Horse	Bch all 228$																 9.92$														 0.0194$													 10% 23																					
Wht	Horse	Bch low 7$																				 6.60$														 0.0155$													 17% 1																							
Wilbraham all 22,728$										 16.97$												 0.0258$													 24% 1,339															
Wilbraham low 2,098$												 15.31$												 0.0296$													 32% 137																			
Williamsburg all 3,508$												 17.20$												 0.0314$													 16% 204																			
Williamsburg low 320$																 21.35$												 0.0387$													 14% 15																					
Williamstown all 6,305$												 13.86$												 0.0259$													 15% 455																			
Williamstown low 503$																 10.93$												 0.0239$													 23% 46																					
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Winchendon all 14,031$										 15.69$												 0.0291$													 22% 894																			
Winchendon low 3,659$												 17.02$												 0.0312$													 34% 215																			
Winchester all 10,211$										 10.35$												 0.0236$													 13% 987																			
Winchester low 398$																 12.84$												 0.0288$													 17% 31																					
Windsor all 1,237$												 13.90$												 0.0240$													 18% 89																					
Windsor low 208$																 14.88$												 0.0273$													 36% 14																					
Winthrop all 20,274$										 14.94$												 0.0298$													 18% 1,357															
Winthrop low 2,129$												 14.19$												 0.0311$													 24% 150																			
Woburn all 35,894$										 13.29$												 0.0292$													 17% 2,701															
Woburn low 6,365$												 16.49$												 0.0376$													 28% 386																			
Woods	Hole all 819$																 7.38$														 0.0197$													 13% 111																			
Woods	Hole low 40$																		 19.90$												 0.0566$													 17% 2																							
Worcester all 274,749$								 14.42$												 0.0284$													 28% 19,055													
Worcester low 83,212$										 15.24$												 0.0323$													 42% 5,459															
Woronoco all 155$																 8.63$														 0.0140$													 15% 18																					
Woronoco low 31$																		 15.49$												 0.0282$													 10% 2																							
Worthington all 1,717$												 15.61$												 0.0306$													 16% 110																			
Worthington low 324$																 27.00$												 0.0406$													 20% 12																					
Wrentham all 13,311$										 15.04$												 0.0232$													 21% 885																			
Wrentham low 869$																 15.52$												 0.0263$													 28% 56																					
Yarmouth	Port all 6,800$												 7.85$														 0.0180$													 23% 866																			
Yarmouth	Port low 650$																 13.00$												 0.0297$													 28% 50																					
Note:	Average	per	household	loss	is	computed	over	those	households	participating	in	the	market	(that	is	not	
across	all	households	in	municipality).
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Supplier-specific	information	(share	of	market,	average	premium,	
etc.)	for	all	households	
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Supplier	ID Average	Rate #	of	Bills
Average	
Premium
Share	of	
Accounts
Net	Consumer	
Loss
Share	of	
Loss
Supplier	#1 0.1697$											 58,892													 0.0797$										 1.00% 2,799,826$													 2.51%
Supplier	#18 0.1571$											 130,806											 0.0657$										 2.21% 4,443,744$													 3.99%
Supplier	#47 0.1561$											 108,393											 0.0657$										 1.83% 3,751,646$													 3.37%
Supplier	#39 0.1452$											 38,021													 0.0552$										 0.64% 1,079,459$													 0.97%
Supplier	#37 0.1450$											 611,891											 0.0546$										 10.35% 20,571,677$										 18.47%
Supplier	#12 0.1417$											 362,897											 0.0511$										 6.14% 8,763,432$													 7.87%
Supplier	#41 0.1382$											 462,750											 0.0484$										 7.83% 12,970,332$										 11.64%
Supplier	#25 0.1449$											 61,886													 0.0477$										 1.05% 1,104,503$													 0.99%
Supplier	#15 0.1376$											 213,518											 0.0458$										 3.61% 4,648,970$													 4.17%
Supplier	#6 0.1282$											 284,867											 0.0381$										 4.82% 6,237,222$													 5.60%
Supplier	#20 0.1282$											 29,505													 0.0374$										 0.50% 624,413$																 0.56%
Supplier	#43 0.1265$											 159,306											 0.0345$										 2.69% 3,098,412$													 2.78%
Supplier	#29 0.1240$											 213,923											 0.0341$										 3.62% 3,596,144$													 3.23%
Supplier	#31 0.1234$											 65,938													 0.0297$										 1.12% 1,171,382$													 1.05%
Supplier	#32 0.1196$											 623,020											 0.0290$										 10.54% 12,035,815$										 10.81%
Supplier	#22 0.1193$											 73,432													 0.0270$										 1.24% 1,146,036$													 1.03%
Supplier	#19 0.1174$											 23,492													 0.0262$										 0.40% 369,553$																 0.33%
Supplier	#24 0.1169$											 88,272													 0.0250$										 1.49% 1,191,389$													 1.07%
Supplier	#13 0.1153$											 92,681													 0.0249$										 1.57% 1,408,879$													 1.26%
Supplier	#30 0.1121$											 27,880													 0.0228$										 0.47% 327,252$																 0.29%
Supplier	#3 0.1128$											 10,671													 0.0225$										 0.18% 130,314$																 0.12%
Supplier	#23 0.1109$											 338,309											 0.0203$										 5.72% 3,778,146$													 3.39%
Supplier	#26 0.1105$											 35,550													 0.0188$										 0.60% 498,606$																 0.45%
Supplier	#46 0.1110$											 11,677													 0.0186$										 0.20% 101,757$																 0.09%
Supplier	#4 0.1098$											 72,038													 0.0181$										 1.22% 727,835$																 0.65%
Supplier	#27 0.1119$											 33,272													 0.0177$										 0.56% 312,916$																 0.28%
Supplier	#14 0.1096$											 7,170															 0.0171$										 0.12% 79,739$																		 0.07%
Supplier	#42 0.1082$											 573,887											 0.0170$										 9.71% 6,429,872$													 5.77%
Supplier	#34 0.1079$											 295,967											 0.0168$										 5.01% 3,379,955$													 3.03%
Supplier	#11 0.1093$											 6,979															 0.0162$										 0.12% 115,496$																 0.10%
Supplier	#44 0.1033$											 837																		 0.0150$										 0.01% 9,338$																				 0.01%
Supplier	#10 0.1051$											 29,947													 0.0146$										 0.51% 431,659$																 0.39%
Supplier	#45 0.1033$											 7,113															 0.0144$										 0.12% 91,124$																		 0.08%
Supplier	#7 0.1028$											 158,203											 0.0121$										 2.68% 1,483,557$													 1.33%
Supplier	#2 0.1007$											 146,034											 0.0111$										 2.47% 1,282,170$													 1.15%
Supplier	#35 0.1009$											 179,346											 0.0104$										 3.03% 1,221,951$													 1.10%
Supplier	#28 0.1012$											 23,327													 0.0094$										 0.39% 286,322$																 0.26%
Supplier	#8 0.1009$											 13,873													 0.0078$										 0.23% 74,409$																		 0.07%
Supplier	#21 0.0954$											 4,372															 0.0064$										 0.07% 32,395$																		 0.03%
Supplier	#16 0.0987$											 458																		 0.0054$										 0.01% 4,315$																				 0.00%
Suppliers	Ranked	by	Weighted	Average	Premium:	July	2016	-	June	2017	-	All	Households
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	2D
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 2/2
Supplier	ID Average	Rate #	of	Bills
Average	
Premium
Share	of	
Accounts
Net	Consumer	
Loss
Share	of	
Loss
Supplier	#33 0.0950$											 1,873															 0.0037$										 0.03% 7,255$																				 0.01%
Supplier	#38 0.0944$											 4,297															 0.0019$										 0.07% 8,742$																				 0.01%
Supplier	#9 0.0899$											 163,131											 (0.0026)$									 2.76% (274,277)$															 -0.25%
Supplier	#36 0.0903$											 62,229													 (0.0045)$									 1.05% (169,726)$															 -0.15%
Supplier	#17 0.0900$											 114																		 (0.0050)$									 0.00% (1,355)$																			 0.00%
Supplier	#5 0.0930$											 285																		 (0.0064)$									 0.00% (1,031)$																			 0.00%
All	Suppliers 5,912,329							 100.00% 111,381,567$								 100%
Table	includes	those	suppliers	that	served	customers	all	twelve	months	of	the	year.		The	average	rates	shown	
are	weighted	by	usage.	The	premium	is	the	difference	between	the	supplier's	average	rate	and	the	
hypothetical	average	rate	that	would	have	applied	if	the	EDC	had	provided	the	same	kWh	during	the	same	
time	periods.
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Supplier-specific	information	(share	of	market,	average	premium,	
etc.)	for	low-income	households	
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	3A
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 1/2
Masked	
Supplier	ID
Average	Rate #	of	Bills Average	
Premium
Share	of	
Accounts
Net	
Consumer	
Loss
Share	of	
Loss
Supplier	#1 0.1671$										 2,635												 0.0778$								 0.22% 118,919$						 0.50%
Supplier	#18 0.1648$										 34,096										 0.0738$								 2.79% 1,229,851$		 5.22%
Supplier	#47 0.1547$										 36,739										 0.0648$								 3.01% 1,327,411$		 5.63%
Supplier	#39 0.1471$										 10,720										 0.0580$								 0.88% 355,810$						 1.51%
Supplier	#12 0.1416$										 136,009								 0.0516$								 11.13% 3,449,749$		 14.64%
Supplier	#41 0.1391$										 105,476								 0.0502$								 8.63% 2,862,367$		 12.15%
Supplier	#37 0.1394$										 56,781										 0.0502$								 4.65% 1,644,197$		 6.98%
Supplier	#15 0.1391$										 88,406										 0.0476$								 7.24% 2,034,689$		 8.64%
Supplier	#25 0.1404$										 9,600												 0.0436$								 0.79% 157,136$						 0.67%
Supplier	#29 0.1282$										 74,480										 0.0394$								 6.10% 1,448,851$		 6.15%
Supplier	#20 0.1297$										 6,880												 0.0390$								 0.56% 144,095$						 0.61%
Supplier	#6 0.1264$										 76,048										 0.0364$								 6.23% 1,554,980$		 6.60%
Supplier	#31 0.1291$										 17,534										 0.0363$								 1.44% 360,426$						 1.53%
Supplier	#43 0.1273$										 45,184										 0.0351$								 3.70% 939,809$						 3.99%
Supplier	#32 0.1225$										 82,977										 0.0328$								 6.79% 1,696,511$		 7.20%
Supplier	#24 0.1190$										 19,311										 0.0277$								 1.58% 276,628$						 1.17%
Supplier	#44 0.1113$										 74																		 0.0272$								 0.01% 1,119$										 0.00%
Supplier	#22 0.1193$										 23,376										 0.0272$								 1.91% 363,828$						 1.54%
Supplier	#19 0.1178$										 7,210												 0.0266$								 0.59% 111,366$						 0.47%
Supplier	#3 0.1135$										 3,418												 0.0264$								 0.28% 43,951$								 0.19%
Supplier	#30 0.1126$										 7,846												 0.0239$								 0.64% 96,573$								 0.41%
Supplier	#13 0.1135$										 21,883										 0.0235$								 1.79% 301,658$						 1.28%
Supplier	#23 0.1125$										 40,691										 0.0227$								 3.33% 489,414$						 2.08%
Supplier	#27 0.1151$										 11,841										 0.0209$								 0.97% 122,471$						 0.52%
Supplier	#26 0.1118$										 2,318												 0.0197$								 0.19% 32,928$								 0.14%
Supplier	#42 0.1108$										 106,105								 0.0191$								 8.69% 1,187,957$		 5.04%
Supplier	#4 0.1098$										 25,201										 0.0184$								 2.06% 257,136$						 1.09%
Supplier	#8 0.1095$										 2,421												 0.0180$								 0.20% 26,873$								 0.11%
Supplier	#46 0.1094$										 5,714												 0.0179$								 0.47% 51,738$								 0.22%
Supplier	#34 0.1081$										 48,707										 0.0178$								 3.99% 527,076$						 2.24%
Supplier	#45 0.1058$										 603																 0.0156$								 0.05% 7,178$										 0.03%
Supplier	#10 0.1045$										 589																 0.0156$								 0.05% 7,255$										 0.03%
Supplier	#14 0.1075$										 775																 0.0154$								 0.06% 7,731$										 0.03%
Supplier	#35 0.1008$										 39,362										 0.0107$								 3.22% 260,940$						 1.11%
Supplier	#2 0.1001$										 8,824												 0.0097$								 0.72% 59,660$								 0.25%
Supplier	#38 0.0988$										 38																		 0.0088$								 0.00% 225$													 0.00%
Supplier	#28 0.0996$										 410																 0.0083$								 0.03% 2,779$										 0.01%
Supplier	#7 0.1000$										 15,068										 0.0073$								 1.23% 69,701$								 0.30%
Suppliers	Ranked	by	Weighted	Average	Premium:	July	2016	-	June	2017	-	Low-Income	Households
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	3A
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Masked	
Supplier	ID
Average	Rate #	of	Bills Average	
Premium
Share	of	
Accounts
Net	
Consumer	
Loss
Share	of	
Loss
Supplier	#9 0.0905$										 35,918										 (0.0022)$						 2.94% (47,153)$						 -0.20%
Supplier	#36 0.0909$										 10,342										 (0.0037)$						 0.85% (22,110)$						 -0.09%
All	Suppliers 1,221,610				 100% 23,561,724		 100%
Table	includes	those	suppliers	that	served	customers	all	twelve	months	of	the	year.		The	average	
rates	shown	are	weighted	by	usage.	The	premium	is	the	difference	between	the	supplier's	average	
rate	and	the	hypothetical	average	rate	that	would	have	applied	if	the	EDC	had	provided	the	same	
kWh	during	the	same	time	periods.
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Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Majority-Minority	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition? Appendix	3B
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General 1/2
Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
68% 351,819						 25% 0.0333$					 30% 45% 25%
18% 2,082,079		 10% 0.0295$					 19% 31% 17%
02121 Dorchester 97% 9,881										 39% 0.0328$					 42% 53% 36%
02126 Mattapan 96% 8,106										 29% 0.0341$					 39% 48% 35%
01840 Lawrence 91% 2,332										 39% 0.0380$					 36% 50% 27%
02119 Roxbury 90% 10,130								 32% 0.0328$					 36% 49% 30%
01107 Springfield 88% 4,069										 49% 0.0379$					 42% 58% 26%
01841 Lawrence 86% 14,349								 39% 0.0387$					 37% 47% 30%
01841 Methuen 86% 55																 35% 0.0403$					 24% 26% 22%
01105 Springfield 85% 4,857										 50% 0.0373$					 39% 54% 24%
02124 Dorchester 83% 17,342								 27% 0.0318$					 33% 46% 28%
01561 Lancaster 82% 351														 10% 0.0190$					 15% 22% 14%
01103 Springfield 80% 1,281										 20% 0.0304$					 18% 45% 12%
01109 Springfield 78% 10,384								 40% 0.0337$					 32% 47% 22%
02150 Chelsea 76% 12,777								 22% 0.0329$					 36% 47% 33%
01608 Worcester 75% 1,106										 18% 0.0378$					 22% 49% 16%
01843 Lawrence 75% 8,848										 28% 0.0329$					 31% 43% 27%
02136 Hyde	Park 74% 12,126								 21% 0.0327$					 30% 39% 28%
02125 Dorchester 69% 13,408								 23% 0.0328$					 28% 46% 22%
02122 Dorchester 68% 9,021										 23% 0.0278$					 31% 51% 25%
01902 Lynn 68% 16,278								 24% 0.0334$					 33% 48% 29%
01104 Springfield 68% 8,284										 36% 0.0368$					 27% 41% 20%
02128 East	Boston 68% 14,862								 18% 0.0382$					 29% 43% 25%
01901 Lynn 67% 1,226										 38% 0.0405$					 27% 35% 22%
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Majority-Minority	vs.	Rest	of	State
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
Percent	
nonwhite	
and/or	
Hispanic
Majority	Minority
Rest	of	State
Total	
accounts
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
01108 Springfield 66% 10,459								 32% 0.0342$					 27% 44% 20%
01905 Lynn 65% 8,990										 22% 0.0336$					 37% 51% 33%
02366 South	Carver 64% 497														 6% 0.0246$					 12% 13% 12%
02368 Randolph 63% 12,076								 16% 0.0276$					 29% 37% 27%
02301 Brockton 63% 22,235								 24% 0.0337$					 34% 47% 30%
01610 Worcester 61% 7,910										 29% 0.0343$					 34% 49% 27%
01151 Indian	Orchard 60% 3,759										 36% 0.0316$					 27% 41% 19%
01151 Springfield 60% 24																 17% 0.0307$					 29% 0% 35%
01851 Lowell 60% 10,503								 21% 0.0334$					 31% 45% 27%
02120 Roxbry	Xng 60% 4,624										 18% 0.0309$					 26% 50% 21%
02111 Boston 60% 4,510										 17% 0.0262$					 13% 35% 8%
01605 Worcester 54% 8,464										 21% 0.0315$					 28% 44% 24%
02118 Boston 53% 11,707								 11% 0.0315$					 14% 35% 11%
02148 Malden 53% 25,123								 12% 0.0334$					 21% 34% 20%
01119 Springfield 53% 5,348										 28% 0.0330$					 23% 34% 19%
01854 Lowell 53% 8,922										 19% 0.0316$					 24% 39% 20%
02302 Brockton 52% 11,463								 23% 0.0307$					 31% 41% 28%
02131 Roslindale 51% 11,784								 14% 0.0296$					 25% 38% 22%
02142 Cambridge 50% 2,348										 3% 0.0352$					 6% 20% 6%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	46	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Percent	
nonwhite	
and/or	
Hispanic
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Total	
accounts
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
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Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Top	20	Percent	African-American	
	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
44% 166,239						 26% 0.0322$					 32% 46% 27%
4% 2,267,659		 11% 0.0301$					 20% 33% 18%
02126 Mattapan 86% 8,106										 29% 0.0341$					 39% 48% 35%
02121 Dorchester 69% 9,881										 39% 0.0328$					 42% 53% 36%
02124 Dorchester 64% 17,342								 27% 0.0318$					 33% 46% 28%
02119 Roxbury 59% 10,130								 32% 0.0328$					 36% 49% 30%
02136 Hyde	Park 46% 12,126								 21% 0.0327$					 30% 39% 28%
02301 Brockton 44% 22,235								 24% 0.0337$					 34% 47% 30%
02368 Randolph 42% 12,076								 16% 0.0276$					 29% 37% 27%
01109 Springfield 39% 10,384								 40% 0.0337$					 32% 47% 22%
02302 Brockton 34% 11,463								 23% 0.0307$					 31% 41% 28%
02122 Dorchester 32% 9,021										 23% 0.0278$					 31% 51% 25%
02125 Dorchester 27% 13,408								 23% 0.0328$					 28% 46% 22%
02131 Roslindale 27% 11,784								 14% 0.0296$					 25% 38% 22%
02366 South	Carver 26% 497														 6% 0.0246$					 12% 13% 12%
01119 Springfield 25% 5,348										 28% 0.0330$					 23% 34% 19%
02120 Roxbry	Xng 25% 4,624										 18% 0.0309$					 26% 50% 21%
01901 Lynn 23% 1,226										 38% 0.0405$					 27% 35% 22%
01608 Worcester 23% 1,106										 18% 0.0378$					 22% 49% 16%
01718 Vlg	Nag	Wd 22% 279														 2% 0.0370$					 14% 40% 13%
01105 Springfield 21% 4,857										 50% 0.0373$					 39% 54% 24%
02071 South	Walpole 20% 346														 5% 0.0314$					 12% 5% 12%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey	
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	46	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Top	20	Percent	African-American	vs.	Rest	of	State
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
Top	20:	percent	African-American
Rest	of	State
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
Total	
accounts
Percent	
African-
American
	 Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition?	 	
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Appendix	3D	
	
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Top	20	Percent	Hispanic	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
55% 131,870						 30% 0.0352$					 33% 47% 27%
8% 2,302,028		 11% 0.0299$					 20% 33% 18%
01840 Lawrence 86% 2,332										 39% 0.0380$					 36% 50% 27%
01841 Lawrence 82% 14,349								 39% 0.0387$					 37% 47% 30%
01841 Methuen 82% 55																 35% 0.0403$					 24% 26% 22%
01107 Springfield 80% 4,069										 49% 0.0379$					 42% 58% 26%
02150 Chelsea 64% 12,777								 22% 0.0329$					 36% 47% 33%
01105 Springfield 64% 4,857										 50% 0.0373$					 39% 54% 24%
01103 Springfield 63% 1,281										 20% 0.0304$					 18% 45% 12%
01843 Lawrence 63% 8,848										 28% 0.0329$					 31% 43% 27%
02128 East	Boston 58% 14,862								 18% 0.0382$					 29% 43% 25%
01104 Springfield 55% 8,284										 36% 0.0368$					 27% 41% 20%
01608 Worcester 54% 1,106										 18% 0.0378$					 22% 49% 16%
01108 Springfield 43% 10,459								 32% 0.0342$					 27% 44% 20%
01902 Lynn 43% 16,278								 24% 0.0334$					 33% 48% 29%
01109 Springfield 38% 10,384								 40% 0.0337$					 32% 47% 22%
01905 Lynn 38% 8,990										 22% 0.0336$					 37% 51% 33%
01610 Worcester 38% 7,910										 29% 0.0343$					 34% 49% 27%
01151 Indian	Orchard 37% 3,759										 36% 0.0316$					 27% 41% 19%
01151 Springfield 37% 24																 17% 0.0307$					 29% 0% 35%
01901 Lynn 37% 1,226										 38% 0.0405$					 27% 35% 22%
01550 Charlton 32% 20																 15% 0.0155$					 25% 0% 29%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	46	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Top	20	Percent	Hispanic	vs.	Rest	of	State
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
Top	20:	percent	Hispanic
Rest	of	State
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Percent	
Hispanic
Total	
accounts
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Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Top	20	Percent	Limited	English		
Proficiency	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
22% 158,850						 25% 0.0344$					 30% 45% 25%
5% 2,274,551		 11% 0.0299$					 20% 34% 18%
01840 Lawrence 43% 2,332										 39% 0.0380$					 36% 50% 27%
01608 Worcester 41% 1,106										 18% 0.0378$					 22% 49% 16%
01901 Lynn 33% 1,226										 38% 0.0405$					 27% 35% 22%
01841 Lawrence 30% 14,349								 39% 0.0387$					 37% 47% 30%
01841 Methuen 30% 55																 35% 0.0403$					 24% 26% 22%
01107 Springfield 30% 4,069										 49% 0.0379$					 42% 58% 26%
02128 East	Boston 29% 14,862								 18% 0.0382$					 29% 43% 25%
01103 Springfield 29% 1,281										 20% 0.0304$					 18% 45% 12%
02111 Boston 28% 4,510										 17% 0.0262$					 13% 35% 8%
02150 Chelsea 27% 12,777								 22% 0.0329$					 36% 47% 33%
02744 New	Bedford 22% 5,155										 37% 0.0316$					 27% 37% 21%
02746 New	Bedford 20% 6,353										 37% 0.0277$					 28% 35% 25%
01105 Springfield 20% 4,857										 50% 0.0373$					 39% 54% 24%
01610 Worcester 18% 7,910										 29% 0.0343$					 34% 49% 27%
01702 Framingham 18% 13,720								 15% 0.0374$					 29% 40% 27%
01104 Springfield 17% 8,284										 36% 0.0368$					 27% 41% 20%
02115 Boston 17% 9,844										 10% 0.0230$					 15% 27% 13%
02149 Everett 17% 16,474								 17% 0.0310$					 29% 40% 27%
01902 Lynn 17% 16,278								 24% 0.0334$					 33% 48% 29%
02125 Dorchester 17% 13,408								 23% 0.0328$					 28% 46% 22%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	48	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Top	20:	pct.	limited	English
Rest	of	State
Percent	
limited	
English	
proficiency
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Top	20	Percent	Limited	English	Proficiency	vs.	Rest	of	State
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Total	
accounts
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
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Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Bottom	20	Median	Income	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
$28,769 117,836						 33% 0.0343$					 31% 44% 25%
$74,282 2,306,506		 11% 0.0300$					 20% 34% 18%
01103 Springfield $15,558 1,281										 20% 0.0304$					 18% 45% 12%
01105 Springfield $16,845 4,857										 50% 0.0373$					 39% 54% 24%
01094 Hardwick $17,708 164														 38% 0.0224$					 24% 27% 23%
01840 Lawrence $18,291 2,332										 39% 0.0380$					 36% 50% 27%
01901 Lynn $21,605 1,226										 38% 0.0405$					 27% 35% 22%
01107 Springfield $22,288 4,069										 49% 0.0379$					 42% 58% 26%
01608 Worcester $22,789 1,106										 18% 0.0378$					 22% 49% 16%
02121 Dorchester $26,150 9,881										 39% 0.0328$					 42% 53% 36%
02746 New	Bedford $26,705 6,353										 37% 0.0277$					 28% 35% 25%
01104 Springfield $28,858 8,284										 36% 0.0368$					 27% 41% 20%
02119 Roxbury $28,885 10,130								 32% 0.0328$					 36% 49% 30%
02721 Fall	River $29,684 11,445								 35% 0.0325$					 30% 38% 26%
02120 Roxbry	Xng $30,487 4,624										 18% 0.0309$					 26% 50% 21%
02724 Fall	River $30,688 7,363										 34% 0.0344$					 28% 34% 26%
01610 Worcester $31,019 7,910										 29% 0.0343$					 34% 49% 27%
02047 Humarock $31,302 686														 1% 0.0319$					 9% 11% 9%
02744 New	Bedford $31,709 5,155										 37% 0.0316$					 27% 37% 21%
02115 Boston $31,737 9,844										 10% 0.0230$					 15% 27% 13%
02723 Fall	River $32,275 6,777										 34% 0.0378$					 31% 40% 26%
01841 Lawrence $32,928 14,349								 39% 0.0387$					 37% 47% 30%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	63	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Bottom	20	Median	Income	vs.	Rest	of	State
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
Bottom	20:	med.	income
Rest	of	State
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
Median	
household	
income
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Total	
accounts
	 Are	Residential	Consumers	Benefiting	from	Electric	Supply	Competition?	 	
Prepared	for	the	Massachusetts	Office	of	the	Attorney	General	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Appendix	3G	
	
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Top	20	Percent	Participating	in		
Low-Income	Program	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
Top	20:	Pct	LI 107,102									 38% 0.0349$						 0.0363$					 32% 44% 25%
Rest	of	State 2,333,080						 10% 0.0300$						 0.0340$					 20% 34% 18%
01105 Springfield 4,857														 50% 0.0373$						 0.0379$					 39% 54% 24%
01107 Springfield 4,069														 49% 0.0379$						 0.0389$					 42% 58% 26%
01367 Charlemont 12																			 42% 0.0415$						 0.0415$					 17% 40% 0%
01109 Springfield 10,384											 40% 0.0337$						 0.0355$					 32% 47% 22%
01840 Lawrence 2,332														 39% 0.0380$						 0.0384$					 36% 50% 27%
01841 Lawrence 14,349											 39% 0.0387$						 0.0410$					 37% 47% 30%
02121 Dorchester 9,881														 39% 0.0328$						 0.0344$					 42% 53% 36%
01862 Tewksbury 137																	 39% 0.0340$						 0.0343$					 41% 51% 35%
01094 Hardwick 164																	 38% 0.0224$						 0.0296$					 24% 27% 23%
01901 Lynn 1,226														 38% 0.0405$						 0.0453$					 27% 35% 22%
02744 New	Bedford 5,155														 37% 0.0316$						 0.0327$					 27% 37% 21%
02746 New	Bedford 6,353														 37% 0.0277$						 0.0294$					 28% 35% 25%
01151 Indian	Orchard 3,759														 36% 0.0316$						 0.0331$					 27% 41% 19%
01104 Springfield 8,284														 36% 0.0368$						 0.0368$					 27% 41% 20%
02721 Fall	River 11,445											 35% 0.0325$						 0.0342$					 30% 38% 26%
01841 Methuen 55																			 35% 0.0403$						 0.0293$					 24% 26% 22%
01607 Auburn 41																			 34% 0.0261$						 0.0168$					 24% 36% 19%
02724 Fall	River 7,363														 34% 0.0344$						 0.0384$					 28% 34% 26%
02723 Fall	River 6,777														 34% 0.0378$						 0.0342$					 31% 40% 26%
01108 Springfield 10,459											 32% 0.0342$						 0.0349$					 27% 44% 20%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	63	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Top	20	Percent	Participating	in	Low-Income	Program	vs.	Rest	of	State
Total	
accounts
Low-
Income	
Mark-Up	
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
All	-	Mark-
Up Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
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Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	market	for	competitive	
retail	electric,	June	2017:	Top	20	Median	Income	Vs.	Rest	of	State	
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Zip Municipality All Low	income Non	-	L.I.
$151,800 76,753								 3% 0.0293$					 15% 18% 15%
$69,463 2,347,589		 12% 0.0303$					 21% 35% 19%
02493 Weston $199,519 3,926										 2% 0.0306$					 16% 29% 16%
02468 Waban $196,250 2,321										 2% 0.0315$					 13% 20% 12%
02030 Dover $185,542 2,088										 1% 0.0245$					 14% 25% 14%
01467 Harvard $183,750 73																 4% 0.0073$					 16% 0% 17%
01741 Carlisle $166,111 1,895										 1% 0.0269$					 15% 19% 15%
01776 Sudbury $165,745 6,196										 3% 0.0311$					 14% 19% 14%
01770 Sherborn $155,956 1,570										 2% 0.0289$					 14% 20% 14%
01773 Lincoln $153,438 2,255										 3% 0.0347$					 17% 22% 16%
02420 Lexington $151,607 5,482										 3% 0.0310$					 14% 18% 14%
01740 Bolton $147,446 1,848										 2% 0.0177$					 19% 35% 19%
02421 Lexington $147,335 6,376										 4% 0.0328$					 14% 14% 14%
01772 Southboro $145,179 3,523										 2% 0.0177$					 22% 24% 22%
01778 Wayland $143,616 5,112										 3% 0.0303$					 15% 19% 15%
01890 Winchester $143,017 7,697										 2% 0.0324$					 13% 17% 13%
02056 Norfolk $141,278 3,503										 3% 0.0274$					 14% 10% 14%
02492 Needham $140,734 6,707										 2% 0.0301$					 14% 16% 14%
02461 Newton	Hlds $140,733 2,856										 5% 0.0351$					 14% 23% 13%
01921 Boxford $140,268 2,783										 2% 0.0297$					 17% 11% 17%
01748 Hopkinton $138,551 6,119										 3% 0.0286$					 13% 20% 13%
02052 Medfield $138,036 4,423										 3% 0.0308$					 14% 15% 14%
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	and	ZCTA	data	from	the	U.S.	Census	2015	American	Community	Survey
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10	total	accounts	were	dropped;	63	rows	with	missing	demographic	data	were	dropped
Top	20:	med.	income
Rest	of	State
Median	
household	
income
Percent	low	
income	
accounts
Zip	code	and	municipality	participation	in	the	competitive	supply	market,	June	2017:	
Top	20	Median	Income	vs.	Rest	of	State
Average	
markup	
over	basic
Total	
accounts
Percent	of	accounts	in	competitive	supply:
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45	zip-municipalities	with	the	highest	mark-up	(premium)		
relative	to	basic	rates	
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Top	45	by	mark-up: Top	45	by	mark-up:
Zip Municipality Total Zip Municipality Total
01236 Gt.	Barrington 90																 32% $0.1386 01074 Barre 203														 31% $0.1100
01821 Billerica 640														 30% $0.0800 01230 New	Marlboro 720														 13% $0.0982
01929 Essex 57																 25% $0.0709 01525 Uxbridge 122														 19% $0.0737
02142 Cambridge 65																 20% $0.0552 01531 New	Braintree 391														 21% $0.0608
01339 Heath 13																 77% $0.0546 01844 Lawrence 72																 22% $0.0483
01982 Hamilton 98																 23% $0.0521 01982 Hamilton 2,552										 18% $0.0479
01776 Sudbury 185														 19% $0.0512 02791 Westport	Pt 240														 14% $0.0474
02138 Cambridge 441														 24% $0.0505 01050 Montgomery 41																 27% $0.0469
01773 Lincoln 58																 22% $0.0493 01220 Adams 3,451										 23% $0.0445
02725 Somerset 169														 36% $0.0488 02140 N	Cambridge 8,373										 11% $0.0436
01240 Lenox 111														 24% $0.0485 01242 Lenoxdale 209														 9% $0.0428
02053 Medway 207														 21% $0.0476 02138 Cambridge 12,873								 10% $0.0412
02559 Pocasset 130														 28% $0.0471 02723 Fall	River 4,487										 26% $0.0407
02032 East	Walpole 89																 17% $0.0467 02139 Cambridge 13,750								 11% $0.0406
01730 Bedford 235														 15% $0.0454 02144 W	Somerville 10,137								 9% $0.0401
01901 Lynn 461														 35% $0.0453 01038 Hatfield 1,101										 12% $0.0396
01754 Maynard 300														 22% $0.0451 01852 Lowell 11,349								 20% $0.0395
01760 Natick 893														 21% $0.0451 01608 Worcester 911														 16% $0.0391
01038 Hatfield 75																 17% $0.0447 02189 Weymouth 5,372										 22% $0.0390
02140 N	Cambridge 564														 34% $0.0444 01267 Williamstown 2,750										 15% $0.0389
01560 Grafton 121														 39% $0.0443 01718 Vlg	Nag	Wd 274														 13% $0.0386
01098 Worthington 59																 20% $0.0441 01944 Manchester 2,370										 15% $0.0386
02467 Chestnut	Hill 186														 20% $0.0440 01850 Lowell 4,437										 25% $0.0383
02141 E	Cambridge 406														 29% $0.0438 01835 Haverhill 4,971										 17% $0.0381
02139 Cambridge 1,236										 36% $0.0438 01050 Huntington 913														 12% $0.0381
45	zip-municipalities	with	the	highest	mark-up	(premium)	relative	to	basic	rates
Percent	in	
CS	market
Average	
mark-up	
over	basic
Percent	in	
CS	market
Average	
mark-up	
over	basic
Low	income	accounts All	other	accounts
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Top	45	by	mark-up: Top	45	by	mark-up:
Zip Municipality Total Zip Municipality Total
Percent	in	
CS	market
Average	
mark-up	
over	basic
Percent	in	
CS	market
Average	
mark-up	
over	basic
Low	income	accounts All	other	accounts
02180 Stoneham 666													 19% $0.0433 02141 E	Cambridge 6,467										 11% $0.0381
01827 Dunstable 31																 39% $0.0431 01338 Buckland 759														 15% $0.0379
02081 Walpole 327														 18% $0.0428 02143 Somerville 11,158								 11% $0.0379
02663 S	Wellfleet 43																 28% $0.0425 02108 Boston 2,176										 10% $0.0379
01012 Chesterfield 64																 20% $0.0424 02650 North	Chatham 1,086										 17% $0.0378
01702 Framingham 2,082										 40% $0.0422 02128 East	Boston 12,202								 25% $0.0378
01473 Westminster 203														 24% $0.0421 02565 N	Falmouth 497														 10% $0.0378
01701 Framingham 708														 24% $0.0420 02445 Brookline 8,258										 11% $0.0377
01930 Gloucester 1,633										 30% $0.0417 02534 Cataumet 703														 18% $0.0376
01255 Sandisfield 98																 16% $0.0415 01754 Maynard 4,229										 13% $0.0376
01983 Topsfield 34																 32% $0.0411 01066 North	Hatfield 134														 7% $0.0376
01915 Beverly 1,301										 27% $0.0411 02725 Somerset 835														 26% $0.0376
01863 Chelmsford 256														 21% $0.0410 01840 Lawrence 1,420										 27% $0.0375
01841 Lawrence 5,601										 47% $0.0410 02127 South	Boston 15,431								 9% $0.0373
02651 North	Eastham 87																 25% $0.0410 01609 Worcester 6,287										 20% $0.0373
02492 Needham 111														 16% $0.0407 01351 Montague 894														 14% $0.0373
01862 Billerica 193														 29% $0.0407 02659 South	Chatham 1,416										 13% $0.0372
01235 Hinsdale 169														 20% $0.0406 01201 Lanesborough 195														 11% $0.0371
02720 Fall	River 3,148										 30% $0.0405 01104 Springfield 5,328										 20% $0.0368
02420 Lexington 152														 18% $0.0405 01054 Leverett 788														 17% $0.0368
Source:	Basic	supply	providers	
Note:	Places	with	fewer	than	10		competitive	supplier	accounts	(low	income	or	all	other	income)	were	dropped
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Appendix	4A	
	
State	Investigations	and	Class	Action	Lawsuits	Alleging	Unfair	or	
Deceptive	Acts	or	Practices	by	Suppliers	Licensed	to	Operate	in	the	
Commonwealth	of	Massachusetts	
	
STATE INVESTIGATIONS AND CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS ALLEGING UNFAIR 
OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES BY SUPPLIERS LICENSED TO OPERATE 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS1 
AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC d/b/a AMBIT ENERGY      
State Investigations 
• New York Department of Public Service: investigation of Ambit (2015).2
Lawsuits 
• Kostovetsky vs. Ambit Energy Holdings, LLC, et al.   U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, docket 1:15-cv-02553.
• Urbino v. Ambit Energy Holdings LLC, et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey, docket 3:14-cv-05184.
• Little, et al. v. Ambit Northeast, LLC, et al. U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey, docket 3:16-cv-08800-PGS-LHG.
• Simmons v. Ambit Energy Holdings LLC.  Supreme Court of the State of New York,
County of Kings, docket 503285/2015.
• Lazarek et al v. Ambit Energy Holdings, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York, docket 6:15-cv-06361-FPG-MWP.
• Silvis v. Ambit Energy LP.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
docket 2:14-cv-05005; Third Circuit Court of Appeals, docket 16-1976.
CLEANCHOICE ENERGY, INC. 
Formerly Ethical Electric, Inc., d/b/a Clean Energy Option 
State Investigations 
• Illinois Attorney General announced a settlement with Ethical Electric (2017).3
• Pennsylvania Attorney General announced an assurance of voluntary compliance with
Ethical Electric (2015).4
CLEARVIEW ELECTRIC, INC. d/b/a CLEARVIEW ENERGY  
State Investigations  
1 This list is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.  There may be additional lawsuits and state 
investigations that were not easily located via internet search. 
2 See https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-energy-bill-refunds-more-1500-new-yorkers 
(last visited February 12, 2018). 
3 See http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2016_08/20160808b.html (last visited February 5, 2018). 
4 See https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510549039-pennsylvania-electric-supplier-faces-legal-action-over-
solicitation-pieces (last visited February 5, 2018). 
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• Maine Public Utilities Commission: investigation of Clearview (2015).  Docket 2015-
00297.
• New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission: investigation of Clearview (2017).  Docket
DE 17-002.
CONSTELLATION ENERGY POWER CHOICE, LLC 
CONSTELLATION ENERGY SERVICES, INC./INTEGRYS ENERGY SERV., INC. 
CONSTELLATION NEW ENERGY, INC.  
Parent Company: Exelon 
State Investigations 
• Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission: investigation of MXenergy (2012).5  Docket
M-2012-2201861.
Lawsuits 
• Coda v. Constellation Energy Power Choice, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey, docket 2:17-cv-03437-JMV-MF.
DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC 
DIRECT ENERGY BUSINESS, LLC 
Parent Company: Centrica, plc 
State Investigations 
• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority: investigation of Direct Energy (2013).
Docket No. 13-07-17.
• Public Utilities Commission of Texas: investigation of Direct Energy (2014). Docket No.
42524.
Lawsuits 
• Richards v. Direct Energy Services, LLC.  U.S. District Court in the District of
Connecticut, docket 3:14-cv-01724-VAB; Second Circuit Court of Appeals, docket 17-
1003.
• Dolemba v. Direct Energy Services, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois Eastern Division, docket 1:14-cv-09677.
• Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois Eastern Division, docket 1:17-cv-06569.
• Forte v. Direct Energy Services, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
New York, docket 6:17-cv-00264-FJS-ATB.
5 MXenergy was acquired by Constellation in 2011. 
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• Wilson v. Direct Energy Services, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio Western Division at Cincinnati, docket 1:16-cv-00454. 
• Getso v. Direct Energy.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, docket 
3:16-cv-02142-K.  
 
DISCOUNT POWER, INC.  
Parent Company: Spark Energy, Inc.          
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Chandler et al. v. Discount Power, Inc.  State of Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial 
District of Hartford docket HHD-CV-14-6055537-S.   
 
ENERGY PLUS HOLDINGS MA 
Parent Company: NRG Energy, Inc. 
 
State Investigations 
 
• Connecticut Attorney General and Office of Consumer Counsel announce a settlement 
with Energy Plus Holdings, LLC (2014).  CT PURA Docket No. 12-07-13. 
• New York Attorney General announced a settlement with Energy Plus (2017).6   
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Fortney v. Energy Plus Holdings, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland 
Greenbelt Division, docket 1:12-cv-08119-WHP.   
• Wise et al. v. Energy Plus Holdings LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, docket 1:11-cv-07345-WHP. 
• Faistl v. Energy Plus Holdings, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey Newark Division, docket 2:12-cv-02879-JLL-MAH.  
• Yu v. Energy Plus Holdings, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
docket 2:12-cv-02627-JLL-JAD. 
 
JUST ENERGY MASSACHUSETTS CORP. d/b/a JUST ENERGY  
Parent Company: Just Energy Group, formerly d/b/a U.S. Energy Savings  
 
State Investigations 
 
• Massachusetts Attorney General announced a settlement with Just Energy (2014).7  
• Public Utilities Commission of Ohio: investigation into Commerce Energy, d/b/a Just 
Energy (2016).  Docket Case No. 16-2006-GE-UNC.   
                                                
6 See https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-800k-settlement-energy-service-company-falsely-
advertised (last visited February 5, 2018).   
7 See http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2015/2015-01-06-just-energy.html (last visited 
February 5, 2018).   
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Lawsuits 
 
• Nieves v. Just Energy New York Corp.  U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
New York, docket 1:17-cv-00561-WMS. 
• Donin et al v. Just Energy Group Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, docket 1:17-cv-05787-WFK-SJB.  
 
LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC  
 
State Investigations 
 
●  Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority announced a settlement with Liberty 
Power (2016).  Docket No. 06-12-07-RE06. 
●  Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority: investigation of Liberty Power (2017).  
Docket No. 06-12-07-RE07. 
●  Public Utilities Commission of Texas: investigation of Liberty Power Holdings, LLC 
(2016).  Docket No. 45215. 
●  New York Public Service Commission: investigation of Liberty Power (2013).  Case No. 
13-E-0062. 
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Dolemba v. Liberty Power Corp., LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois Eastern Division, docket 1:13-cv-05429. 
• Moore v. Liberty Power Holdings LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois Eastern Division, docket 1:16-cv-07553.   
• Kreke v. Liberty Power Holdings LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Illinois, docket 3:17-cv-00808-DRH-RJD.  
          
MAJOR ENERGY ELECTRIC SERVICES LLC 
Parent Company: Spark Energy, Inc.     
 
State Investigations 
 
• Illinois Commerce Commission: investigation of Major Energy (2014).8 
• Maryland Public Service Commission: investigation of Major Energy Electric Service, 
LLC and Major Energy Services, LLC (2014).  Case No. 9346. 
 
Lawsuits 
 
                                                
8 See 
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/Major%20Energy%20Press%20Release%20FINAL%205%206%201
5.doc (last visited February 13, 2018). 
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• Carrera v. Major Energy Services, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, docket 3:15-cv-03208-MAS-LHG. 
• Gillis et al v. Major Energy et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, docket 2:14-cv-03856-MSG.   
 
MASSACHUSETTS GAS & ELECTRIC    
Local Subsidiary of: U.S. Gas & Electric 
Parent Company: Crius Energy 
 
State Investigations 
 
• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority: investigation of Connecticut Gas & 
Electric (2013).  Docket No. 13-07-15. 
• Maryland Public Service Commission: investigation of U.S. Gas & Electric and Energy 
Service Providers, Inc. d/b/a Maryland Gas & Electric (2014).  Case No. 9347. 
• Pennsylvania Attorney General and Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate 
announced settlement with Pennsylvania Gas & Electric (2015).9   
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Sobeich v. U.S. Gas & Electric, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, docket 2:14-cv-04464. 
 
PALMCO POWER MA LLC     
 
State Investigations 
 
• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority investigation of Palmco (2017).10  
Docket No. 10-01-24RE01. 
• New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, and New Jersey 
Division of Consumer Affairs announce settlement with Palmco Power NJ, LLC and 
Palmco Energy NJ, LLC (2016).11 
 
Lawsuits 
 
• The People of the State of Illinois v. Palmco Power IL, LLC.  The State of Illinois Circuit 
Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, docket 2017-CH-00099.   
• Komoda v. Palmco Energy NJ, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, docket 1:14-cv-01679-KAM-VVP.  
 
PROVIDER POWER MASS, LLC 
                                                
9 See  http://www.oca.state.pa.us/Industry/Electric/Attorney%20General%20Kane%20Press%20Release.pdf (last 
visited February 5, 2018).   
10 See http://www.ct.gov/occ/lib/occ/8-17-17_palmco_settlement.pdf (last visited February 12, 2018).   
11 See http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases16/pr20160623b.html (last visited February 5, 2018).   
Are Residential Consumers Benefiting from Electric Supply Competition? Appendix 4A
Prepared for the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General 5/9
	
Parent Company: Spark Energy, Inc.        
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Veilleux et al v. Electricity Maine, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maine, docket 1:16-cv-00571-NT.  
 
PUBLIC POWER, LLC  
Parent Company: Crius Energy  
 
State Investigations 
 
• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority investigation of Public Power (2016).  
Docket 13-02-08. 
• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority investigation of Public Power (2013).  
Docket 11-10-06. 
• Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission investigation of Public Power (2013).  Docket 
M-2012-2257858. 
• Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission investigation of Public Power (2016).  Docket 
No. M-2015-2439492.   
 
 
SPARK ENERGY, INC. 
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Ortiz et al v. Spark Energy, LLC. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California, docket 4:15-cv-02326-JSW.   
• Hoy v. Spark Energy Gas, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois Eastern Division, docket 1:14-cv-09579. 
• Ballantyne v. Spark Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
docket 2:17-cv-11018-MFL-SDD. 
• Melville v. Spark Energy, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
docket 1:15-cv-08706-RBK-JS. 
• Rolland v. Spark Energy, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, docket 
3:17-cv-02680-MAS-LHG.   
• Bank v. Spark Energy Holdings, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, docket 1:13-cv-06130-JG-VMS. 
• Markey et al v. Spark Energy, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, docket 2:16-cv-01597-MSG.  
 
STARION ENERGY, INC. 
 
State Investigations 
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• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority investigation of Starion Energy (2015).  
Docket No. 09-10-10. 
• District of Columbia Office of the People’s Counsel announced a settlement with Starion 
(2014).  Formal Case No. 1105.   
• Delaware Public Services Commission investigation of Starion Energy (2013).  PSC 
DOCKET NO. 395-13.   
• Maryland Public Service Commission investigation of Starion Energy (2013).  Case No. 
9324.   
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Gruber v. Starion Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, docket 
3:14-cv-01828-SRU. 
• Owens v. Starion Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut New 
Haven Division, docket 3:16-cv-01912-VAB. 
• Primack v. Starion Energy PA, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois Eastern Division, docket 1:14-cv-08772. 
• Camuso et al v. Starion Energy Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
docket 1:17-cv-12215. 
• Windley v. Starion Enery Inc., et al.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, docket 1:14-cv-09053. 
• Orange v. Starion Energy PA, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, docket 2:15-cv-00773-CDJ; Third Circuit Court of Appeals, docket 16-
1949. 
• Eisenband v. Starion Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 
docket 9:17-cv-80195-KAM.   
 
VERDE ENERGY USA MASS LLC      
Parent Company: Spark Energy, Inc.  
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Roberts v. Verde Energy USA, Inc. U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
docket 3:15-cv-00312-VLB. 
• Vebell v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
docket 3:15-cv-00008-JBA. 
• Coleman v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Illinois, docket 3:17-cv-00062-DRH-SCW.   
• Bunnell v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
docket 3:15-cv-30220-MGM. 
• Schley v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
docket 2:17-cv-00887-LS. 
• Richardson et al v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, docket 5:15-cv-06325-LS. 
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• Wachstock v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, docket 1:14-cv-04082-WFK-JMA. 
• Bowser v. Verde Energy USA, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, docket 7:15-cv-09471-CS. 
 
VIRIDIAN ENERGY, INC.    
Parent Company: Crius Energy  
 
State Investigations 
 
• Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority investigation of Viridian Energy 
(2015).  Docket No. 09-04-15RE03. 
• Maryland Public Service Commission investigation of Viridian Energy (2012).  Case No. 
9255.12 
 
Lawsuits 
 
• Sanborn v. Viridian Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
docket 3:14-cv-01731. 
• Steketee v. Viridian Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
docket 3:15-cv-00585-SRU.  
• Mirkin et al v. Viridian Energy, Inc.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
docket 3:15-cv-01057-SRU. 
• Hembling et al v. Viridian Energy, LLC et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of 
Connecticut, docket 3:15-cv-01258-SRU. 
• Lempert v. Viridian Energy, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
docket 3:15-cv-00703-VLB. 
• Daniyan v. Viridian Energy, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, 
docket 1:14-cv-02715-GLR. 
• Landau v. Viridian Energy PA, LLC.  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, docket 2:16-cv-02383-GAM.  
 
XOOM ENERGY MASSACHUSETTS, LLC  
Parent Company: ACN, Inc.   
 
State Investigations 
 
• The Maryland Public Service Commission investigation of Xoom Energy (2014).  Case 
No. 9346. 
 
Lawsuits 
 
                                                
12http://webapp.psc.state.md.us/newIntranet/sitesearch/Press%20Releases/Maryland%20PSC%20Issues%20$60,000
%20Civil%20Penalty%20Against%20Viridian%20Energy.pdf (last visited February 12, 2018). 
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• Adesina v. ACN, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina, docket 3:14-cv-00562-GCM. 
• Todd et al v. ACN, Inc. et al.  U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, docket 
8:15-cv-00154-GJH. 
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Appendix	5A	
	
Connecticut	Office	of	Consumer	Counsel	Summary	for	
January	2017	through	December	2017	–	Fact	Sheet	
Updated on 
February 6, 2018 
OCC FACT SHEET: ELECTRIC SUPPLIER MARKET, 
JANUARY 2017 THROUGH DECEMBER 2017 
The following is an update to the Office of Consumer Counsel’s (OCC’s) Electric Supplier 
Market Fact Sheet, originally created in 2014.  The numbers provided herein are based on data 
submitted as compliance filings in the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority’s Docket Number 
06-10-22.
• Retail suppliers serve 26.4% of Eversource Energy (Eversource) residential customers
and 32.7% of United Illuminating (UI) residential customers, in December 2017.
• In the month of December 2017, nearly six out of ten residential supplier customers paid
more than the Standard Offer in Eversource territory, and eight out of ten residential
supplier customers paid more than the Standard Offer in UI territory.1
• In the month December 2017, residential Eversource customers who chose suppliers paid
in aggregate $3,043,199.42 more than the Standard Offer for their electric generation,
and residential UI customers who chose suppliers paid in aggregate $1,598,120.23 more
than the Standard Offer.2
• For the rolling year of January 2017 through December 2017, residential consumers who
chose a retail supplier paid, in aggregate, $46,298,211.20 more than the Standard Offer.
1 This Fact Sheet only examines available data regarding pricing by electric suppliers. While some suppliers may
offer products or services to customers such as airline miles or a product with additional renewable energy content, 
there is no data available to quantify the value of such offers.  OCC recommends that customers look carefully at the 
fine print for offers for additional products or services that come with higher prices, to ensure they are getting 
sufficient value to justify the higher price tag. 
2 These calculations are based on an assumption of 750/month kWh usage.
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• The Standard Offer for Eversource customers from January 1, 2017 through June 30, 
2017, was 7.87 cents/kWh.  From July 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017, the Standard 
Offer for Eversource customers is 8.01 cents/kWh. 
• The Standard Offer for UI customers from January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2017, was 
9.26 cents/kWh.  From July 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017, the Standard Offer for 
UI customers is 7.59 cents/kWh. 
• The following table lists all electric suppliers who charged at least 20% of their 
residential customers 12.021 cents/kWh (50% higher than Eversource standard service) 
or 11.399 cents/kWh (50% higher than UI standard service) or more in the month of July.  
The phone numbers for each supplier are taken from those listed at energizect.com or the 
website for that supplier.   
 
Suppliers Charging at Least 20% of their Customers 50% or more than Standard 
Offer in December  
Electric Suppliers % of 
Eversource 
Customers 
paying over 
12.021 cents 
% of UI 
Customers 
paying over 
11.399 cents 
Supplier Phone 
Number 
Aequitas Energy, Inc. N/A 35.73% (855) 799-8200 
Choice Energy 90.18% 92.82% (888) 565-4490 
Direct Energy Services 37.68% 41.98% 1(800) 348-2999 
Energy Plus Holdings, LLC 92.61% 91.41% (888) 766-3509 
Liberty Power Holdings LLC 48.18% 91.10% 1(866) 769-3799 
Major Energy Electric Services, LLC 66.67% N/A (888) 625-6760 
North American Power and Gas LLC 33.13% 48.31% (888)313-9086 
NRG Retail Solutions 88.10% 90.30% 1(855) 457-5700 
Public Power, LLC 23.77% 39.34% (844) 585-8900 
Spark Energy LP 45.27% 37.64% (877) 374-8013 
Starion Energy Inc. 27.79% 31.22% (800) 600-3040 
Viridian Energy Inc. 24.48% 51.15% (866) 663-2508 
 
 
Please feel free to contact the Office of Consumer Counsel at 860-827-2900 or occ.info@ct.gov 
if you have any questions about this information. 
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Appendix	5B	
	
“State	Urged	To	Probe	Abusive	Electricity	Suppliers,”	
Gregory	B.	Hladky,	Hartford	Courant,	January	31,	2017	
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-call-to-probe-abusive-electric-suppliers-20170130-story.html
A
State Urged To Probe Abusive Electricity
Suppliers
By Gregory B. Hladky
JANUARY 31, 2017, 2:15 PM | HARTFORD
new state investigation is needed into abusive and deceptive marketing practices by electricity
suppliers who target vulnerable consumers, Connecticut's consumer counsel and several Democratic
lawmakers said Monday.
Consumer Counsel Elin Swanson Katz said the companies con or lie to potential customers to get them to
switch electric providers, then charge them higher rates. The companies have targeted elderly homeowners,
Consumer Counsel Elin Swanson Katz talking about complaints from electric customers.
ADVERTISEMENT
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low-income residents, people with disabilities and non-English speaking immigrants, Katz said.
Katz said her office is seeking an in-depth probe by the state Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to
determine if there is a pattern of targeting certain consumers using high-pressure tactics and deceptive
practices. Key legislative Democrats backed her request.
"We also can't forget that, when those facing financial difficulties cannot pay their bills, the unpaid amounts
are collected from other ratepayers," Katz said. Last year, consumers who chose a third-party retail supplier
paid a total of $59 million more than they would have under the standard service rates, Katz said.
But a spokesman for the Retail Energy Supply Association said there is no need for an investigation. "We
believe PURA has all the authority it needs to respond to any problems they may identify," said Bryan Lee, a
spokesman for the industry group.
Lee said state statistics show there were fewer consumer complaints about third-party energy suppliers
between July and November than about Connecticut's standard suppliers, Eversource and United
Illuminating.
Connecticut's deregulated energy system allows consumers to choose independent or third-party electricity
suppliers rather than pay the standard rate for power with Eversource or UI.
Katz said available data "demonstrates that, overall, customers using a supplier have been paying millions
more than customers on utility standard-service rates" through Eversource and UI.
In 2014, a supplier called Energy Plus settled state charges of deceptive practices and agreed to pay a penalty
of $4.5 million. Michael Coyle, a PURA spokesman, said Monday that Energy Plus is no longer operating in
Connecticut.
A state investigation was launched in 2015 into allegedly deceptive practices by another supplier, Palmco
Power CT. At the time, Katz charged that many of Palmco's customers were subjected to "outrageous and
intimidating marketing practices." A state ruling on that probe is now pending.
At least two other energy suppliers, Direct Energy Services and Choice Energy Review, are also under review.
The Senate's top Democrat, President Pro Tem Martin Looney of New Haven, said a full investigation is
needed to see if legislation passed in 2014 aimed at halting such practices is working. The 2014 law provided
a range of potential sanctions for violators including fines and the suspension of licenses.
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Katz acknowledged that the law gives state regulators broad powers to act against companies using deceptive
or illegal practices, but said a probe is needed to determine if these are isolated cases or a pattern within the
industry.
Sen. Terry Gerratana, D-New Britain, said many elderly people simply don't understand what's happening
when they are pressured by electric company sales representatives. Gerratana said that when she decided to
switch to Medicare for health insurance, she was inundated by calls from energy suppliers urging her to
switch to their companies.
"It becomes overwhelming to try and deal with these phone calls and understand what these people are
talking about," Gerratana said.
Katz offered a series of examples of complaints to her office by consumers or their relatives about
representatives of third-party suppliers claiming to work for Eversource or United Illuminating and using
high-pressure tactics on consumers.
In one case, two women working for a third-party energy supplier talked their way into the home of two
sisters aged 97 and 99 by claiming they worked for Eversource, Katz said.
Katz said another complaint involved energy company representatives contacting refugees from Burma
living in one building and telling them they all had to switch from Eversource to the representative's firm.
"There are too many stories not to be concerned," Katz said.
Lee said reputable energy suppliers are worried that theactions of a few companies will sully the reputation
of the industry.
"We don't want those actions to paint the whole industry with a broad brush," Lee said.
Copyright © 2017, Hartford Courant
This article is related to: Martin M Looney
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Appendix	5C	
	
Illustrative	report	filed	by	an	EDC	in	Connecticut	pursuant	to	PURA	
Docket	No.	06-10-22.		(Eversource	for	January	2017)	
	
(Appendix	includes	excerpt:	first	and	last	page)	
Connecticut Light and Power
 dba Eversource Energy
Supplier Code Supplier Name Price $/kWh
Number of Residential 
customers by price
January 2017
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0499 5
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0549 16
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0588 6
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0599 6
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0629 2
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0699 4
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0729 14
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0749 5
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0759 19
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0769 45
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0774 6
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0779 4
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0789 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0795 2
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0798 5
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0799 47
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.08 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0805 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.081 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.08149 111
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0815 10
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0818 3
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0819 15
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.082 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0825 2
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.083 2
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0834 18
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0835 3
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0836 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0839 260
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0843 4
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0845 2
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0846 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0849 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.085 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0853 3
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0854 3
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0855 4
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0857 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0858 2
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.086 12
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0862 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0864 1
GI ABEST POWER & GAS  LLC                            0.0865 118
Page 1 of 79
Connecticut Light and Power
 dba Eversource Energy
Supplier Code Supplier Name Price $/kWh
Number of Residential 
customers by price
January 2017
ED VIRIDIAN ENERGY  INC                              0.1168 7
ED VIRIDIAN ENERGY  INC                              0.1169 27
ED VIRIDIAN ENERGY  INC                              0.1199 2602
ED VIRIDIAN ENERGY  INC                              0.1299 80
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0649 114
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0781 2
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0799 69
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0829 292
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0839 1
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0849 231
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0869 105
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.088 1
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0899 504
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0919 30
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0929 27
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0949 736
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0969 6
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0975 33
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0989 1
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.0999 758
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1049 157
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1079 13
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1099 506
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1119 75
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1129 239
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1149 129
EV XOOM ENERGY CONNECTICUT LLC                       0.1199 202
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